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Chronology of the Root Mission
{March - November, 1917)
The dates given are according to the Western
(Gregorian) calendar.

The Western calendar was 13

days ahead of the Russian {Julian) calendar that
was in effect in Russia until February 1, 1918.
The Western calendar is used throughout the text.
March

8

March 10

Mass demonstrations in Petrograd.
General strike, demonstrations, and bloodshed in the capital.

March 11

Tsar dissolves the Duma.
The Temporary Committee of the Duma is
formed.

March 13

Tsarist government is overthrown in
Petrograd.

The Temporary Committee

assumes control of bureaucratic functions.

Petrograd Soviet of Workers

Deputies is formed.
March 14

President Wilson received Ambassador
Francis' telegram reporting a successful
Russian revolution.

March 15

Tsar Nicholas II abdicates.
Milyukov and the Soviet agree on terms
for ruling Russia.

March 16

Inauguration of the Provisional Government.

; ;
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March 22

Ambassador Francis recognizes the Provisional Government on behalf of the United
States.

March 27

Petrograd Soviet issues a call for peace
without annexations or indemnities.

April

2

President Wilson delivers his war message
to Congress.

April

6

America declares war on Germany.

April

9

Oscar Straus suggests an American Commission to Russia.

April 10

Colonel House suggests a commission.

April 11

Lansing received Ambassador Francis'
telegram warning that Russian Army is
"precarious" and some groups are urging
peace.

Lansing conveys this to the

President and urges a commission.

Wilson

agrees.
April 12

The President and Lansing exchange ideas
as to the personnel of such a commission.

April 16

Lenin arrives in Petrograd.

April 24

Elihu Root accepts the position of
Special Ambassador to Russia.

April 26

Root discusses the Mission with Wilson.

April 27

Senator Robert LaFollette (R-Wisc.)
attacks the selection of Root and accuses
Root of attempting to hinder the cause of
Russian political refugees.
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May

1

Professor Milyukov's war aims note is
published.

May

2

Morris Hilquitt attacks the selection of
Ambassador Root.

May

3

Alexander Petrunkevitch suggests that
Root is a poor choice to head the commission.

Violent anti-Milyukov demonstra-

tions in Petrograd.
May

4

Samuel Untemeyer criticizes the selection
of Root.

Petrograd demonstrations

continue.
May 13

Alexander Guchkov resigns as Minister of
War and Navy.

May 15

Milyukov resigns.

Socialist Party of

America expels Charles Russell.

Root

Mission leaves Washington.
Mav 18

First Coalition government formed in
Russia.
War.
posts.

Six socialists obtain ministerial
Prince Lvov continues as Premier.

Root Mission sails from Seattle.

May 20
June

Kerensky becomes Minister of

3

The American Mission disembarks at
Vladivostok.

June 11-12

Root Mission discusses a propaganda
campaign.

June 13

Root Mission arrives in Petrograd.

v

June 16

The American Mission is formally presented to the Provisional Government.
First all-Russian Soviet convenes in
Petrograd.

June 18

Ambassador Root cables Lansing to suggest
a major publicity campaign.

June 21-24

Majority of Root Mission visits Moscow.

June 22

Bolsheviks call off their planned antigovernment demonstration.

June 26

Lincoln Steffens tells Wilson that he
should clarify Allied war aimscnd suggests public abrogation of Allied secret
treaties.

June 27

The President declines.

Root and General Scott visit Russian
Army Headquarters.
William Phillips replies to Root's cable
of June 18:

The administration is con-

sidering the idea of a publicity campaign.
July

1

The Russian offensive in Galicia begins.
Bolsheviks win a decisive moral victory
in mass parades in Petrograd.

July

2

Root sends his second cable urging a
publicity campaign.

July 5-7

Petrograd Conference of Allied Ambassadors.

July

Frank Polk cables Root that the publicity

7

campaign is still under consideration.
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July 10

Root cables Lansing that the Mission has
completed its work.

July 12

Root Mission leaves Petrograd.

July 16-17

Violent anti-government demonstrations
in Petrograd.

July 18

Provisional Government orders arrest of
Bolshevik leaders.

July 21

Premier Lvov resigns.

Alexander Kerensky

forms interim government.

Root Mission

arrives in Vladivostok
August 4

Root Mission arrives in Seattle.

August 6

Kerensky forms second coalition.

August 8

Root Mission arrives in Washington and
confers with Wilson and Lansing.

August 21

The President receives the Report of the
Root Mission.

August 25-28

Moscow State Conference.
in Moscow.

General strike

The President's vague message

is read to the State Conference.
August 30

Root, Dr. Mott, and Cyrus McCormick make
final attempt to persuade the President
to begin a publicity campaign on Russia.

September 9-12

Kornilov insurrection.

October 7

Kerensky forms Third Coalition.

October 27

President sends Edgar Sisson to Russia
with instructions to begin a publicity
campaign.

vii

November 6-7

Provisional Government is overthrown.

No~ember

Soviet

8

November 25

Inaugur~tion.

Edgar Sisson arrives in Petrograd.
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I.

Introduction
The final decision to enter World War I was made

by President Wilson in late March, 1917, within two
weeks of the March Revolution in Russia.

With the

entry of the United States into the world war the
Russian war effort became a subject of great importance to the administration.

Several sources close to

the President advised him to send an American commission to Russia in order to keep that nation in the war
and as a show of American sympathy.

Wilson officially

agreed to send a special mission on April 12, 1917.
Neither the President nor most of his advisors
knew or cared much about Russia prior to the spring
of 1917.

Those few who did have a knowledge of that

country failed to achieve a satisfactory understanding
of the revolution prior to the selection of the Root
Mission.

This failure to understand substantially

contributed to errors in the selection of the personnel
of the commission.

Although the President was

actively involved, secretary of State Robert .Lansing
appears to have carried primary responsibility in the
selection process.

Choosing the right person to head

the commission was a difficult decision that quickly
narrowed to former Secretary of State Elihu Root,
former President Theodore Roosevelt, and former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan.

President Wilson

ix

chose Root because he disliked or feared Roosevelt.
Why Secretary Bryan wasn't chosen is unknown.

Both

Roosevelt and Bryan would have been superior choices
because of their comparatively liberal records and
charismatic styles.

Difficult decisions also had

to be made regarding who would be sent to represent
American labor and American socialism and whether
or not to send a Jewish representative.

The choices

of Root, Socialist Charles Edward Russell, and labor
leader James Duncan were not well received in
some quarters.

Anti-war and pro-German forces

attacked their credibility, usually unfairly,
both in America and in Russia.

The resulting

damage may have ruined any chance of success that
the Mission may have had prior to its departure
from America.
Although most members of the Root Mission were
at worst harmless, the critical choices of Root,
Russell, and perhaps Duncan were poor, even fatal,
one.

This was not due to any real failing on their

part, but because of their inherent political vulnerability.

After their arrival in Petrograd, the

American emissaries met constantly with numerous
members of the Provisional Goverru:tent, the old Tsarist
government, and various other Russians, Americans and

x

Allied representatives.

The Mission was hampered by

President Wilson's excessive concern with war aims
and peace terms which prevented it from addressing both
of these crucial issues.

Thus restrained, the members

concentrated on information gathering and encouraging
the Russians to fight.

Several members had exciting

adventures and at least three had profound short-term
impacts.

Only two members of the Mission visited the

Soviet, which had become the visible center of power
in Russia.

This was most probably for obvious reasons

of diplomacy.

It is doubtful that either American had

a profound impact on the Soviet.
Despite their lack of Russian background the
Mission's members had, by the time of their departure,
a surprisingly comprehensive if somewhat narrow
understanding of the Russian situation.

They

concluded very early that a massive publicity campaign
was desperately needed, but the administration ignored
their requests for money and other necessities to begin it.

In spite of the frustrations thus engendered

the American emissaries returned in an openly optimistic frame of mind.

This positive outlook probably

reflected the assumption that the predicted Bolshevik
revolt would be crushed and that this occurance would
bring an end to internal divisions in Russia. Further,

xi

an optimistic appraisal of the situation would have
a positive effect on the American war effort.

After

they returned to America, most members of the Mission demonstrated a serious concern for Russia s fate.
However, at an immediate audience with the President
the emissaries' plans for a major propaganda campaign
in Russia were not even mentioned by President Wilson.
Several members continued in their attempts to see
the President or otherwise to influence Russia and
America.

During the fall of 1917 a modified form of

the proposed publicity campaign was finally begun.
It was too little and too late.
It is impossible to determine whether America
could have influenced the course of events in the
Russia of 1917.

If she could have and failed, the

blame, barring as yet undiscovered information, must
lie with Woodrow Wilson.
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this study is to examine the
Root Mission to Russia from it conception to its
final report and to evaluate the effectiveness of
each member individually as well as that of the
Mission as a whole.

Further, major actions and

responses of the Wilson Administration and other
American officials have been considered where these
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actions have a direct bearing on the e£fectiveness of
the Root Mission.

This study·a1so provides a nar-

rative account of the constructive work of the commission and attempts to highlight those experiences which
might well have had a significant impact on the Mission's understanding of the Russian situation.

It is

not the purpose of this study to provide a deftnjtive
account of all aspects of the Root Mission, its
members, or the Wilson Administration's relations with·
Russia during this period.

Nevertheless, this work

does examine the majority of available sources relating to the Root Mission, its members, and the administration during this period of American History.
The scope of this paper is limited to the presentation of the actions, experiences, and viewpoints
of the mission and its individual members both as to
the Russian situation and to the actions of the
administration.

Naturally much of the correspondence

between the President, Secretary of State Lansing,
and other important Americans has been included.
It is not within the scope of this :Paper to provide a definitive study of internal administration
and State Department communications or to examine, in
depth,

the Russian reactions to the Root Mission or

its members.

All primary Russian sources contained

xiii

herein were those that were translated for Root
Mission personnel and can be found in American
sources.

Most secondary Russian sources on this

period have little bearing on the Mission but often
provide interesting background information.

Several

important subtopics require further study that is beyond the scope of this paper.

These include internal

State Department communications, Russian newspaper
reactiai to the Root Mission, and the activities of
Charles R. Crane.

Neither the primary nor secondary

sources used in this study document or strongly suggest any other
reached.

conclusion than the one I have

It is important to note, however, that

the motivation behind the inaction of Wilson, Lansing,
and other important American officials on the issue
of a major progaganda campaign remains in doubt and
to my knowledge undocumentable.
Sources
The primary sources used in developing this
study include the papers of Woodrow Wilson, Robert
Lansing, Elihu Root, Charles Edward Russel, and
General Hugh L. Scott, all of which are housed in
the Library of Congress.

With some important

exceptions, I have used only those parts of the
papers cited above that bear directly on the Root
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Mission:

March throuoh Auqust, 1917.

The most use-

ful among these include The Report of the Root Hinsion
and The Log of the Root Mission, both included in
the papers of Elihu Root at the Library of Conqrcs,s,
and several separate reports by General Scott (in tho
Russell Papers), l\dmiral Glennon (Root Papers), and
Dr. John R. Mott (Root Papers).

In addition. State

Department records, housed in the National Archives
under the title, "World War I and itn Termination,
1914-1929" were used extensively.

This source con-

tains many of the documents that have not been published in the extremely valuable scricn, Tho United
States Department of State:

Papers Relating to the

Foreign Relations of the United Staten.

Of this

latter series, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, and
1918:

Russia, particularly

Volu~n

I contain much of the

official correspondence between administration off 1cials and American

directly on this period.
many important

abro:id that bears

diplo~~ts

?:cvcrthclcss, there arc

co:::.~unications

that can only be

found in the National Archives.

In addition The New

York Times has been used extensively throu9hout.
Existing primary sources that were not consulted
include:

Dr. ,\rthur Link's r.i.ajor work on the W1laon

papers: tho p.'lpcrs of

O~vid

R. Fronc1n. tho

A.~crican
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Ambassador to Russia during this period, located
at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri;
the papers of Colonel Edward M. House at Yale
University; the papers of Colonel William V. Judson at
the Newberry Library in Chicago; the papers of Samuel
N. Harper at the University of Chicago; and papers
·Of Charles R. Crane which are divided between the
Institute of Current World Affairs in Hanover, New
Hampshire and Columbia University in New York.

I know

of no other existing papers relating directly to the
Root Mission, its members, or those closely connected
with it.
Dr. Link's work on the Wilson Papers, has not,
as of December, 1979, been carried up to the period
of the Mission.

Judging from

his written accounts,

his communications with his superiors, and comments
made about him by George Kennan, Jr. and Lincoln
Steffens, the papers of David R. Francis would
probably contain only insignificant insights on the
Root Mission.

The papers of Colonel House may con-

tain some useful information that cannot be found
in Charles Seymour's The Intimate Papers of Colonel
House and other primary and secondary sources.
Colonel Judson's activities were largely centered
around those,of General Scott and thus usually outside the activities of the main body of the Root
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Mission.

Nevertheless, they may be important sources

on this topic and are certainly important from
August, 1917 until Judson was recalled from Russia.
Samuel R. Harper's memoirs were published posthumously
and were used herein.

The Crane papers at Columbia

University may be examined only with permission of
his closest living relative which I was unable to get
at the time of this writing.

Although most of these

papers are not crucial, the absence of those of Crane,
Harper, and possibly Judson prevent this from being
a definitive study.
Memoir accounts by those who were with the Mission, include two books by Charles Edward Russell,
Bare Hand and Stone wa1·1s which covers most of his
life and contains a chapter on his activities in
Russia and Unchained Russia which gives his views
on why the Allies 'failed to understand the situation
and thus

11

save

11

Russia.

The latter is excellent.

Colonel T. Bentley Mott's Twenty Years as a Military
Attache is a useful account that supports Root's
viewpoint of the Mission.

James Duncan recorded his

experiences in a pamphlet entitled "Labor Presents
Russian Revolution," which appears to have been a
copy of the speech he delivered to the American
Federation of Labor's convention in Buffalo in 1917.
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The author found it useful but short of

enlighten-

ing.
Memoir accounts by American of official status
during the period include Secretary of State Robert
Lansing's War Memoirs which touches on the Root
Mission, David R. Francis' two books, Russia from
the American Embassy, a

rambling account of limited

value, and Russia Observed, demonstrates that Francis
did eventually gain a better understanding of what
had occured.

Samuel N. Harpers memoirs, entitled

The Russia I Believe In,· The Memoirs of Samuel N.
Harper, 1902-1941, were useful for background information and include his appraisal of the Root Mission,
Francis, and the Russian situation.
A most valuable memoir account is by one of the
Russian guides, Dmitri Fedotoff-White, and is entitled
survival Through War and Revolution in Russia.

Taken

in part from the author's diary, this work gives an
excellent and thorough account of Admiral Glennon's
activities.

Fedotoff-White also offers characteriza-

tions of the Root Mission's members which add some
insight, admittedly opinionated and one-sided, into
their characters, habits, and appearances.

The diary

of American Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels,
and his book, The Wilson Era, offer background on
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decision making at the cabinet level during this
era and describe the March 23 meeting that discussed the Root Mission.

Alexander Kerensky, who

led the Provisional Government after May 15, 1917
wrote numerous books giving insight into his viewpoint and a minimum of information on the Root
Mission.

His major book covering this era is

The Catastrophe.:
Revolution.

Kerensky's own Story of the Russi·an

Influential industrialist Charles R.

Flint's Memories of an Active Life gives support
to Root's viewpoint that the American Mission was
a "grandstand play" perhaps designed to discredit
Root.

Famous "muckraker" Lincoln Steffen's Autobio-

graphy sheds some light on Charles Crane.

George

Creel's How We Advertised America and Rebel at Large:
Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years discuss American
war propaganda but give little on the Root Mission.
Arthur Bullard, who was eventually given charge of
American propaganda in Russia, barely touches on the
Root Mission in The Russian Pendulum:
Democracy - Bolshevism.

Samuel Gompers

Autocr:acy Seventy Years

of Life and Labor reveals his viewpoints on various
topics including Russia and the revolutions.

Morris

Hillquit's highly opinionated Loose Leaves from a
Busy L'ife mentions Root I Russell and others.

xix

My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic
Memories, a two volume work by.Sir George Buchannan,
British Ambassador at the time fails to touch on the
American Mission but gives interesting background
on the numerous personalities of the era.

American

Ambassador to Sweden Ira Morris offers some insights
on American policy towards Russia in From and American
Legation.
Secondary sources on particular individuals who
were members of the Root Mission include Philip

c.

Jessup's excellent biography,· Elihu· Root, Albert
Parry's brief but useful account of Charles R.
Crane's life in the Russian Review, Basil Mathews
biography of Dt. Mott, entitled John R. Mott:

World

Citizen, and Justin Kaplan's' Lincoln Steffen's: A
Biography.
There are as yet no secondary sources dealing
with the Root Mission either exclusively or in detail.
George F. Kennan, Jr.'s Russia Leaves the War was
very useful on the period and gives background information on several members of the Root Mission.

The

most useful general sources of the period included
William Henry Chamberlain's The Russian Revolution,
1917 - 1921, Marcel Lievman's The Russian Revolution,
Robert D. Watth's The Allies and the Russian
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Revolution and William Appleman Williams' AmericanRussian Relations, 1781 -

1941~

Tbe l\merican Impact on Russia:

Max M. Laserson's
Diplomatic and

Idealogical, 1784 - 1917 contained background information and a critical view of the President's choices.
Christopher Lasch's American Liberals and The Russian
Revolution was also insightful and somewhat critical.
The most useful views of Woodrow Wilson's
political background and general approach to Foreign
Policy were Harley Notter's The Origins of the Foreign
Policy of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur

s.

Link's Wilson the

Diplomatist and N. Gordon Levin's Woodrow Wilson and
World Politics.

CHAPTER ONE
THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF RUSSIA

-1-

On March 15, 1917, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia
relinquished his throne, ending three hundred years
of Romanov rule.

Nicholas was a victim of several

,

factors, most importantly his own naivete and ineptitude and the Russian governmental system.

He

headed an autocracy which had proven itself to be
incapable of handling the social and political
problems of a society that had begun to move into
the modern, industrial world after 1880.

When World

War I broke out, Russia's bureaucratic inefficiency
and industrial backwardness were no match for Kaiser
Wilhelm's highly organized war machine.

As the war

progressed, the government found itself faced with
food shortages that it could not rectify and mounting internal dissention.

In addition, the Tsarina,

her advisor--the infamous Gregory Rasputin, and a
group of high court officials were widely rumored
to hold pro-German sympathies.

The combination of

high court rumors, military defeats, and internal
chaos caused one important member of the Russian
legislature to question, in December, 1916, whether
Russia's defeats were the result of "stupidity or
treason."

1

Despite these rumblings from below, most Russians,
from Monarchists to Bolsheviks, were surprised by
the Revolution of March, 1917.

The revolt that was
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to topple the Romanov dynasty had begun as a bread
riot on March 9.

By the early morning hours of March

13; these riots had grown into a full scale revolt
that forced the Czar to abdicate on March 15. 2
Following a brief attempt to preserve the monarchy, first under the

Tsar'~

son, Alexei, then under

the Czar's brother, Grand Duke Michael, power in
Russia fell to two groups:

The Temporary Committee of

the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet.

The Temporary Com-

mittee of the Duma had been created on March 11, 1917,
after the Tsar, buoyed by an exaggerated report of
that day's successful suppression of demonstrating
crowds, dismissed the Duma.
ing the Ts;=ir'c:: 11k;=ic::,,.

+h~
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After technically accept-

members of the major non-

Rightest Duma parties formed a Temporary Executive
Committee with monarchist Duma President Michael
Rodzianko as its leader.

The avowed purpose of the

Temporary Committee was to preserve order in the
capital, b11t many of its mP.mbers also retained the
hope of preserving the Monarch in some form.

In fact

the rapid pace of events caused some members of the
Committee to argue that they should take power before
the more radical elements seized it.

4

Eventually

this viewpoint won out and on March 16 the Temporary
Committee created, from among its members, the
Provision Government of Russia.
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Politically the Provisional Government cannot
be said to have reflected the Russia of 1917.

Al-

though it represented the major moderate parties
in proportion to their representation in the old
Duma, that body had been elected in 1912 under an
electoral system deliberately designed to favor
conservative parties.

As a result the large and

powerful socialist parties had only one representative:

the charismatic Labor Duma deputy, Alexander

Kerensky.

Along with Kerensky, the new Government

consisted of seven Cadets (Constitution Democrats)
and five Octobrists (Conservative Nationalists),
giving it a political stance that would have been
moderately liberal before the Revolution but was
now decidedly conservative, particularly on issues
relating to the war and economics. 5
The principal figure in the new government was
Dr. Paul N. Milyukov, a classical Liberal whose model
government was the British Parliament.

Historian

William H. Chamberlain describes Milyukov, who was
the leader of the Cadet Party, as shre\old
what academic. 6

but some-

Titular leadership of the Provisional

Government rested in the hands of the public-spirited
but colorless President of the Union of Zemstvos and
Municipalities, Prince George E. Lvov.

Other ministers

worthy of note were Finance Minister Michael I.
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Tereschenko, a wealthy, young sugar manufacturer from
the Ukraine and War Minister Alexander I. Guchkov, a
'Well-to-do Moscow merchant and leader of the Octobrist
party.

7

Counterpoised against the Provisional Government
was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies.

This body traced its origins to the

Revolution of 1905 and was initially a somewhat
accidental group composed of socialist Duma representatives, radical lawyers, and journalists.

The

Soviet met for the first time since 1905 on March 16
in a room of the Tauride Palace.

Originally known

as the Soviet of Workers Deputies, it was expanded
to include representatives of the large number of
soldiers who had gathered in the ·room.

During

March and April of 1917 the predominance of power in
the Soviet was held by the Menshevik wing of the
Social Democratic Party and the largely agrarian
Social Revolutionary Party.

~he

Bolshevik wing of

the Social Democratic Party remained in eclipse
until the return of Lenin in April.

But even

after Lenin's return the more moderate parties re8
mained in control until mid-September.
On March 14 Dr. Milyukov reached an agreement
with the Soviet on a general program for ruling
Russia.

By the terms of this agreement the Provisional
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Government was to act as caretaker until a Constituent Assembly could be elected.

Agreement was

also reached on the establishment of various
democratic institutions and such measures as a
general amnesty, the right to organize and to
strike, and freedoms of speech and press. 9
It was on the critical issues of continuing
the war, the type of peace that would follow, and
Socialist desires for redistribution of land that
the bourgeois Milyukov and the leaders of the
Soviet were unable to agree.

These critical issues

were to continue to be the cause of sporadic internal unrest throughout the Provisional Government's
existence.

In addition to creating problems for

the government, the failure to adequately resolve
these questions served both as weapons in the hands
of the Bolsheviks and thus ultimately political
difficulties for the moderate socialist parties
which did not attempt to force a final resolution
.

o f the 1 an d ques t ion.

10

The Petrograd Soviet, initially owning the
allegiance of the majority of soldiers and workers
in the capital, might well have resolved both issues
and taken power for itself in March.

That it did

not was due primarily to the philosophy of its
majority, which felt that the Revolution was bourgeois
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in character and that Russia must first go through
a period of capitalist rule and' development before
socialist theories could be applied.

This philos-

ophy was so pervasive among the majority of Soviet
members that even the ideas of sharing power with
the government or allowing individual members of
the Soviet to participate in the government were
initially voted down by that body's Executive
Cornrnittee. 11

But despite the Soviet's decision not

to participate in the Provisional Government it was
able to exercise considerable de facto veto power
due to its extensive following. 12
The resulting dual system of government presented a confusing picture to most Russians and to
their Allies.

Realistically~

the ability of any

group to exercise power depended upon support of
the leaderless soldiers in general and those of the
Petrograd garrison in particular.

The soldiers,

having largely rejected their officers but having
no leadership structure of their own, were clearly
unprepared to take power.

Nevertheless, their

identification with and support of the Soviet put
the Provisional Government in a precarious position
13
whenever it disagreed with the former body.
In the United States President Woodrow Wilson
had officially learned of the March Revolution on
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on March 14 when the American Ambassador in Petrograd,
David R. Francis, had cabled Secretary of State
Robert Lansing.

Francis reported that he had been

unable to send a telegram since March 11 and that
the "Revolutionists have absolute control in
Petrograd and are (making) strenuous efforts to
preserve order, which successful except in rare
instances. 1114
Like most other Americans, Wilson's background
on Russia and her affairs must be presumed to have
been extremely limited.

There is no evidence that

he had studied the affairs of that nation at any
time.

The vast majority of the President's back-

ground and experience inclined towards domestic
rather than foreign affairs.

In the latter he

assumed that the primary goal of American diplomacy
was to translate American ideals into action in the
world.

He idealistically desired a peaceful world

but felt this would only occur when "democracy"
triumphed everywhere.15

Professor Arthur Link

summed up the President's problems with foreign
policy:
Time and again Wilson used the same
methods and almost always with the same
results: the formation of faulty
policy\through sheer ignorance, men
working at cross purposes, confusion
in the state Depart~ent and in the.
16
embassies and legations, and the like.

-8-

It is little wonder that Wilson told a friend shortly
before assuming office in 1913 that it ''would be the
irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly
with foreign affairs. 1117

Nevertheless, Wilson, by 1917,

did have experience in foreign affairs:
was knowledge of Russia.

what he lacked

Unfortunately his Secretary

of State knew little more about Russia than did the
President.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing had followed
his father into the practice of law and had first
turned towards diplomacy in the 1890's when he married
the daughter of President Cleveland's Secretary of
State, John Foster.

Thereafter, Lansing served as an

American representative in numerous international
arbitrations until 1916 when he became counsellor of
the State Department.

When William Jennings Bryan

resigned in 1915, Lansing was chosen as his successor.
Like Wilson s,Lansing s background reveals no particular knowledge of or interest in Russia.

Despite this

fact he was to exert considerable influence on the
makeup of the American commission and on Wilson's view
of the American and Russian roles in World War

r. 18

On March 20 Robert Lansing had put forward the
idea that the Russian Revolution was important to the
Allied cause because it had ''removed the one objection
to affirming that the European War was a war between
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Democracy and Absolutism."

Lansing felt that such

an approach would "put a new spirit in the Allies"
and might strengthen both the Russian democracy and
the democratic element in Germany. 19

Although he

did not accept this view initially, by April 2, in
his War Message to Congress, Wilson made several
references to Russia, describing her as "always in
fact democratic at heart" and having "added to our
hope for the future peace of the world" by throwing
off the "terrible" autocracy which ruled her.

Wilson

referred to Russia as "a fit partner for a league of
honour. 1120

With the United States now fully conunitted

to the War, Russia's new democratic government and
its ability to continue became matters of great concern to the administration.

Lacking adequate

knowledge, the President relied on various sources
but turned principally to a set of trusted advisors.
This small group consisted,on this

issu~

of Lansing,

Colonel Edward M. House, Charles R. Crane, and
Professor Samuel N. Harper.

21

Colonel House had long been one of the President's
key advisors and trouble shooters.

Like Lansing he

had no extensive personal knowledge of Russia, but
he did have numerous sources of information, mostly
British and French, who at least as early as January
1916, had become concerned about Russia's ability to
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continue the War.

Although House's influence on

Russian affairs appears to have been limited after
the first stages of American relations with the
Provisional Government, he did influence America's
. Russia.
. 22
ear 1 y responses t o th e new governmen t in
Charles Crane was the son

of a wealthy Chicago

industrialist who had amassed a great fortune in
the plumbing business.

Originally a Republican,

the younger Crane had become active in the Progressive
Party.

In 1912 he had decided to support Wilson over

Roosevelt and had been active in financing Wilson's
campaign.

Crane's long-standing romantic interest

in Russia resulted from his extensive travel there
and his many contacts among Russia's upper and middle
classes.

Crane was primarily interested in Russian

art and religious affairs, but Wilson seemed to have
placed great and perhaps undue reliance on Crane's
.
view of t h e Russian
po 1.i t.ica 1 si. t ua t.ion.

23

Samuel Northrup Harper first became interested
in Russia when his father, William Rainey Harper,
then President of the University of Chicago, had
joined Charles Crane on one of his many visits to that
country.

Harper had converted his early interest in

Russia into a career, becoming Professor of Russian
Language and Institutions at the University of Chicago
with his chair being financed by Crane.

Harper, who
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had visited Russia many times, had attended four
sessions of the Duma and had witnessed the Bloody
Sunday massacre of 1905.

24

He had gone to Russia

twice during the war, once in 1915 as advisor to
Ambassador Francis and again in 1916 on his own.
Harper's contacts in Russia, unlike Crane's, were
primarily among bourgeois circles, although he had
also made limited contacts with some socialist groups. 25
Upon learning of the Russian Revolution on March
14 Lansing asked his aide Richard T. Crane, who was
Charles Crane's son, to contact Professor Harper in
order to obtain "some knowledge of the participants
in the revolution and the purpose sought by it. 1126
Harper's analysis of the situation was both simplistic
and to a large extent inaccurate being based on very
little knowledge of what had actually occurred.
Harper informed the State Department that the March
Revolution was political rather than social in nature.
The revolution had not been directed against the
dynasty but was a revolt against attempts by the Czar's
government to "disrupt public organizations" such as
the Prince Lvov's

Zemstv~

Union, the War Industries

Committees, and the peasant cooperative societies.
Further it was clear to Harper that the Duma had the
support of these public organizations and the Army.
Based on this belief he concluded that the leader of
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the Provisional Government would "be able to hold
the

confidence of (the) country and army" and

accomplish its aim, namely a "more effective prosecution of war and war till victory. 1127

This view

completely ignored the fact that the leaderless
soldiers and workers of Petrograd, who had brought
about the March Revolution, were certainly not motivated by a desire to win the war.
Charles Crane's initial analysis of the state of
affairs in Russia was remarkably similar and Wilson
appears to have accepted the Crane-Harper view that
the Provisional Government had "the confidence of
the Russian people" and that the "liberal-nationalists"
who, from Harper's viewpoint, appeared to be in
control were enthusiastic supporters of demoncracy
based on the Western model.

28

The initial reaction of the American public was
also one of enthusiasm and optimism.

Particularly

indicative of this trend were the mass meetings held
in New York under the sponsorship of such groups as
the American Society of Friends of Russian Freedom,
the American Conunission of the All-Russian Zemsky
Union, and the American Committe for the Encouragement
.
R
.
29
of Democratic Government in
uss1a.

The enthusiasm of the administration and important
sections of American society was initially confirmed
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by America's diplomats in Russia.

America's

Ambassador to Russia at this time was David R.
Francis.

Francis was not well suited for the task

he was to face.

He had initially been sent to

Petrograd in March of 1916 to negotiate a new trade
treaty with Russia. 30

A former Mayor of St. Louis,

Governor of Missouri, and member of President
Cleveland's cabinet; Francis was undoubtedly selected
to negotiate the new treaty because of his loyalty
to the Democratic Party and his background as a grain
merchant and banker.
was a poor choice.

As a diplomat, however, he
He neither had familiarity with

Russia nor spoke the language.

His midwestern man-

ners soon made him a virtual outcast at the court of
the Tsars.

Even one of his admirers described him

as "a very blunt, outspoken American, who believed
in speaking his mind regardless of the rules of
diplomacy. 1131
In spite of his personal drawbacks, Francis'
prestige and influence as the representative of the
world's foremost democracy soared with the coming of
the March Revolution.

On March 18 he cabled Lansing

asking that he be allowed to be the first Ambassador
to extend recognition to the new government, which
"will have a stupendous moral effect especially if
given first. 1132

Lansing replied in the affirmative
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on March 20, in spite of Colonel House's attempts to
have the United States await recognition by Britain
and France.

33

On March 22, 1917, at 4:30 pm, Francis

formally recognized the Provisional Government on
behalf of the United States at a meeting of the Council
. . t ers. 34
o f Minis

Outside of Francis, the Wilson Adminsitration's
major sources of information were the American consuls.
at Petrograd and Moscow; North Winship and Madden
Summers.

The contrast between their reports and those

of Francis is striking.

Francis

reports were often

overly optimistic and almost always lacking in depth.
While the Ambassador appears to have been well informed
on the feelings and opinions of the Provisional Governrnent he had very little knowledge or understanding of
the Soviet and seems not to have even bothered to
send an observer to that body.

35

Winship and Surruners

on the other hand were well informed on the Russian
situation and wrote excellent, lengthy reports.
Unfortunately, Francis' short telegrams arrived in
Washington one or two days after they were sent.

The

reports of Winship and Summers were sent by diplomatic
pouch and took from one to two months to reach the
State Denartment.

36

Francis' first reports had emphasized the virtually universal acceptance and tranquil aftermath of
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the March Revolution. 37

By March 23 he had, however,

become concerned, warning Lansing that the "socialistic element composed of working men and soldiers
holding continuous meetings in the Duma are advocating
abolition of classes and the right of soldiers to
disobey their officers.

38

In spite of this situation,

Francis was able to report that Petrograd remained
tranquil and that the Provisional Government was growing stronger, although it was "compelled to handle
socialistic element carefully and danger from that
source is not entirely dissipated. 1139
This potential threat from the Russian left did
not dissipate; by April 11 Francis was warning that
conditions in the Russian armed forces were "precarious",
that certain groups were "urging peace", and that some
of his sources of information feared that the "army
will be influenced thereby."

Lansing, undoubtedly

already concerned about German pressure on the eastern
front, passed the cable to the President, adding that
he wished "we could do something to prevent the socialistic element in Russia from carrying out any plans
which would destroy the efficiency of the Allied Powers."
The Secretary of State went on to suggest that the
United Stat.es send a "commission of some sort" in
order to accomplish this purpose.

40

This marks the

beginning of the official discussion between the
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President and Secretary Lansing on this subject.
More importantly Francis' cable and Lansings' response
document the Administration's awareness of the possible threat to the continuation of the war effort that
was posed by the Russian socialists.

CHAPTER TWO
A CONSERVATIVE MISSION
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It was on the basis of Ambassador Francis
telegrams and several other coricerned sources that
the idea for an American mission to Russia was first
conceived.

In his response to Lansing's memo of

April 11, Wilson stated that the "suggestion of a
commission to Russia has come to me from a number of
quarters, and I am inclined to think that it would
be a good plan to send one, and send it .practically
at once. 111

When and by whom the idea of sending a

commission to aid the Provisional Government first
came is not certain.

It is certain, however, that

the idea did not originate with Wilson, and it appears
to have come from several sources over a period of
about a week.
The earliest documentable mention of sending
some type of American commission to Russia appears
to have occurred on April 7 when the New York Times
mentioned that a group of unidentified Americans
"having large interests in Russia" sent a report to
London which recommended an American commission of
"national character" to help in providing for financial assistance and various other supplies that the
new government in Russia might require.

Further, such

a commission "would do much to cement the stability of
the institutions which have resulted from the revolution. 112
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On April 9, Oscar Straus, the former chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, presented such a
plan to Andrew D. White.

White, a former American

Ambassador to Russia, apparently conveyed Straus'
ideas to Robert Lansing and Colonel House.

Straus

discussed the matter with his close friend George
Kennan who reports that both Lansing and House liked
Straus'

idea, provided the Provisional Government was

amenable. 3
On April 10 Colonel House cabled Wilson from New
York that "some distinguished Frenchmen asked me today
to suggest to you the sending of an American Commission
to Russia. 114
Charles R. Flint, a merchant, shipper, financier,
and adventurer, who frequently corresponded with the
President, wrote Wilson in April urging that a commission,

"thoroughly representative of all elements

in American life", be sent to Russia to experess the
"congratulations and sympathy of the American people
and "to ascertain the most effective means by which the
two countries could

cooperate in the prosecution of

the war. 115
Whether Wilson received similar suggestions in
other personal corrununications is not revealed by the
sources available.

It does appear that those who

were offering advice to the President were concerned
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about both the possibility that Russia would be unable to continue the war and their own economic
interests.

6

With America now having joined the

conflict, Russia's ability to pin down a sizeable
portion of the eastern armies of the central powers
became of paramount importance to Colonel House and
his French acquaintances.

The latter went so far

as to propose that American aid for the Provisional
Government be preconditioned on a continuation of
the war.

Russia must "be told authoritatively that

if they are to have the good will and financial
support of this country, they must compose their
internal differences and not make a separate peace
at this time. 117
Undoubtedly the purposes that were to be fulfilled by sending a mission to Russia were clear in
the minds of Wilson's advisors.

However, it is

critical to any analysis of the success or failure
of the Root Mission that Wilson's own concept of the
purpose of the mission and his instructions to its
members be known.

If the President shared the view

of his advisors that the purpose of the Mission was
to keep Russia in the War then his selection of
personnel, his final instructions to them, and their
performance must be judged on that basis.

If the

President had other purposes in mind then these questions should be approached accordingly.
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Unfortunately the President's public and private
statements on this subject consist of rather innocuous
generalities.

On May 17 the United States conveyed

its official statement of purpose to the Provisional
Gevernment.
convey

11

The American Mission was being sent to

the friendship and good will" of the United

States, to express the "confident hope" of America
that the new democracy of Russia "will join with the
free people of America in resisting with firmness
and fortitute the ambitious designs of the German
Government", and to find "the most efficient means
of cooperating with the Russian Government in the
prosecution of the war.

11

8

Thus it is clear that

the Administration wanted to keep Russia in the war
and that this goal was at least one of the objects of
the Mission.
The President, in the invitations extended to
the American envoys, asked them to show Russia

11

our

interest and sympathy at this critical juncture in
Russian affairs and to associate ourselves in counsel
and in all friendly service with the present Government of Russia. 119

Additional statements reflect a

similar view of the Mission's purpose and for perhaps
understandable reasons Wilson seems to have avoided
any public reference to the war-oriented objective of
.
.
10
th e Mission.
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In the absence of any record of the actual
instructions that were given verbally to the members
of the Mission, the clearest statement of the aims
of the Root Mission was, due to its confidential
nature and sources involved, a cable from a member
of the Root Mission, Basil Miles, to Moscow Consul
Madden Summers.

This cable was sent on June 18, 1917,

with the purpose of informing Summers of the Mission's
arrival in Moscow and its aims while in Russia.

Miles

stated that:
This is a war mission, whose purpose is
concerned exclusively with what the United
States can do to help Russia prosecute the
war immediately to a successful conclusion.
The mission,. if practic~ble (sic) is anxious
to impress on the public mind the firm and
vigorous support offered by the United States
to free Russia.11
The speeches and actions of the Mission's members
while in Russia reflect this view. 12
On April 14 Lansing, at the instructions of
Wilson, cabled Ambassador Francis· asking him to
"Discreetly ascertain from Milyukov 11 whether it would
be acceptable for the United States to send a commission of "distinguished Americans to consult with the
Russian Government as to the best means of cooperation
and to convey a message of good will from the United
States. 1113

On April 19 Francis responded that such a

mission was acceptable.

He suggested that it "should
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be very discreet and 9ivc attention first and r.uiinly

to successful prosecution of the war, cxcrcisino
care in giving expression to views concernino internal affairs." 14
The process of selectin9 personnel for tho Mission was nevertheless bc9un even before tho Provisional
had approved the idea.

Gover~~ent

The Prooidcnt wrote

Lansing on April 12 with his initial list of persons
to serve on the co:r::tission, followino the suooestions
Colonel House r..ade to him on April 10:

"a prominent

Jew (Oscar Straus), a businessl'!\<ln (W1llard Straioht),
a labor leader (Sar:lucl

Go~pers),

and ar. c-ducator

(Benjamin Ide Wheeler)."

To thenc he added Charles
R. Crane and Samuel Harpcr. 15
LansinQ, whose suggestions cvcntunlly represented
a

of the co:-:-::iiss1on, dincarded rnont of the

r.~jority

Wilson-House suggestions in rcnpondinq to the President later in the aay.

Reta1n1nq Gor.:pcrs and Crane,

Lansing found that Wheeler and Stra19ht were unsuitaolc, that Oscar Straus r.liqht overplay .. tho Jew
clcr:icnt" if

G~pcrs

W'cre also chosen and that Harper,

according to "several dlf fercnt sources 18 not as
popular as I had supposed in Rusa1a," and should not
be sent.

Lansinq went on to propose Doctor John R.

?-!ot t, "a bus 1ness~.an 1 ikc Cyrus :-tcCon:iick or Harold
(Howard) Elliott: a f 1nanc1cr 11kc Bertrand (Samual
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Bertron); and a lawyer of prominence. 1116

Of these

all except Howard Elliot made the trip to Russia.
Although the President relied to a large extent
on Lansing to initiate the individual selections, he
did have a clear idea of the type of men he wanted.
To Wilson the "important, perhaps the all-important
thing is the personnel.

Men of large view, tested

discretion, and a sympathetic appreciation of just
what it is they have been sent over for are the sort
we need;" further,

" ••• they should look the part."

In addition Wilson clearly wanted a bipartisan mission:
" ••• they must not all be Democrats - need not any of
them be Democrats, - but should all be genuinely enthusiastic for the success of the Russian revolution. 1117
Crane, Dr. Mott, Bertron, and McCormick appear to have
fit this description; in Wilson's view their inclusion
in the Mission appears to have been setted from April
19 onwards.

18

It is obvious from the type of men chosen that
one of the major functions of the first tier of commissioners was to represent various American interests,
e.g., labor, finance, business, religion.

These men

were given the title Envoy Extrordinare and were
largely selected for their knowledge and standing in
their fields of endeavor.

They were expected to be

able to confer on these broad topics with their
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Russian counterparts.

Only Crane and to a lesser

degree Dr. Mott and Cyrus McCormick had prior interests in Russia.

It was undoubtedly a major purpose

of the second tier of the commission to provide the
knowledge that their superiors often lacked.
Dr. John R. Mott was an American leader of the
Y.M.C.A.

Although he was a Methodist, he became

fascinated by the Russian Orthodox Church.

He was

active in attempting to bridge the gaps between all
Christian churches but had taken a particular interest
in the Russian Church, perhaps because of its geographic
isolation from the majority of Christian groups.
George M. Day,

Dr.

Fraternal Secretary of the Y.M.C.A.,

described Mott's attitude as "extremely agile •.• in
hurdling the barriers of denominationalism, creed,
color, race!

To him the words of our Lord,

'that they

all may be one', were sacred, prophetic, vital!"

Dr.

Mott had made contacts with the leaders of the Russian
Church and had visited Russia in 1909.

He was a

natural and appropriate choice to join the American
19
.
.
Ml.SSl.Oil.
There is little information available on Samuel
Reading Bertron.

Born in Mississippi, Bertron had

graduated from Yale and thereafter founded the banking
firm of Bertron and Storrs in New York.

Although it

does not appear that he had any connection with or
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knowledge of Russia, he did have some prior

diplo~

matic experience having been an American representative
to the Turkish-Italian peace negotiations of 1912.

I

have found no written record of his business or political dealings or of his activities while a member of
the Root Mission. 20
Cyrus R. McCormick was the son of the famous
inventor of the reaper and head of the International
Harvester Company, which had relatively extensive
business interests in Russia and was part of the
massive holdings of J. P. Morgan and Company.
McCormick had frequently corresponded with the
President on subjects relating to Russia during the
spring of 1917. 21
While the choices of Crane, Dr. Mott, Bertron,
and McCormick were handled with dispatch the remaining
selections required greater consideration.

Choosing

the right man to lead the American Mission appears
to have caused much discussion and involved the entire
cabinet.

This was, of course, a critical choice, most

probably because diplomatic missions of ten take on
the character of their titular head, especially in the
minds of the press and general public of both their
own nation and the nation to which they are sent.
The field of candidates being considered for the
leadership position was narrow.

The President had
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initially wanted to send a member of his cabinet,
and Colonel House thought Treasury Secretary William
G. McAdoo would be the best choice.

Secretary of

Interior Frank K. Lane was also mentioned. 22

Wilson

decided, however, that members of his cabinet could
not be spared from the more pressing problem of war
.

prepara t ion.

23

It was thus decided to look outside

the administration for a man to head the commission.
The President and his cabinet appear to have considered only three possibilities:

Wilson's own former

Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan: former
President Theodore Roosevelt, and former Secretary
of State Elihu Root.

24

William Jennings Bryan had long been a pacifist
and was a vigorous opponent of American entry into
World War I.

He had, in fact, resigned as Wilson's

Secretary of State when the President insisted on a
firm note to Germany which Bryan believed might
. t.ions. 25
close t h e 1 ast d oor to nego t ia

Nevertheless,

with America's entry in the conflict, Byran had offered
his services and declared that the "discussion has
ended,"

the entire country must now "stand undivided

behind the President."

The proof of his sincerity

can be seen in the fact that he was to spend much of the
war supporting bond drives and giving patriotic
speeches to new recrui' t s. 26

Bryan also had some
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previous connections with Russia, having visited that

country in 1902.

If Secretary of the Navy Josephus P.

Daniels' account is correct, Bryan had once predicted
that Russia would be the "first country in Europe to
become a Republic. 1127

There is no documentary evidence

that President Wilson had any reason not to select his
former Secretary of State.

Bryan's resignation had

apparently been of a cordial nature and both men
appear to have been saddened by the occasion.

28

William Jennings Bryan would have been a good,
even excellent, choice to head the American commission
precisely

because he had been such an adamant and

vociferous pacifist prior to April, 1917.

Further,

his liberal-populist viewpoint and gift for fiery
oratory may well have appealed to many Russian socialists and possibly some of those who opposed the war.
Of the three candidates for the position he was the
least vulnerable to socialist criticism.
Former President Roosevelt was another potentially good, perhaps excellent, choice.

Although

Roosevelt did not have an extensive knowledge of
Russia, he had been the mediator of the Treaty of
Portsmouth ending the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.
This must have given him some standing in that country
which, when added to the fact that he was a former
American President, makes it highly likely that he
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would have been recognized in Russia as a name, a
personality, and perhaps a friend.

The choice of

Roosevelt seems a good one because the former President 1 s fairly progressive views and record were
widely known and difficult to tamper with.

While

not quantifiable, Roosevelt also possessed a certain
charisma that could well have made him extremely
popular with the Russian people and an inspirational
war advocate.

He had a domestic following similar

in size to Bryan's and there appears to have been some
popular support for the idea of sending him to Russia.
Further, Roosevelt appears to have been the only one
to have actually expressed an interest in the appointment.

John Hays Hammond, an American mining engineer

and associate of President Taft, stated in his autobiography that several of the

~ormer

president's

friends had asked him to intercede in Roosevelt's behalf.

Hammond approached Colonel House, who liked

the suggestion of sending the flamboyant Republican
to Russia. 30

Wilson, however, did not.

He dismissed

the idea with the remark that "I could not in any
circumstances consider the suggestion of sending Mr.
Roosevelt anywhere to represent the administration."
Thus President Wilson's longstanding distaste for
31
Roosevelt prevented the latter's selection.

29
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Senator Elihu Root's background made him an
obvious choice from the standpoint of enlisting
Republican support for the Administration's war
program; a policy that Colonel House had strongly
urged the President to follow. 32
Born in Clinton, New York, in 1845, Root had
begun his law career by starting his own firm in
New York City, where he soon became a leading
corporate lawyer.

During the last two decades of

the nineteenth century he had become interested in
politics and had associated himself with the reform
element of the Republican Party of New York.

He

subsequently became a close friend of Theodore
Roosevelt.

In 1899 President William McKinley, look-

ing for a man with legal skills to administer the
territories recently acquired in the Spanish-American
War, appointed Root to the post of Secretary of War
In this position Root successfully dealt with the
Philippine insurrection in 1900 and effected a major
reorganization of the War Department.

With.the death

of John M. Hay in 1905 Roosevelt appointed Root
Secretary of State.

Between 1905 and his resignation

from that office in 1909 Root brought about significant improvement in American relations with both Latin
America and Japan, concluded the lengthy North Atlantic
fisheries dispute, and negotiated numerous arbitration
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treaties with Europe.

In 1912 he

recei~ed

the Nobel

Peace Prize for his handling of American possessions
as Secretary of War and ·his successes as Secretary of
State.

Upon his resignation from the State Depart-

ment in 1909 Root won a seat in the United States
Senate from his native New York.

He remained in the

Senate until 1915, where he aligned with the Taft
Republicans and became a leading and vociferous
opponent of President Wilson.

33

Root's opposition

to Wilson was in fact so vociferous that the President
had on one occasion described Root and Massachusetts
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as men who would stoop to
"twist the truth", had little conscience and used
"insincere and contemptible methods of fighting. 1134
After America declared war on April 6 the suggestion
came from various quarters that a war-time coalition
cabinet be formed and that it include both Root and
Roosevelt.

It is doubtful that the President looked

on this idea with any degree of enthusiasm.

In any

event it was Root who took the President off the hool
by declaring on April 9 that the Republicans needed
"no coalition Government to make us loyal.

We will

make a coalition ourselves with every Democrat in the
country."

35

It was Lansing who first mentioned Root for this
position at a cabinet meeting in April.

Secretary of the
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Navy Josephus Daniels, who appears to have raised
the only objection, wrote later that he considered
Root deserving of the appointment in every way, but
feared that the former Secretary of State would be
perceived as "a little brother of the rich" and that
the Russian refugees then living in America would be
able to discredit Root in the eyes of Russian socialists.

"Before Root arrives in Russia these reports,

unjust to him, will close the ears of Russian revolutionists to his arguments and appeals.

He will

not have a chance to do the things he sincerely
wishes to do."

Daniels contends that he actually

made this specific statement at the time and was not
using the advantage of hindsight to criticize or
apologize for Wilson's selection.

If his memory was

accurate, Daniels' reservations should have been
heeded, for they demonstrated remarkable foresight. 36
Daniels states that he went on to suggest that
either former President Roosevelt or William Jennings
Bryan be appointed to head the Mission.

Both Lansing

and McAdoo were unbending in their support of Root.
The President, who had earlier expressed his determination not to let considerations of party enter into the
37 0 A ·1 19
.
debate, sided wit h Lansing
an d McAdoo.
n pri
the President wrote Lansing that if the Secretary
found Root to be "a real friend of the Revolution"
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during his conference with the Senator

~n

then Root should head the cominission. 38

that date,
Root

apparently met Wilson's qualification, for on April
21 the. New York Times reported that the former Senator "appeared tonight to be the probable selection,
although several other men were under consideration. 1139
According to Lansing, Root accepted on April 24 at a
dinner given by the Secretary of State for visiting
British leader Arthur Balfour.

40

Root called on the

President on April 26 to accept the job formally and
discuss the situation. 41

The following day his

appointment was publically announced by the State
Department. 42
Numerous reasons have been suggested for the
selection of Root to head the commission.
the impetus came from Lansing.

Clearly

Josephus Daniels

suggests that perhaps it was because Root had supported the appointment of Lansing as Counsellor to
t h e State Depar t ment

~ a cr1't'1ca 1 JUnc
.
t ure. 43

a~

Certainly Lansing had cause to be grateful as he
probably would not have become Secretary of State
had he failed to obtain the Counsellor post.

It

is more probable however that Lansing, in addition
to his own conservative inclinations and appreciation
for Root's support, felt that the former Secretary
of State was the best choice from the standpoint of
diplomatic expertise.
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Why Wilson was willing to support Lansing on
this is of course the crucial· question.

Colonel T.

Bently Mott, who accompanied Root on the Mission,
suggests that Root was chosen in order to satisfy
44
the cries for a proposed coalition cabinet

This

seems unlikely, for the coalition issue had already
been settled.

It is cleac however, that Wilson was

concerned with Republican support in the House of
Representatives and in the country as a whole.

This

partisan concern must be considered a secondary factor in Root's selection. 45
Charles R. Flint, who visited Root just prior
to the latter's departure suggests that Root was
sent "for the purpose of weakening his political
prestige. 1146

Although Root's participation in the

Mission may have had this effect there is no evidence
that Wilson had intended such a result.
Wilson himself, in response to critics of the
appointment, emphasized Root's experience, understanding of the fine art of diplomacy, and sympathy for
the new Russian democracy.

47

This latter consideration

was of paramount importance to the President.

It

probably stemmed from the genuine sympathy which
Wilson himself felt towards that nation.

48

It also

shows that Wilson was serious in his hopes that the
Mission would at least be helpful to the new Russian
Government.

49
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Another requirement that the President

empha~

sized was that the members of the Mission "must look
the part. 1150

This requirement appears to add credence

to the theory that Wilson was at least secondarily
concerned that the Mission give a prestigious appearance to both America and the Provisional Government,
a purpose for which Root was well suited.
The selection of the man who was to lead the
mission was made with dispatch, even haste.

The

elections of representatives of American socialism
and American labor, and the decision not to send a
Jewish representative were made with greater difficulty.

Wilson and Lansing had clearly decided that

a representative of labor should be included and had
agreed on Samuel Gompers, President of the American
Federation of Labor, on April 12.

51

The suggestion

had come originally from Colonel House in his cablegram of April 10, but he had changed his mind by
April 20 after learning that Gompers was "persona
non grata with the labor people" in Russia.

52

Wilson

had apparently already come to this conclusion by
the nineteenth, feeling that "Gompers himself and the
leaders irrunediately associated with him are known to
be pronounced opponents of Socialism and would hardly
be influential in the present ruling circles of labour
at Petroqrad."

Wilson suggested someone named
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"Lehman", but added that Lansing should consult with
Gompers as to who would be a ,;real representative of
American Labour"; not a socialist but yet someone who
would not be regarded in Petrograd as "an active
opponent of Socialism".s 3
Gompers recommended James Duncan the first Vice
President of the American Federation of Labor and
sixty year old head of the Granite Cutters International.

Born in Scotland, Duncan's primary accom-

plishment was his successful leadership of a campaign
to bring the eight hour day to the granite cutting
industry.

Duncan had no formal diplomatic experience

aside from participation in several international
trade union conventions, and there is no evidence
that he had any knowledge of Russia or the sentiments
of her workers.s 4

He accepted an invitation to join

the mission on May 7, stating that he was "in hearty
accord" with the Mission's objectives.SS

Duncan was

not a good choice and the reason for his selection,
in spite of Gomper's recommendation, is uncertain.
The President may well have selected Duncan because
he felt that sending a representative of the American
Federation of Labor was a domestic political necessity.

Nevertheless Wilson knew that Gompers and his

"inner circle", which must have included Duncan,
were not acceptable to many, if not most, Russian
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56

The effect of this selection was to

place all hope of establishing a rapport with the
Soviets in the hands of an as yet unnamed American
socialist.
The idea of sending a second representative
from the American Socialist or labor camps was probably conceived on April 19 when Joseph Choate, an
American diplomat and lawyer, saw Lansing and mentioned that knowledgeable friends of his in New York
"thought that two representatives of labor should be
sent" to Russia,

"one from each class."

Lansing

passed the idea along to Wilson, saying that he presumed Choate's advisors to have meant that representatives of both socialist and non-socialist labor

. 1 es s h ou ld b e sen t t o Russia.
· 57
circ

The President

agreed and the difficult search for an American
socialist who would be acceptable to Russian socialists and who had views on the war that were acceptable
to the administration began.
The choice was a difficult one because the
Socialist Party of America was, in 1917, dominated by
such pro-German and anti-war socialists as former
Wisconsin Congressman Victor Berger and Morris
Hillquit.

For some unknown reason, perhaps naivete,

Berger was actually asked to join the mission but
declined.

When Hillquit's name was mentioned,
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Wisconsin Senator Paul

o.

Hustings recommended

that Wilson publicly deny that such "rabid proGermans11 were even being considered. 58
The field was quickly narrowed to those Socialists who had declared their willingness to support
the war effort.

The names most often mentioned were

William English Walling, Arthur Bullard, A. M.
Simons, John Spargo, George Kennan and Charles
Edward Russell.
Walling was the nephew of Grover Cleveland's
Vice Presidential candidate in 1880.

He spoke fluent

Russian, was a contributing editor of numerous popular magazines, and a founder of the NAACP.

Walling

was perhaps the best choice for the position and
quickly became the Administratd.on's first choice
after being suggested to Root by Charles R. Flint. 59
After daily meetings with the Secretary of Labor,
Walling declined State Department Counselor Frank
Polk's invitation to join the American commission;
despite his willingness to serve he feared that the
anti-war socialists would attempt to discredit him.

60

Walling went on to suggest Simons, Spargo, or Russell,
in that order.

Simons, the non-Jewish head of the

Milwaukee Branch of the Wisconsin Defense League,
declined. 61

John Spargo apparently was passed over,

and attention now turned to Charles E. Russell.
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Russell had been a reporter and writer with several
major American newspapers and was the author of
twelve books and numerous.articles of an anticapitalist, anti-corruption bent.

In 1908 he had

become active in the Socialist Party and was their
candidate for Governor of New York in that year and
again in 1912.

In March of 1917 he had joined several

other prominent American socialists in writing an
article for The New Republic in support of the war. 62
In addition Russell had written Wilson that he was
convinced that the United States should intervene
in the war in an attempt to rid the world of German
autocracy and militarism permanently. 63
Despite this ietter to the President the choice
of Russell came from Lansing, who wrote the President
on May 3 that he had read

w.

E. Walling's The Social-

ists and the War and found the views of Charles
Russell contained therein to have been "more in
accord with what I conceive to be the best suited
•
• 1 is
• t s. 64
to influence Russian
Socia
II

invited soon thereafter.

Russell was

.Like Duncan he had neither

diplomatic expertise nor familiarity with Russia and
was apparently selected largely on the basis of his
views on the war.

Since the Russian Socialists were

unlikely to pay much attention to an American trade
union representative the selection of an American
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socialist who could both support the war and relate
well to the Russian

socialist~

was again critical.

Although it was difficult to find such a representative, either Arthur Bullard or George Kennan
might have been better choices.
Bullard's background in Russian affairs was
extensive.

He knew many members of the Russian

socialist parties and had been active during the
Revolution of 1905.

In addition he met the necessary

criteria of supporting the war and being an active
socialist although he was not a member of the socialist party of America.

Bullard had been recommended

by Simons on May 4 when the latter declined to join
the mission, but the President did not pursue Simon's
suggestion at that time.

65

Bullard was again recom-

mended to the President by George Creel on May 14.
Creel, newly appointed head of the Corrunittee on
Public Information, had met with the President in
early May to discuss this very topic but had overlooked Bullard on that occasion.

On May 14, after

Russell had already been invited, Creel wrote Wilson
about Bullard.

Wilson thought that the suggestion

was "a splendid one" and said that he had just sent
Lansing a note to that effect.

66

Lansing, either

resenting the influence of Creel or finding Bullard
too liberal, blocked his appointment on the grounds
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that Stanley Washburn, a London Times correspondent,
had already been selected for the position in
question. 67
George Kennan would have been another excellent
choice to represent the American socialist viewpoint
to the Russian people.

Kennan was a noted author,

lecturer, and world traveller and had spent many
years in Russia in various pursuits.

There Kennan

had become well versed in Russian affairs and his
expose of Tsarist practices in the Siberian prison
system made him popular in Russian socialist circles. 68
On May 3 Senator Root wrote Lansing supporting Kennan's
inclusion in the trip to Russia in some capacity.

69

Why Kennan wasn't invited is unknown, although he may
have been ill at the time.70 In any event neither
Bullard nor Kennan became members of the Root Mission,
and Russell, totally unknown in Russia, became
America's best hope of reaching the Russian masses.
The question of whether to send a Jew as a member
of the commission became both a difficult and embarrassing issue.

It was Colonel House who had originally

suggested that a prominent Jew be includea.

71

Lansing, while not opposing the inclusion of a Jewish
representative, had not wanted to send more than one,
and he preferred Gompers. 72

When Gompers declined

Wilson decided to send Eugene Meyer of New York.
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Meyer was a Wall Street banker and close friend of
Justice Louis D. Brandeis.

He had no diplomatic

experience and no apparent connection with Russia;
his selection was probably due entirely to his
friendship with Brandeis.

Meyer accepted the invi-

tation and began preparations for the trip.

On

April 30 Lansing, following a conversation with
Stanley Washburn, told the President that it would
be a "great mistake" to send any Jews to Russia
because "there was never a more intense bitterness
and hostility to the race than at present."

Washburn

apparently felt that this was due to the Provisional
Government's "endeavoring to impress the idea of
liberalism in the treatment of the Jews."

Further-

more, the presence of a Jew on the commission would
arouse "popular suspicion" as to the purpose of the
Mission and thereby threaten its effectiveness. 73
Ambassador Francis telegraphed a similar opinion. 74
The issue may have been decided on May 2 when
Colonel House added fuel to the fire by warning
Wilson that the commission already contained too
many capitalists and that there was strong opposition
to Meyer who was seen by some as a "reactionary
stockbroker of doubtful reputation" and whose only
qualification was his friendship with Brandeis. 75
With such

~rrenuous

opposition corning from both
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Russia and America, the administration was forced
to withdraw the Meyer invitation.

On the negative

side Lansing warned that it would be difficult to
explain this in America and it would require "very
careful handling. 1176

On May 3 Meyer, accompanied

by Brandeis, visited Lansing and declared his willingness to withdraw upon learning of the administration's
posi' t 'ion. 77
The fact that Meyer had been asked to withdraw
from the Root Mission did not make news in the United
States until late May, when Judge Aaron Levy of New
York, who had met with Wilson on several occasions,
published a story in the New York Hebrew-language
daily, The Warheit.

He recounted the incident and

claimed that Meyer had been dropped because the
Provisional Government "objected to having a Jew on"
78
.
.
th e Cornrnission.

The President, who had been trying

to keep the matter out of the press both for its
possible negative effect on the Provisional Government and for obvious domestic political reasons, was
"shocked" and "amazed" that his confidence had been
violated.

A series of cables between Levy, the

President's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and Wilson
followed.

Levy protested his innocence and contended

that the rival Jewish paper, The Day, had intentionally misinterpreted him in its telegram to Tumulty. 79

,--

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
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The Meyer and Levy incidents did not become American
political issues and were

ha~dly

reported, but

President Wilson remained convinced that his confidence had been violated. 80

The Warheit 1 s article

may well have adversely influenced American Jewish
opinion of the Provisional Government.
Although the labor and Jewish questions were
perhaps the most difficult, the remaining selections
were not easily made.

On May 7 the acting chairman

of the American Red Cross wrote Wilson suggesting
that a member of that institution should be included
in the Mission as it would "enhance our reputation
and show you care. 1181

Assistant Secretary of State

William Phillips inquired as to what Root thought
of the idea.

For some reason the former Senator

responded that he was "absolutely and unalterably
opposed" to this.

82

Wilson sided with Root, perhaps

out of deference to the Special Ambassador, and the
matter was dropped.

There is no evidence to explain

Root's vehemence on the subject. 83
Aside from the Red Cross, numerous other institutions and individuals applied for positions.
Wilson, Lansing, Root, and other influential government officials were bombarded with requests to accompany the Mission.

In addition various Conunission

members, particularly Cyrus McCormick, had their own
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ideas of who ought to be included and numerous newspapers asked to attach correspondents.a 4
By mid-May the Root Mission was complete.

In

addition to Root, Crane, McCormick, John R. Mott,
Bertron, Duncan and Russell, the other senior members
of the Mission were General Hugh Scott and Rear
Admiral James Glennon.

The inclusion of military repre-

sentatives was suggested by Treasury Secretary McAdoo.as
General Hugh L. Scott had made his reputation
fighting Indians in the American West and as Governor
of the savage Moro tribes of the Philippines.

He had

just retired his position as Chief of Staff of the
Army and the Root Mission appointment was probably
intended as his "last hurrah."

In addition the

appointment of the retiring Army Chief of Staff was
undoubtedly considered prestigious from a diplomatic
. t o f view.
.
a6
poin

Rear Admiral James F. Glennon was the selection
of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.a?

The

Admiral, who was younger and of lower rank than
General Scott, was selected with an eye towards
avoiding potential conflicts between two officers of
equal rank. 88

At the time of his appointment Glennon

was the Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard and
Superintendant of its Naval Gun Factory; he was one
of the Navy's foremost ordinance experts.

His war
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experience had included action at Newchwang, Santiago,
Havana, and in the Philippines.

Both Scott and

Glennon were rather gruff, old-school types, who
undoubtedly knew both their specialties and how to
lead men.
The middle level members of the Root Mission had
much more experience in and knowledge of Russia.
Rather than representing various groupings of
American society, these men were undoubtedly selected
with an eye towards providing insights and information
about that country which most of their superiors
lacked.

First among these was the Military Attache

of the Root Mission, Colonel William V. Judson.
Judson was knowledgeable in Russian affairs, having
been the U. S. Army's observer in Russia during the
Russo-Japanese War.

He was a graduate of West Point,

had earned an M. A. from Harvard, and had served the
Army in various capacities relating to harbor engineering.

George Frost Kennan describes Judson as "a

man of utmost integrity of character" and credits
him with much insight.

89

Judson's appointment to

the Root Mission was the recommendation of Postmaster
.
90
Genera 1 Omar Bur 1 1son.

Colonel T. Bentley Mott also had West Point and
career military backgrounds.

Mott had been to Russia

in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War but had only
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limited experience in or knowledge of that country.
Born in Leesburg, Virginia, he had spent the majority
of his life in the Army serving in various capacities
as an attache and observer.

In 1903 he had assisted

then Secretary of State Root during the Alaska Boundary negotiations.

He had become a close friend of

Root's at that time and passed up an opportunity to
join General Pershing's staff in order to go to
Russia at Root's personal request. 91
Major Stanley Washburn, who had spent the previous three years in Russia as a war correspondent,
was made Secretary to the Mission.

Lansing was very

desirous that Washburn have this position and although
the Major was ill at the time, he was persuaded to
join the American party.
about Washburn.

Little has been written

He was, however, one of the few

members of the Mission who had an extensive Russian
background and appears to have been both useful and
influential. 92
Mr. Basil Miles became Secretary of the Mission
on May 9.

Miles also had Russian experience having

been Secretary to American Ambassador George Meyer
in St. Petersburg from 1905 through 1907.

During

1916 and early 1917 Miles had been a special minister
of the United States in charge of overseeing Russian
.
.
prisoners
o f war. 93
t rea t men t o f German and Aus t rian
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Mr. Eugene Prince was named as a civilian aide
and interpreter.

Prince, who had been born and

educated in Russia, provided both a knowledge of the
language and the country.

He was the Russian repre-

sentative of the Willys-Overland Company and owed
his American citizenship to an act of Congress.
would join the mission in Vladivostok.

Prince

94

Probably the most difficult task, according to
Colonel Mott, was that of organizing the clerical
staff.

Numerous Congressional clerks, often with

the backing of their employers, attempted to find a
place with the Commission. 95

Two were selected:

James F. O'Rourke, secretary to Senator Pomerane,
and Jay Keegan, Secretary to Representative Baker.
James F. McKenny, a State Department clerk, was made
Chief Clerk and Disbursing Officer, and Duane E.
Washburn, another clerk with a State Department
background, served as a secretary.

The remainder

of the staff included McCormick's private secretary,
Clyde
Paul

s.

z.

Stilwell, General Scott's orderly, Seargent
Randolph, a clerk with the Carnegie Peace

Foundation, George D. Gregory and George E. Long, who
had been to Russia three times, as messenger.

96

The overall make-up of the Root Mission was
decidedly conservative, particularly considering that
it was being sent to a country in which extremely
idealistic socialists wielded much influence.
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Root, Bertron and McCormick were all clearly connected
with capitalism.

Even the mor~ liberal members were

relatively conservative by Russian standards.

The

progressive Crane was also a capitalist by birth,
Russell was one of the more conservative socialists
available, and Duncan's practical trade-unionism was
totally out of place in revolutionary Russia.

The

documentary evidence available shows that the Root
Mission was primarily the creation of Secretary of
State Robert Lansing.

Why Lansing maneuvered for such

conservative personnel cannot be fully understood.
Certainly his basic conservatism must be taken into
account.

Lansing's ignorance of the fundamental

philosophies and relative strengths of Russian social
and political groups must again be considered a factor.

The Secretary of State may have simply picked

people that he liked personally without a critical
examination of the

situation.

Why Wilson took a back seat to-Lansing in the
selection of the Mission's personnel is an even more
interesting question, to which there appears to be
no clear-cut answer.

There is no apparent reason for

the President to have assumed that Lansing had a
superior understanding of Russia.

It is possible,

however, that Wilson had delegated this responsibility
to his Secretary of State with the understanding that
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the "experts" in this area, including Crane and
Harper, and undoubtedly others, were to be consulted. 97
In any event the Root Mission's final make-up
was one that might well have been excellent for a
mission coming to the United States.

As a mission

being sent to revolutionary Russia it was too conservative as a whole and, more importantly, its
"liberal" members were exceedingly vulnerable to
attack.

Clearly neither the President not his

advisors gave adequate consideration to the possible
socialist reaction.

It was, however, the reaction

of the Russian refugees then living in America that
may well have done most to destroy the Mission's
credibility.

CHAPTER THREE
A TREASONABLE CONSPIRACY
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The announcement of the appointments of the
various members of the Root Mission was generally well
received in America.

The New York Times of April 26,

1917, described the upcoming Root Mission as "one of
the most important diplomatic missions which the
United States has ever undertaken in foreign lands,"
and praised the appointment of Ambassador Root as
"like putting the best diplomatic brains which this
country can provide against the machinations of
German diplomacy. 111
Although the majority of American press opinion
seems to have been favorable to the Mission and to the
appointment

of Root, there was opposition.

It came

from three broad groups -- those who were genuinely
concerned that Root and perhaps other members of the
Mission would not be well received, those who were
not politically disposed to like Root, and those who
were trying to prevent the Mission's success.
Alexander Petrunkevitch, Yale economics professor
and son of the first floor leader of the Russian Duma,
was the premier public spokesman of the first group.
Petrunkevitch first brougltup the issue at the
Economics Club in New York where he cautioned that
the members of the Root Mission will "be met there
(in Russia) with distrust" because the New York
socialist press opposed the Administration's choices
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and would not hesitate to cable their condemnation
of Root Mission personnel.

Petrunkevitch went on

to contend that the members of the Commission should
be chosen with an eye towards accommodating the
Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries, whom
Petrunkevitch considered to be,

"now in power."

The

Yale professor further stated that he had attempted
to convey his view to President Wilson but implied
that the latter had been too busy with other problems. 2

Petrunkevitch's speech is important because

Senator Root, who declined to comment for some reason,
read the reports of it, and President Wilson must
have been aware of it. 3

Despite this warning, Wilson

refused to reconsider, most probably because it would
have been a public political embarrassment.
Samuel Untemeyer, a prominent Jewish intellectual
who appears to have been genuinely concerned for the
ultimate success of the Mission, criticized Root's
appointment on the grounds that he was "incredibly
narrow and provincial in his conception of the Jew. 114
Rabbi Stephen

s.

Wise of New York wrote the President

on April 24 that he felt that Root should not be
chosen, for he "represented those very influences and
powers from which the Russian people have at last
been liberated. 115

The views of Untemeyer and Wise

were nndnubtedly motivated in part by the domestic
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political concerns of the American Jewish community.
It is not at all clear that Root's attitude toward
the Jews, whatever i t may have been, had any significant impact upon his reception in Russia.

6

While some of the criticism that was leveled at
Root came from those who were either genuinely concerned with the Mission's success or merely offended
by Root's appointment, the majority of the attacks on
the former Secretary of State came from sources bent
on discrediting Root and the Mission altogether.
Abraham Shiplacoff, a socialist member of the New York
Assembly, went so far as to present a resolution asking the President to reconsider the appointment.

Root

was very popular in New York, even amongst Democrats,
and Shiplacoff's resolution was quickly "hooted down"
by his fellows and a motion was "unroariously carried"
to the effect that no mention of it be made in the

.
1 •7
JOUrna
Representative Meyer London (D-New York) made
the critical observation that the Russian socialists
would look on the appointment of Root "as a calamity. 118
This attack may well have been strictly political in
nature; it was not well received.

London was even-

tually forced to publicly deny that he was leading a
movement to discredit the commission.

9

Morris Hillquit, one of the most important leaders
of the majority, anti-war faction of the Socialist
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Party of America, was very critical of Root's appointment and warned that "There is no doubt • • • that by
the time Mr.Root reaches Petrograd the people of
Russia will be informed of his record as a conservative. 11

When asked if he had conveyed this message to

Russia, Hillquit replied "Not yet," but "I repeat they
will know all about Mr. Root.
that."

I can assure you of

A reporter mentioned that Hillquit's veiled

threats might, if carried out, constitute a violation
of a law against discrediting government representatives during time of war.

The socialist leader con-

tended that the Root Mission was not a war mission
only a friendly "visit. 1110
Hillquit's threats began a series of attacks on
Root and other members of the Commission by the antiwar, often pro-German, socialists.

Various socialist-

oriented newspapeis including Victor Berger s
Milwaukee Leader, the New Yorker Volksreitung, a
German Social Democratic paper, the radical socialist
New York Call and the Russian Social Democratic paper,
Novy Mir, attacked Root for his conservatism and his
alleged mistreatment of two Russian refugees;
Christian Rudewitz and Janoff Pouren.

The Volksreitung

went so far as to call Root the "fiercest enemy of
comrades Rudewitz and Pouren. 1111
The charges concerning Pouren and Rudewitz were
baseless and in fact the direct opposite of the truth.
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Both men had fled Russia under fear of imprisonment.
Under intense pressure from the Tsarist regime the
United States government had ordered them, through
the court system, returned to Russia.

Root, then

Secretary of State, had intervened in their behalf
and ordered the cases reopened.
were denied in both cases. 12

Extradition orders

Despite these facts

the socialist papers must have had some effect, for
some of the thousands of refugees who were returning
to Russia from America undoubtedly believed them.
Although it is impossible to document, it is certainly probable that some pro-German and anti-war
socialists sent letters and copies of their newspapers
to Russia hoping to discredit Root.

13

Somewhat surprisingly, one of the major allies of
these socialist papers was Progressive Republican
Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin.

LaFollette,

while perhaps a socialist at heart and certainly
extremely anti-war in oratory, was· presumably not
pro-German in sentiment.
LaFollette

Nevertheless, it was

who gave greatest credence to the notion

that Root had attempted to deny political asylum to
Pouren and Rudewitz.

LaFollette made these charges on

the Senate floor on April 27, 1917.

14

Whether he had

gotten his "facts" from the pro-German socialists or
vice-versa is unknown but his mention of Root's
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treatment of Russian refugees occurred prior to those
of the socialist papers.

More importantly LaFollette's

position made the charge more convincing to those
Russians and Americans who wished to believe them.

15

As titular head of the American Mission, Ambassador Root was likely to receive some criticism.

He

was not alone; James Duncan and Charles Edward Russell
were also targets.

The most damaging of these attacks

occurred in Russia, where Maxim Gorky's The New Life
expressed "astonishment" at the choices of Duncan and
Russell and claimed that neither was an official representative of either American labor or socialism.

16

Obviously James Duncan was as true a representative
of American labor as could have been sent and Samuel
Gompers wasted no time in cabling Petrograd to that
effect. 17

Russell had no defense.

On May 15 the

National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party
of America, easily dominated by pro-Germans, issued
a statement asking Russell to decline his appointment,
denied that Russell truely represented American
socialism, and expelled their one-time candidate for
Governor of New York.

18

While Wilson, Root, Duncan, and Russell offered
no public defense, the Administration's friends did
counter-attack through W. E. Walling and Samuel Gompers.
Wallina attacked the Hillquitt group on May third, when
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he accused them of a pro-German attitude and of
aiding the enemy.

Remarkably, Walling suggested

that there should be no socialist representative
whatsoever, while at the same time he stressed the
need to conciliate the Soviet. 19

In another state-

ment issued the same date, Walling and J. G. Phelps
Stokes, another important socialist in the WallingRussell camp, recommended another of their group,
James W. Gerard, as a popular choice to represent
.
. l 'ism. 20
Am er1can
soc1a

The reason behind these contra-

dietary statements is unknown.

On May 5 Gompers, at

the request of Senator Root, cabled the Petrograd
Soviet that the "Kaiser's agents in New York as well
as in Russia" were carrying on "a campaign of misrepresentation and villification" against the Root
Mission and were not to be believed. 21
On Monday, May 7, the Department of Justice
revoked the passport of Boris Reinstein, "a prominent
member of the Socialist Labor faction in New York",
stating that it was feared that Reinstein intended to
go to Russia to agitate against Root and the American
22
.
.
M1ss1on.

Reinstein was closely connected with the

anti-war faction of Berger and Hillquit; whether he
had intended the actions he was accused of is unknown.
On May 20 the New York Times struck what was
apparently the final blow in the battle between the
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administration, its allies, and tho anti-war and proGcrman socialists.

In an editorial of that dato,

entitled A Treasonable ConRpiracy, the JJrncs stated
that Gompers ought not to be forced to fight "sinQlo
handed" .Jgainst the "orc;;nni:cd and trcononoblo o!!ort
now being made to undermine the
to Russia."

A.~cr1can Co~ission

The TimcR defended Hoot, Runncll, "n

socialist who puts

!"~er ica

f irnt". :ind Duncan and

accused their opponents of Qiving "aid and co::lfort
to the encmy." 23

It will in all prob.3b1l1ty never

be known whether this veiled threat would hovo been
carried out, but its effect wan to n1lcnce tho Root
Mission's critics.
Despite the e!fect of the

Ti~cn'

is possible, even probable, that the

ed1torinl it
da~~Qc

to Root,

Russell, and possibly Duncan had nlrcady been dono.
The choices were questionable in the !1rst place and
their vulnerability should have been anticipated.
should be said in the defense of the Kilson
tration that it was !aced v1th a dt!!icult

It

Ad~inisdtlc::r.~.

The adr:anistration could not send pac1f tstti or

r:-~jority

factlon socialists 11ke 13.crqcr and H1 llqu1t to convince Runsia to
~en

rc~a1n

in the war.

On the other h<>nd,

11kc Root. Dur.can and Russell vcre cantly d1n-

crcditcd in Russiar. eyes.

The

ad~1n1ntratton'a

course would perhaps have been to ncnd

~en

best

like Bryan,
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Roosevelt, Kennan, and Bullard, who both favored the
prosecution of the war and were more likely to be
highly esteemed in Russia.

The selection of a social-

ist was certainly a major problem, and on the surface
it would be difficult to quarrel with the Party's
candiaate for Governor of New York as a proper representative of American socialism.

Unfortunately,

among the activist ranks of American socialism,
identification with ethnic background outweighed
both their loyalty to the country that had taken them
in and the neutralist and anti-autocratic tenets of
their political philosophy.
Despite domestic opposition, whether well intended or not, it is highly questionable whether the
initia 1

ignorance and overly optimistic outlook of

the Root Mission's members could have been overcome.
The necessarily pro-war position of the American
representatives could never have been well received
in some important circles in Russia.

Even Bryan,

Roosevelt, Bullard, and Kennan would have been forced
to take this pro-war position.

Whether they would

have been more convincing is open to question.

They

would, however, have presented greater problems for
Russia's anti-war factions.
Despite this domestic opposition the final composition of the Root Mission was set by early May,

,---1
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although Root's initially positive outlook on the
expedition had changed.

First, his cordial relations

with Wilson and Lansing were interrupted by the announcement that a second American mission was being
sent to Russia.

This was the Commission of Railway

experts, headed by the famous American engineer,
John F. Stevens, and being sent to assist Russia with
her severe transportation problems.
ing

The idea of send-

railway experts to Russia had originated prior

to the March Revolution. 24

After the Revolution the

two missions were at first to be merged but the
administration decided to separate them.

25

Root

was opposed to separate missions and cabled Lansing
that it was "plain ·that we can't have three bodies
dealing with the Russian Government at the same time
-- the regular Embassy, the President's Mission and
the R. R. Commission."

Root suggested that the Rail-

26
.
1 u d e d in
.
h.is own M.ission.
.
way experts b e inc

Lansing forwarded Root's views to the President who
considered the problem to be one of misunderstanding.
Wilson's view was that the. two commissions should be
separated because of their functional difference.
Basically the Root Mission was to gather information,
while the Railroad Commission was to examine the
transportation crisis on a first hand basis and aid
the Russians directly and specifically.

The division

27
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was a natural one and the President expected Root
to understand the reasons for it once he had been
able to consult with Bertron, with whom

Wilson had

discussed the matter. 28
Although Ambassador Root had perhaps overreacted to the appointment of a separate Railroad
Commission, he also began to have serious doubts
about the real purpose of the mission; perhaps with
good reason. 29

A few days prior to Root's departure

he was visited by William English Walling, Melville
Stone, head of the Associated Press, and Charles R.
Flint, the wealthy and highly influential financier.
Flint recorded the meeting.

Root remarked that he

was "going to Russia in the same spirit that my
(Flint's) son is enlisting in the Army" but Flint
felt that Root was "fearful that the corrunission • • •
was not likely to be properly supported." 30

There

is no other evidence that Root actually said this and
Flint's recollections were published after the fact
in 1923.

Nevertheless, Root had obviously been con-

cerned when he asked Flint and Walling to go to
Washington and persuade Gompers to cable the Petrograd
Soviet in support of the Root Mission.

In his memoirs

Flint suggested that Root was sent to Russia "for the
purpose of weakening his political prestige. 1131
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The best evidence against this view is Wilson's statements to Lansing as to the caliber and personnel he
desired for the Commission made on April

12, 1917. 32

Further Root, at age 72 and having retired from the
Senate, was no longer a direct political threat to
Wilson.

Although Root was still a very influential

man and it is certainly possible that, while never
stated, the political objectives of the President
and his Secretary of State were either assumed or
conveyed orally, Flint's conclusions are highly improbable.
Whatever the case may have been, Ambassador Root
appears to have been concerned both with the support
the Mission was to get from the Wilson Administration
and the reaction of the Russian socialists.

If Flint'

report of his conversation with Root is accurate it
may show that Root was at least suspicious of the
optimistic reports on Russia's internal situation that
he had been getting from some quarters and suspected
that the soviet was a body of potentially significant
political clout and worthy of some observation.
Certainly we know that Root had read the report of
Petrunkevitch's speech and we can probably assume
that he read the various reports relating to the
activities and statements of the Soviet carried in
the New York Times during April and May of 1917.

33
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Further, Root had received cables from, among others,
Melville Stone (on May 15) to the effect that the
Russian socialists did not look on him favorably.
Stone had gotten this view from Charles H. Boynton,
an associate of Eugene Meyer and member of the
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, who had gone
to Russia on March 19 to promote Russian-American
trade.

34

The Ambassador received a similar report

from Count Leo Tolstoi, who had earlier backed
Roosevelt, and who now predicted some trouble for
Root in Russia. 35
It would be surprising if the attacks on Root
in the press and the warnings from Boynton and Tolstoi
didn't raise some serious doubts in the former
Senator's mind.

Still, when he wrote his wife that

he was not looking forward to the trip and that he
was going to be "awfully bored" in Petrograd, he made
no mention of the anti-war socialists• attacks or his
questions about the behavior of the President. 36

In

addition to his doubts about what awaited him, he was
probably not in the best of health as he had just
recovered from

11

a severe attack of the grippe. 1137

The Ambassador had come to look on the Mission as a
tedious duty.

He ordered a large package of novels

and two cases of Scotch. 38
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The Root Mission left Pennsylvania station in
Washington at 6:15 pm on May 15 in two pullman cars
belonging to the Pennsylvania Railroad.

On the six-

teenth the Conunission stopped near Chicago to allow
Professor Harper to board.

Harper was to brief the

Root Mission on the political situation in Russia.

39

After changing trains in Chicago the party proceeded
to St. Paul and Seattle.

It was during this unevent-

ful trip of three days that Harper briefed the Mission
on his appraisal of the Russian situation.

Whether

his views had changed significantly from the ones he
had originally cabled to the State Department is
unknown but highly probable.

On May 18 Root cabled

Lansing asking that Charles Crane, who had now been
in Russia for several weeks, cable his impressions to
Vladivastok for the Mission's inspection. 40

The

remainder of the trip was spent being entertained by
General Scott who recounted his adventures among the
Indians.

41

On May 20 the Root party arrived in Seattle
and were met by Captain Hinds of the USS Buffalo; a
reconverted destroyer which was to take them to Russia.
Cyrus McCormick, who had been on the West Coast for
personal reasons, joined the Mission that afternoon
after which they departed.

The first few days were

cold and unpleasant and several members of the Mission
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fell victim to seasickness of which General Scott's
was the most serious case.

From May 25 to the 30th

the Buffalo was engulfed in a dense fog with visibility limited to a few hundred yards.

The passengers

occupied themselves with "deck golf, an invention of
Dr. Mott, Colonel Mott's sand-filled football, and
movies.

On May 30 the Buffalo entered the Sea of

Okhotsk where the first bird alighted.

As the dense

fog cleared on the thirty-first the Buffalo was forced
to change course when it hit an iceberg.
minimal.

Damage was

As the Buffalo entered the Sea of Japan on

June 1 the envoys began preparation for their mission.
Senator Root addressed the group on the purpose of
the Mission and warned against talking too freely "as
Russia was full of German sympathizers and spies".
Dr. Holton Curl instructed the party on the proper
diet.

42

On June 3 the Root Mission arrived in Vladivostok
one day early and thirteen days after leaving Seattle.
They were met by Lt. Commander Griida of the Russian
flotilla, the American Consul at Vladivostock, John K.
Caldwell, and several others.

Major Stanley Washburn

and interpreter Eugene Prince also joined the Mission
here.
What the members of the Root Mission expected to
see upon their arrival at Vladivostok is unknown.
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Since the Root Mission was initially conceived, several
major events had occurred in Russia and in RussianAmerican relations.

First, from late March through

April and May thousands of political refugees had
returned to their native land from several western
countries, including the United States. 43

The

internal atmosphere in Russia was one in which all
those who had opposed the Tsarist regime were viewed
as heroes.

No matter who these individuals were or

how radical their views, they were welcomed home
with open arms.

Further, the Provisional Government

paid for their return in many cases.
refugees were politically
were

ra0;~a1

Many of these

in view and most

undoubtedly opposed to the war.

They had come

home to change their country, not to die in its army.
Among their number were included powerful Bolshevik
leaders Lenin, Trotsky, Borodin, Shatov, and
Kollontai, and the anarchist, Prince Peter Kropotkin.
The Provisional Government, still favoring a continuation of the war to a successful conclusion,
became concerned as anti-war ranks were swelled.
There was little the government could do because the
moderate socialists in the Soviet took the view that
socialists of any view were their "comrades" and
could not be criticized openly.

One result of the

influx of radicals was to shift the Russian political
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spectrum to the left, both within the Soviet and
throughout the country.
On May 1, 1917, Foreign Minister Milyukov had
announced in an internal memo that Russia would
observe the secret treaties that the Tsar had made
with the Allies in 1915.

The treaties obligated

Russia not to accept a separate peace and promised
important territorial gains.

The crucial aspect

of the secret treaties, as far as Russia was concerned, was that in the event of victory, she would
acquire both Constantinople and control of the
Dardanelles, principal goals of Russian foreign
policies for centuries.

The Soviet, while not

necessarily against a continuation of the war, was
diametrically opposed to territorial aggrandizement.
Most of its members applied the principle of "peace
without annexation, without indemnities, and on the
basi·s of self-determination for all people. 1144
When Milyukov's note was published, despite the
Foreign Minister's attempt to keep it secret, the
conflicting principles of the Foreign Minister and
large numbers of socialists resulted in an open confrontation with both sides staging demonstrations over
45
.
th e secre t t rea t 1es.
The socialists won out and forced the resignations
of Guchkov on May 14 and Milyukov on May 15.
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socialists• enormous influence in Russia.

The new

coalition government did not, however, shift its policy
decisions radically to the left.

The change was most

obvious in semantics; speeches and publications were
now worded in a manner that was acceptable to the
. t . 46
Sovie

Alexander Kerensky became Minister of War

and was now the key figure in the government.

He was

a Trudovic, a small non-Marxist faction that usually
aligned with the moderate Social Revolutionaries, and
obviously not ready to put many of the major tenets of
socialism into practice in the Russia of 1917.

He was

the bridge between the government and the Soviet of
which he was still a member.

The other key figure in

the government was Michael I. Tereschenko who became
Minister of Foreign Affairs and can be seen as the
leader of the bourgeosis half of the government.

47

Both Kerensky and Tereschenko had decided to
continue the war as long as possible.

The acquisi-

tion of Constantinople and the Dardanelles had become
a political anathma which could not be discussed
openly.

The socialist view of no annexations and no

indemnities became the government's public stance.
If there were to be no annexations and no indemnities,
the war was now one wholly of defense unless occupied
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"Russian" land in Poland were considered.

Thus,

depending on Russia's desire to retain these landholdings, further war could come to an end unless
Germany attacked or Russia could be persuaded to
aid her western allies.

48

It was now up to the

Root Mission to assist the Provisonal Government in
convincing as large a percentage of Russian society
as possible that it was in their interest to continue
the war.

It is doubtful that the Mission's members

realized the extent of opposition to their cause.
Whatever the Root Mission expected when they
disembarked at Vladivostok they were quickly enlightened and perhaps rudely awakened by the local political scene.

Upon disembarking they were met by Mr. N.

P. Matveev, the President of the local Executive
Committee. 49
cans' purpose.

Mr. Matveev inquired as to the AmeriRoot responded that the Mission had

come "to convey to the Russian democracy the good
will of America, her sister democracy; to seek to
establish closer cooperation and friendship between
the two nations, and to assist her in every way
possible. 1150
In addition to Matveev the Root party was also
met by some soldiers and workmen and a representative
of the City of Vladivostok.

It was soon learned that

neither the city nor the garrison were under the
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control of the Provisional Government but rather
directed by various corrunittees elected from among
their rank and file.

Further a group of radical

socialist refugees who had returned from America
only a few days ahead of the Buffalo had attempted
to arouse the local garrison and civilians against
the Mission.

The attempt to turn back the Root

Mission was defeated in the Vladivostok Soviet.
Despite the radicals defeat, the Root Mission was
hurried on board a train after spending only a half
hour in Vladivostok. 51

This situation must have had

a profound impact on the Americans as they set out
for their trip across Siberia to European Russia.
It should have been useful to the American mission's
understanding of the Russian situation that its first
real contact with Russia revealed a city not under
the control of its national government but in the
hands of several local committees.

In addition, the

Root party became aware that there was definite opposition to their mission.

It is also important to note

that the vote of the Vladivostok Soviet was the mission's first evidence that at least some parts of the
new Russian democracy were not opposed to the
Americans, but might take a "wait and see" attitude.
Nevertheless, if Charles Edward Russell's account is
accurate, the Bolsheviks had already decided to oppose
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the American Mission.

Russell reported that the

party hired a train to follow the Root Mission to
Petrograd and denounce the American at every station
at which they stoppea.

52

CHAPTER FOUR
DEMOCRACY MEETS DEMOCRACY
WITH A VENGENCE
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The ten day trip to Petrograd was largely uneventful.

It included several informative meetings

with military officials and numerous momentary stops
where the Mission was met by cheering crowds.

These

were probably taken too seriously.
On June 4 the Root Mission stopped at Harbin in
Manchuria where it joined the American Railroad
Commission.

The American ministers were also met by

General Horvat, govenor of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and General Potapov, later a member of the
Russian Mission to the United States.

Potapov claimed

to have been Russia's first revolutionary general and
stated that he had great influence with the Soviet.
Root saw Potapov as "a glaring example" of the unfortunate tendency of everyone in Russia to consult
"his own wishes in obeying any instructions coming
from what would be considered higher authority."
The American party left Harbin later in the day after
meeting with a deputation from the Chinese Foreign
Minister.

1

Now riding in the Tsar's Imperial train, which
included the dining car in which the Tsar had signed
his abdication, the American Mission reached Irkutsk
on June 5.

2

Sometime during the fifth Root sent his

first telegram back to Washington.

It read:

"Indicatious situation critical but not without

-72grounds for hope. 113

Whether this impression had

come as much from the generals ·as from impressions
of the situation in Vladivostok is unknown.
The next few days produced events of a more
positive nature.

Several train loads of women,

children, and soldiers passed shouting "Hurrah,
Americanski!," and cheering crowds met the Root
party at several Siberian town where Root made short
speeches.

4

On June 7 the Mission conferred at Irkutsk with
Mr.

s.

Saltykov who was the Chief Commissioner of

the Siberian Provinces.

Saltykov stated that he

felt the Provisional Government would have a very
hard time governing while the war continued and
Russia was experiencing economic and political
troubles.

Ambassador Root's somewhat insensitive

reply was that "a country's strength comes from hard
times. "

Envoys Russell and Duncan probably made a

better impression in Irkutsk, receiving loud and
repeated applause from a large crowd of soldiers and
workers to whom they spoke.

5

The Root party got another glimpse of the "new"
Russia on June 8 when they passed a train decorated
with "a number of red placards bearing various
devices with regard to democracy and freedom. 6
June 9 the Mission was loudly cheered at Novo

on
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Nikolaievsky by a large crowd and again at Kanishlov
on the following day.

There Root, Scott, and Russell

spoke and all received ovations, particularly Russell
when he removed
held it aloft.

a

7

small red ribbon from his coat and
Despite their enthusiastic reception

the Russian masses of 1917 must have been a rugged
lot; and in one of the small towns on their way across
Russia, Root turned to Colonel Mott and observed:
"Tibby, I am a firm believer in democracy, but I do
not like filth. 118
The remainder of the trip was uneventful and
the American Mission arrived in Petrograd on June 13.

9

The cross-country train trip to Petrograd demonstrated
that the

Provisiona~

Government had failed to fill

the void caused by the fall of the old tsarist bureaucracy.

This had left Russia in a state of "extra-

ordinary decentralization" with both military and
civilian affairs being conducted by "tens of thousands" of separate committees "having no established
relations with each other and practically acknowledging little or no right of control on the part of the
Petrograd government."

Although the Provisional

Government had been recognized it had yet to exert
control over the numerous Soviets and other
committees that had sprung up thoughout the country.
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Root's appraisal was, however, that revolutionary
Russia was in an "extraordinary condition" of "good
10
order."
Russia's relative stability was perhaps the
most outstanding aspect of the interlude between the
fall of the Tsar and the Bolshevik revolution.

With

the exception of desertions from the army, the great
mass of the population had been going about their business as usual.

This situation is noted in a number of

primary and secondary sources and appears to have
existed, with a few relatively minor exceptions,
until mid-July.

11

Nevertheless The Mission's arrival

in Petrograd must have left the members wondering
if the Provisional Government had any kind of
organizational ability whatsoever.

Dmitri Fedotoff-

White, a young Russian Naval officer who had been
assigned to the Root Mission as a guide and interpreter,
described the scene of the Mission's arrival.
no band present.

There was

It had probably refused to be bothered.

The honor guard was "untidy" and in khaki uniforms
"blended perfectly with the dirty yellow walls of the
station" and thus went totally unnoticed by :.hE'
. . t ors. 12
American v1s1

The reception presented a striking contrast.
The Americans, who wore formal attire, were greeted
by Prime Minister Lvov,

Foreign Minister Tereschenko,
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Finance Minister Shingarev and Communications
Minister Nekrassoff, all of whom wore simple business
suites.

Prince Lvov was the worst offender, wear-

ing "a badly cut sack suit."

Perhaps what was most

noticeable was "the intense earnestness visible on
every face.

The members of the Russian Cabinet had

a drawn, worn, tired look, as of men overworked,
weighted with a tremendous responsibility, and suffering from its strain."

It was "democracy greeting

democracy with a vengence. 1113
Ambassador Francis was characteristically
enthusiastic and undoubtedly delighted to see his fellow countrymen.

14

Francis introduced the American

Mission as representing "every phase of political
belief" in the United States and went on to state that
there were "no classes in America."

This latter re-

mark brought out "a few furtive grins among the solemn
faces·of the audience. 1115
Ambassador Root followed Francis with a speech
of his own.

It was one that would be typical of the

approach of the American Mission.

Root first con-

gratulated the Russians on their achievement of
democracy and then went on to encourage them to continue the war.

16

As Root's speech came to an end

socialist Minister A. V. Peshekhonov asked FedotoffWhite to "please tell these Americans that we are
tired of 1this war.

Explain to them that we are weary
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of the long and bloody struggle."

Although White

declined to translate the message and the Americans
were unaware of what had been said, it was symptomatic of the basic conflict of interests involved.

17

The Americans wanted an active eastern front to keep
the pressure on Germany.

The Russians were tired of

war with good reason, and if they took the socialist
view that there were to be no annexations or
indemnities there was nothing to fight for; they
would fight only if the Germans attacked.

The Ger-

mans had undoubtedly decided that they could not
reasonably spare the troops to attempt a major
attack on Russia, nor did their strategy require it.
They would not attack.

Nonetheless the American mis-

sion had to try for there was, of course, no guarantee
that the Germans could be beaten with or without
Russia.
Dmitri Fedotoff-White described this perception
of the Americans' attitude:
"On the whole the attitude of some of the
members of the Mission was not unlike that
of a lot of missionaries descending •
in the beginning of the nineteenth century
upon a tribe of benighted savages on some
Pacific island to bring to them the blessings of the white man's civilization and
deriving a great deal of satisfaction from
the flattering notion that the Lord had
made them from other clay than the poor
heathens they were about to proselytise.18
Fedotoff-White felt that the majority of the Root
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Mission looked upon the Russians as "a lot of likeable but unreliable and sometimes very naughty
children."

On the other occasions Fedotoff-White

cited a "senior attache" who lectured him on the
prevalance of syphillis and the lack of "moral
restraint" among the villagers and the general
attitude among the Mission members that "All senior
officer were either grafters, incompetents or
libertines, interested only in making love to
ballerinas. 1119
There was, undoubtedly, some general truth in
these views despite their offensiveness to FedotoffWhite and any other Russians who might have discerned
them.

That Russia was not ready for democracy of the

western type should have been obvious.

After centuries

of Tsarist tyranny the largely illiterate population
lacked many qualities, such as education and democratic
experience, that are often considered necessary
for Western democratic government.

However, there

good behavior in the absence of either police or
unified leadership was undeniable.

20

on Thursday, June 14, 1917, the Americans met
with the foreign and domestic press and visited
Foreign Minister Tereschenko whom Root described as
"tall and impressive," highly intelligent and
.
. t.ive. 21
imagina

Afterwards the military members of the
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American mission called on War Minister Alexander
Kerensky.

The Americans were surprised to find

the Russian War Minister wearing "very rough khaki
colored cloths" with his arm in a sling from shaking
hands with the troops.

Root and General Scott visited

the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, in the
late afternoon.

22

The following day saw the Root Mission again
receive the press in the morning.

Root lunched with

Francis, Prince Lvov, and Tereschenko.

In the even-

ing the entire Mission was formally presented to the
Provisional Government.
major addresses.

23

Root and Tereschenko gave

Ambassador Root's speech stressed

that "one fearful danger threatens the liberty" of
both Russia and America
cracy.

-

the German military auto-

The American democracy, although not directly

threatened, was preparing to fight for both nations'
.

f ree d om.

24

The obvious implication was that America

had joined the conflict to put an end to autocracy
and war and that she had no other self-interested
motives.
Tereschenko replied on behalf of the Provisional
Government emphasizing the unity of purpose of newly
democratic Russia and the United States; both as
fellow democracies and partners in a war against autocracy.

Treschenko went on to attack German militarisn
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and "imperialistic schemes."

The Russian Minister

was very careful not to offend the Soviet. 25 Arnbassador Root had either perceived the situation or had
been informed of it by the government and had made a
careful reference to American support of the "right
of self-determination of all nations."

Copies of

both speeches were sent to the President through

.
26
Lans1ng.
On June 17th, a New York Times reporter who was
covering the Mission would report that it was "in this
direction of thrashing out the question of the aims
of the war that the chief province of the Mission
will lie. 1127

This was not to be the case.

Wilson

appears to have already been preoccupied with the
peace that would follow the "war to end all wars."
As soon as he received a copy of Root's speech the
President instructed Lansing to wire Petrograd in
order to caution the members of the commission against
speaking about "the terms of peace or of settlement
which will be insisted on by the United States.

The

President is himself reserving all such utterances
until very different circumstances arise, and hopes
that you will pursue the same policy.

1128

Whether or not Wilson was overreacting, the
effect of his action was to tie the hand of the Commission on this crucial issue.

The question of war
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aims was probably the parmount issue of the intellectuals of the Soviet and it had been this issue
that had forced the resignations of Milyukov and
Guchkov.

The Soviet and the majority of the Russian

population would not accept a war of conquest or indemnity.

The inability of the members of the Root

Mission to speak to this crucial issue played into
the hands of those who desired to discredit the
motives of the Allied governments.

The most ironic

aspect of this situation was that President Wilson's
policy at Versailles on these issues was similar to
that of the Russian Soviet.

It was unfortunate

that the President's failure to adequately articulate
American was aims before June undermined the credibility of the Root Mission and therefore of America.
It was not that the President was unaware of the
position of the Soviet, the fact that Tereschenko
and Kerensky desperately desired to appease that body
on these issues, nor that Root had taken the position
that Tereschenko and Kerensky undoubtedly hoped he
would take.

There is no evidence that Root had

discussed his speech with members of the Provivional
Government.
The President's extreme caution on the issue of
war aims may be attributable to his desires to avoid
speaking for or offending Britian, France and the
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.
29
a 11 ies.

.
In a dd.1t1on
he may not have been able to

perceive the disasterous effect his actions would
have on Root Mission and American credibility.

It

is highly doubtful whether Wilson had, at this
point, and understanding of the true nature of the
Russian situation.

He therefore gravely under-

estimated the potential importance of the Root Mission.

More importantly, the President may have

failed to understand the importance of Russia in his
over-all concept of world-wide democracy.

Unfortunately

a continuation of the war and the triump of Russian
liberal - nationalistic democracy appear to have been
mutually exclusive.

30

After the formalities of the first two days the
Ambassadors spent the next six days meeting with
and gathering information from Tereschenko, former
War Minister Guchkov, British Labour Party minister,
Arthur Henderson, and numerous other Russians, Allies,
and members of the American business community in
Petrograd.
In order to cover the various areas of Russian
society the Mission's members split up with each
one working on his own specialized areas in the hope
of producing an overview in the report.

This approach

allowed the American Mission to cover a much broader
spectrum of Russian society, investigating the
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financial, military, labor, religious and political
affairs of Russia in much greater depth than would
have been otherwise possible.

Although this system

proved to be somewhat disorganized, due more perhaps
to time limitations than anything else, its principal
fault can perhaps be found in its failure to expose
most members of the Mission to the Russian masses
and their power center, the Soviet.

Only Charles

Russell and James Duncan would visit that body.
While this lack of exposure to these crucial
areas may have colored the final report and overall
impressions of the members of the American Mission,
that job was really one to be undertaken by those
administration and state Department officials who
were more familiar with the intricacies of the Russian scene and were stationed in Russia on a fulltime basis.
Ambassador Root spent his initial period in
Petrograd meeting with partisans of the old government, the new government, Russian and American busi-

·
l'1s t s.
nessmen an a JOUrna

31

It soon b ecame o b v1ous
.

to Root and others of the party that the situation
in Petrograd was discouraging.

This view was con-

tained in Root's first Petrograd report to Lansing
which was very pessimistic:
"Conditions here critical, general St.

-83Petersburg opinion very pessimistic;
industrial and financial conditions
bad; Provisional Government seems
secure; no visible agitation against
it at present. Government very confident of pulling the country through."
The "fundamental" problem according to
Root's view was that the soldiers had
"interpreted new freedom as meaning
that every man could do as he pleased"
and "refused spoken orders from anyone. Accordingly authority of officers
has been repudiated and military discipline has practically failed." Root
laid the blame for this situation on
"a tremendous German propaganda" and
the "extreme socialists who are for
peace at any price and very active."
Although some elements did favor a continuation of the war effort, Root concluded accurately that the decision
rested with the soldiers and "we have
got to get at them in someway. 11 32
Whether Root correctly interpreted the optimism
of the Provisional Government ii open to question.
Dmitri Fedotoff-White felt that the more realistic
33
members did not think Russia could continue.
Kerensky and Tereschenko did however, and they were
working very hard to rally the country behind them.

34

To support their efforts Root proposed to Washington
a massive publicity campaign costing "at least
$5,000,000 11 and featuring newspapers, pamphlets,
posters, public speakers, and motion pictures.

In

addition, he advocated the establishment of Y.M.C.A.
stations along the Russian front and went on to ask
for an immediate funding of $100,000 to begin the
campaign. 35

Root was not alone in his view; surpris-

~---
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ingly the majority of the Root Mission had already
made up their minds about what should be done to aid
Russia.

The Mission 1 s consensus would appear to have

been that if the Russians were unwilling to continue
the war the Americans could not invest extensively
in Russia.

Russell had advanced this position as

early as May 31 while still on board the Buffalo.

36

The specific idea of an all-out propaganda
campaign was conceived as early as June 11 when
Stanley Washburn brought up the idea, arguing that
it was a very close decision whether the Russians
would continue the war.

On June 12, while still on

board the train to Petrograd, the Mission held a
general conference on the subject at Russell's urging.
Washburn introduced his plan to begin the effort
immediately and in conjunction with the British.
There was general agreement on this and Washburn and
Russell began work on it at once.

37

Thus Root's plan

had been some time in the making before he cabled his
ideas to Lansing.

Obviously, the Ambassador believed

the situation to be critical and expected a prompt
response that was not forthcoming.
In the interim Root continued his numerous meetings and speeches.

Root's speeches presented the

basic theme of the official American viewpoint:

the

United States was pleased with the Russian Revolution,
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at least as it was understood in America, and intended to help the new Russian·democracy.

Germany

was the enemy of democracy and of the essential
interests of both America and Russia.

Ambassador

Root and the other members of the Commission made
clear with varying degrees of subtlety that American
aid to Russia was essentially predicated on Russia's
continuation of the war.

38

While Root concentrated on the upper echelons
of the Provisional Government and other Allied
representatives, Samuel R. Bertron and Cyrus
McCormick were given the job of acquiring an understanding of Russia's financial problems and needs.
Neither man appears to have left any detailed record
of h:is activities or impressions outside of the official reports of the Mission.

39

The financial needs of the new government were
massive.

On May 16 the United States had established

a $100 million credit at 3% interest per year.

Upon

receiving the credit the Russians immediately ordered
500 locomotives and 10,000 freight cars which they
desperately needed.

The first American credit was

due to mature on June 30, 1917 but would be funded by
a larger credit on that date.

40

It was the task of

McCormick and Bertron to determine further Russian
needs.
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In persuit of their mission the two American
businessmen met with Finance Minister A. I. Shingarev
on numerous occasions, Acting Minister of Commerce
and Industry Stepanov, Frank Corse of the New York
Life Insurance Company, and Professor Emory, the
Hussian representative of the GuaI"anty Tru:;t

co.

out of these meetings McCormick and nerton came up
with what they called a "comprehensive statement" of
Russia's financial needs. 41
McCormick made no public addresses and, except
for the meetings required to get a view of Russian
economic needs, he was, according to Dmitri FcdotoffWhite, concerned only with "looking after the interests
of his harvesters."

That Fedotoff-\oihite was unim-

pressed by the harvester heir is an understatement:
he found McCormick rude and bad mannered: "a cunning
old merchant. 1142
Berton was more active than McCormick.
he made no pub! ic addresses, the

Although

::cw York banker

participated in the negotiations of transJX>rtation
problems and was active in organizing the propaganda
campaign.

He appears to have been or become a con-

fidant of Root on this trip.

Berton left little

record of his impressions of the mission.

He was

obviously in favor of the progaganda campaign and
43
concurred with the Root Mission's final report.
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Dmitri Fedotoff-White could remember very little
about Bertron except that he was "obsessed" with
informing the Russians about America's part in the
war. 44

Samuel R. Bertron was certainly the most

obscure member of the mission although he may have
actually done more real work behind the scenes than
several of the other members. 45
Charles R. Crane was another member of the Root
Mission whose activities in Russia remain partially
obscured.
Chicago.

Crane was born on August 7, 1858, in
His father, Richard Teller Crane, had been

unencumbered by formal schooling and he decided that
his . son Charles should not be allowed to go beyond
the eighth grade.

Charles worked for the Crane

Company for many years, but eventually sold his
interest in it to his brother Richard after the
death of their father.

This transaction left Charles

Crane with $12 million with which to travel and
influence world politics.
Crane had long been interested in Russia, China,
and the Middle Eastern countries.

Originally a

Republican of progressive leanings, he was made
American Minister to China in 1909, undoubtedly as
a reward for his efforts in Republican financing.
Crane promptly attacked the Sino-Japanese treaty
of that year and President Taft was forced to recall
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him at the insistence of Secretary of State
Philander C. Knox·.

46

Charles Crane's interests in Russia centered
around the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian art
and architecture, and the Russian aristocracy, with
whom he had many contacts.

Mrs. Madden Summers,

wife of the American Consil at Moscow described his
knowledge of Russia as "superficial".

Charles

Crane's knowledge and personality were indeed
unusual.

He had the charm of an aristocrat and

"was gifted with an extraordinary sensitivity to
men and what they stood for.

47

Although his per-

sonal interests and emphasis were mainly cultural,
Crane seemed to have often gravitated to politics.
He travelled extensively and was often rumored to
have been financing political factions including
sun Yat-sen, an Albanian uprising, and Syrian and
Lebanese revolts against French colonialism.

48

At

one time he attempted to buy out the entirety of
Sau d i. Ar b.ian

01'l

. t eres t s. 49
in

crane's activities while in Russia in 1917
remain somewhat of a mystery.
trips

On his, previous

to Russia he had cultivated a close friend-

ship with Professor Milyukov.

50

In the absence of

further evidence, he should be seen as a supporter,
if onlv in soirit, of Milyukov's Cadet Party.
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Crane sailed for Russia soon after the March
Revolution.

On March 27 he boarded the Norwegian

Christianiaford, accompanied by famous muckraker
Lincoln Steffens.

51

This was the same vessel on

which Trotsky attempted to sail, but he was forced
to disembark at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Crane arrived

in Russia, via the Baltic, in later April and in
time to witness the downfall of his good friend
Milyukov.

This activities during May are obscure,

but there is some evidence that, through the efforts
of Steffens, he visited the Petrograd Soviet. 52
Crane, who apparently went to Russia as Wilson's
observer, was not appointed to the Root Mission
until after his arrival there.

53

With the arrival of the Root Mission later in
May, Crane joined Dr. John R. Mott on his trip to
Moscow and accompanied the YMCA Leader on most of
his activities.

Little mention of him is made in

54
.
.
t h e 1 og o f th e Miss1on.

Crane's initial impression

of the Russian situation is contained in a telegram
sent to his son Richard, .Lansing's secretary, on
May 14, 1917.

Crane instructed his son to tell Dr.

Mott that the Orthodox Church "had no part in Revolution which is entirely socialistic and material in
aims.

However, Revolution now going on in Church
II

Those Bishops who had been elevated or
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held power under the influence of Rasputin were on
the way out and the new hierarchy "will probably
be socialistic certainly democratic and free and
Bishops will have to come down to people for support
and inspiration.

Much spiritual agitation and

apocalypse widely studied. 1155
Crane left little further evidence of his
thoughts on the Revolution during this early period.
Dmitre Fedotoff-White in the last entry that is
purported to have been taken directly from his diary
described Crane as "very absent-minded .
always inunersed in thought and dreams."

II

White went

on to note that despite this, "he seems to be the
only member of the Mission who had a more or less
clear idea of what it is all about.

56

By mid-June Crane had obviously become concerned
at the course the revolution was taking.

In fact he

was so concerned that he asked Lincoln Steffens to
return to Washington to carry a message to Wilson.
Crane said that he, Francis, and Kerensky had cabled
Wilson "in vain; they could not make the President
understand that public opinion reigned in Russia and
that the new government had no power to do what the
allies wished. 1157

Steffens agreed to go, whereupon

he met twice with Kerensky.

During these meetings,

Kerensky stated his view that the Russian people
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would not fight unless the secret treaties, which
were widely believed to exisf, were repudiated.
Public opinion in Russia might be directed,
Kerensky thought, but not by him. The
President might steer it back to the war -he and the allies, if Wilson could manage
the allies. Nobody but President Wilson
can answer that German charge and destroy
that belief in the simple minds of the
Russian peasants.~8
On June 26 Steffens, armed with letters from Crane
and Francis, met with the President.

"I delivered

my message to a silent, thoughtful man."

Wilson

"knew nothing about the secret treaties.

But the

way he said it and what he meant was clearly understandable to me ••• He knew of those secret treaties,
not as an ally, not officially.as a party ••• but
only as I and the public knew of their existence."
Wilson went on to say that if the United States had
been a party to their making he could request the
public abrogation which Kerensky needed so badly.
Wilson was not in that position and didn't feel he
could do what Kerensky wanted:

"N.o, that is hard.

That I cannot very well do. 1159

Thus ended the

attempts of Kerensky, Crane, and to a lesser extent,
Francis, to persuade Wilson to take the lead on war
aims and give the Russian people a cause to fight
for.

Wilson's inaction here is another possible

miscalculation in America's relations with Russia
during tbe revolutionary period.

Of all the members
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of the Root Mission, Charles Crane seems to have had
the most influence on Wilson's policy decisions
regarding Russia.

60

The failure of Crane's personal

agent to persuade the President to take action must
be seen as the de facto conclusion of the issue.

If

Steffen's account is accurate, this was obviously a
question of priorities in the mind of the President.
Wilson decided that he would rather not risk disagreements with his allies than take this step
towards uniting the Russian people behind Kerensky.
In fact the President appears to have seen
the texts of some of the secret treaties and at
least to have discussed them with Arthur Balfour
during April, 1917.

It was most probably on the

basis of this knowledge that the President wrote
House on July 21:
England and France have not the same views
with regard to peace that we have by any
means. When the war is over we can force
them to our way of thinking, because by
that time they will among other things be
financially in our hands: but we cannot
force them now, and any attempt to speak
61
for them . . • would bring on disagreements.
This statement serves to explain Wilson's muzzleing of the Root Mission, his reticence on war aims,
and his negative response to Steffens.
these were serious mistakes.

Nonetheless,

Wilson, Lansing, Francis

and others all knew that the Russian Army was in
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rearming and releasing of the Bolsheviks and their
leaders.

When Charles Crane arrived in Sweden in

late September he told an American report that
the Russians "are losing the proper sense of their
position in the scheme of worldly affairs."

Further,

"extensive and laborious repairs are necessary."
It would become a test of strength between the
Bolsheviks and the workers with their "ignorance of
economics" and the "more conservative peasant
farmers."

62

CHAPTER FIVE
THE GREAT ORATORS

i-------
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While the main body of the Root Mission remained
largely in Petrograd, various members of the Mission
travelled extensively.

Dr. John R. Mott and Charles

R. Crane, who had the best contacts in Russia of the
major members of the Mission, journeyed to Moscow.
General Scott travelled to the front and Roumania.
Admiral Glennon toured both the Baltic and Black Sea
fleets.

Mott, Scott, and Glennon had perhaps the

most interesting experiences of all the Mission's
members and perhaps the greatest short-term influence
on Russia.
Dr. John R. Mott saw his purpose in Russia as
that of "cultivating" what he considered the heart
of Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church.

1

Dr. Mott's

first contact with that church had occurred in 1897
in Tokyo when he had met with Russian Orthodox
Archbishop Nicolai of Japan.

In 1909, as a leader

of the YMCA and member of the World Student Christian Federation, Dr. Mott participated in the worldwide student evangelistic meetings which were held
in Russia.

Later, he learned that the Holy Synod

had passed a resolution that he was not to be permitted to visit Russia for religious purposes again.
The cause for this attitude is unknown but is probably a sign that the Tsarist dominated Church was
apprehensive about any movements that were not its
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own.

2

Undeterred, Dr. Mott held the meetings of

the w.s.c.F. in Constantinople· in 1911 so that some
of the Orthodox leaders that he ·had met in 1909 could
attend and some did.

3

Once in Russia, John R. Mott concentrated on
observing the new democracy and attempting to persuade the Russian Orthodox Church to take a leading
role in Russian political affairs and to support the
Russian war effort.

4

Through his contacts with

Charles Crane, Mott knew that although the Church
had taken no part in the March Revolution, it was
undergoing an internal upheaval.

The major outward

result of this was the ouster of Bishops who had
been appointed by Rasputin.

Crane had felt that in

the new Orthodox Church the Bishops would have "to
come down to (the) people for support and inspiration."

Further there was much "spiritual agitation

and the apocalypse (was) widely studied. 115
After spending the first few days in Petrograd,
Dr. Mott and Crane set out for Moscow where they
witnessed the first National Sobor (convention) of
the Russian Orthodox Church in nearly 250 years.
June 19 Mott addressed this body.

On

He stressed the

importance of the Orthodox Church taking a role in
political affairs.

He contended that the Church had

held the Russian nation together in the past and
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that it was the Church that must assert itself now
if Russia were to be saved from internal disintegration.

Nevertheless Dr. Mott placed great emphasis

on the continuation of the war:

"We are deeply

grateful because of what you are proposing and planning to do to continue this struggle to a successful
conclusion."

Mott went on' to encourage the Russians

with an account of American war preparations and its
commitment to the cause of the democracies.
received loud applause.

6

He

While in Moscow, Mott had

eight lengthy interviews with Prince Vladimir Lvov,
the High Procurator of the Orthodox Church.

Lvov,

who was technically a member of the Provisional
Government and well informed on Russian political
events, discussed the problems facing both the Church
'
an d th e Russian
na t'ion. 7
After these meetings Mott and Crane returned to
Petrograd where they attended the meetings of the
Holy Governing Synod of the Orthodox Church.

Dr.

Mott was able to participate in the deliberations of
the council of that body which was the process of
revising the constitution of the Church.

8

Mott also

participated in the deliberations of the Commission
on the Revision of the Curriculum of the Ecclesiastical Academies and Seminaries.

Dr. Mott spent much of

the balance of his time in Russia holding private
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interviews with various religious leaders and visiting seminaries and monasteries.

He did not confine

himself to the Russian Orthodox Church.

He visited

with all the major Protestant leaders except those
of the Lutherans, three of the most influential
Jewish leaders, and Bishop Ciplack the leader of
the Polish Roman Catholics.

One of the meetings

that Dr. Mott enjoyed the most, according to his
biographer, was that with the leading Bishops of
the Old Believers, the twelve million member sect
that included among their number about half of the
Cossacks.

This group had been persecuted for cen-

turies due to their adherence to an earlier brand
of Christianity.

9

On June 27 Dr. Mott, James Duncan,

and Samuel Harper visited the Cossack Congress in
Petrograd.

This group was significant both because

of their fierce independence and their military
abilities.

Although he came uninvited, Dr. Mott

was able to talk to numerous delegates and address
the conference.

Mott's address struck the usual

theme, emphasizing the American interest in the continuation of the war.

10

According to his report

Dr. Mott received an "enormous ovation" and the
Cossacks passed a resolution supporting an immediate
offensive against Germany in order to "consolidate
the conquests of the revolution. 1111
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Mott also began the organization of YMCA
sponsored camps in the major garrison cities of
Petrograd, Moscow,

Kiev~

and Jassy in Roumania.

He believed that the idleness of the Russian Army
was a major factor in its declining discipline and
morale.

Working in connection with Mr. Archibald

Harte, the YMCA's chief representative in Russia,
Dr. Mott began organizing and instructing those
American Prison Camp secretaries who had not already
.
. th'is area. 12
b ecome ac t ive
in

Aft er h'is re t urn t o

America Dr. Mott would continue to work on the YMCA
angle until the Bolshevik revolution in October.
Charles R. Crane described Dr. Mott's selection
as "amply justified" and characterized the Christian
leader's efforts as "the really great and inspiring
and permanent achievement of the Corrunission.

11

Crane felt that Mott's addresses to the Orthodox
Church in Moscow and that to the Old Believers had
a profound impact. 13

Although Dr. Mott was very

active while in Russia and his speeches were undoubtedly effective, particularly the one he made to the
Cossacks, Charles Crane's estimate of the YMCA
leader's effect was an understandable exaggeration.
Dr. Mott's stated goal of persuading the Orthodox
Church to take a more active role in Russian politics
went unfulfilled.

Although there is little doubt
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he had a strong impact on the Orthodox, the Old
Believers, and the Cossacks, only the latter group
was probably in a position to have a profound impact
on Russian events.

The Orthodox Church did not

have a strong tradition of activism in Russian politics, had little influence over the minds of the
proletariat, and had been closely tied to the
Tsarist Monarchy in the minds of many Russians.
Thus Mott's speeches and YMCA activities, despite
some positive impact, appear too little in quantity
and too late to be effective. 14

Part of the reason

for this was that the time limitation placed upon
him was severe, and it was hardly Mott's fault that
the areas of Russian society where he had the greatest influence were not the areas that would have a
major impact on the course of Russian history at
that time.

His lasting impact must be seen as con-

a to th e h ear t s an d min
· as o f
.
f ine
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Dr. Mott returned to America sharing the view
of the majority of the Root Mission that Russia
could be kept in the war with the aid of American
money, propaganda, and the YMCA camps.

He was per-

haps brought to this view by his interviews with
Procurator Lvov and the very positive responses
. pro-war speec h es receive
. d . 16
t h at h is
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wasted no time in delivering his interpretation of
the American position in the most blunt terms.

Scott

stated that if he sent such a telegram the President
would inquire when the Russians would make an advance
on the western front.

"What would I answer?"

asked

the American General.

Manikovsky, now grasping fully

the Americans' terms for economic and military assistance, promised an advance in the near future.

General

Scott replied that he would telegram the President
in the near future. 18
Having been told of Russia's basic needs Scott
set out for Russian military headquarters (Stafka)
at Mogilev on June 27.

He was accompanied by

Ambassador Root, Dr. Mott, Colonels Judson and Mott,
and Lieutenant Michie.

The American contingent was

entertained by General Brusilov who held a reception
and dinner in their honor and spent several hours
discussing the military situation.

Brusilov then

outlined his plans for the Russian advance which was
to begin in four days.

Scott did not record his

impressions of Brusilov or the proposed advance,
but by the time the American general left Russia
the advance, although, initially successful, had
begun to collapse and the telegram Scott had promised
was never sent.

19

U:;;;;,:;y
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Perhaps the most interesting part of General
Scott's mission did not occur fn Russia but in
Roumania.

The Roumanians formed an important link

on the eastern front.

Unfortunately they had be-

come bottled up around Jassy and had lost two thirds
of their pre-war territory.

Nevertheless they

possessed fifteen divisions, ten of which were
considered to be in very good fighting condition.
Perhaps more importantly the spirit of these units
had a positive effect on the Russian soldiers around
them.

20
Scott set out for Roumania the day after meeting

with Brusilof, accompanied by Judson, Colonel Mott,
Michie, and Major Parker, a military observer connected with the American legation in Roumania.

When

it arrived in Jassy, the Scott party met with
Roumanian Prime Minister Ion Bratinau, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, the Army Chief of Staff, and
American Consul William Andrews.

21

The American party attended a lunch with King
Ferdinand I and his Queen after which General Scott
suffered an embarrassing moment.

When he found him-

self alone with the King, as protocol dictated,
neither he nor the Roumanian monarch could think of
a "single word to say to the other".

After several

moments of silence the King turned and went to the
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Queen's side.
ai.d • 22

Colonel Mott came to the General's

Undoubtedly embarrassed by this incident,

General Scott redeemed himself nicely soon thereafter when he was given an opportunity to speak to
the assembled members of the cabinet, the royal
family, and various members of the parliament.

The

aging general had perhaps his finest hour giving a
rousing speech in which he declared that America had
mobilized eleven million men, twenty thousand
aeroplanes, and voted billions of dollars for war.
All of this was a rather large exaggeration and
Scott knew it.

The Roumanians responded with cheer-

ing and thunderous applause.

The Prime Minister

declared it to have been a tremendous success and
Consul Andrews agreed that "no other speech of
official visitors had the value for them {the
Roumanians) which the speech of General Scott
carried."

In a cable to Washington, however,

Andrews noted that Scott's speech had had the unfortunate side effect ''of giving the Roumanians the
idea that the United States would give them everything they are asking for" and warned that the
United States might be embarrassed by this in the
near future.

23

At very least the Scott visit to

Roumania had boosted morale at a critical time;
and the General seems to have had, according to

-104-

Colonel Mott, every intention of carrying out his
promises to the Roumanians.

By the time he returned

to America, however, he had forgotten exactly what
these promises were. 24
General Scott's view of the Russian government,
gathered from meetings with Kerensky, Manikovsky,
and others both before and after his trip to
Roumania, was less positive.

In Scott's eyes

"radicalism pervaded the whole government to a
dangerous degree," and on one occasion he went so
far as to advise Kerensky to "execute about one
hundred of these German agitators like • • . Lenin
and Trotsky, or at least deport them. 25
Unlike most of his compatriots, Scott was
able to perceive that "all" of Russia was tired of
the war.

Whether the majority desired peace at any

price was a question as yet unanswered in his mind.
Further he was unsure whether the Provisional
Government had the capacity to restore order and
continue the war.

But the General also recognized

that Russia's presence in the war would be of immense
value.

In his report Scott expressed his fears that

if Russia withdrew it would be "hard to predict how
long it will take to win" and it was "possible that
Germany can't be conquered" at all.

26

General Scott concluded that it would be worth
the cost of substantial American war loans to keep
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Russia "even passively in the war until next spring"
and hope that she could launch an attack during the
following surruner.

Scott went on to recorrunend that

the United States take over Vladivostok as an
American base for purposes of supplying Russia as
it was in "total confusion. 1127

Scott's analysis

seems to have been as close to approximating a
reasonable American approach to the situation as
anyone's.

From a military viewpoint America could

aid Russia primarily with her transportation problems.

The confusion of this system not only made

it difficult to supply the Army but also endangered
the supply of food and other necessities.
could give rise to

~nternal

disorder.

This

Further, as

an assistant to Kerensky had pointed out, any advance
was likely to exaggerate the supply problem.

28

In

his official report Scott advocated a loan of $300
million for Roumania.

The American General concluded

that Roumania's fate was inexorably tied to that of
Russia and thus it was important to keep the ten
strong Roumanian divisions in the field because of
their positive influence on nearby Russian divisions.
Admiral James F. Glennon had perhaps the most
exciting adventures and the most significant shortterm impact on Russia of any of the American Envoys.
After soendinq several days in Petrograd, Glennon,

29
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accompanied by Dr. Holton Curl, Lieutenant Alva
Bernhard, Captain Newton Mccully, out-qoing American
Naval Attache at Petrograd, Commander Walter

s.

Crosley, his replacement, and Dmitri Fcdotoff-White
set out to visit the Black Sea Flcet. 30
Before the Glennon party reached the Black Sea
they were given their first taste of Russia's internal
dissension.

The party was stopped at one of the

larger stations to the south of Moscow to purchase
tonic water when a burly soldier rushed their car
yelling "throw the damn bourgeois out!"

As the

attacker lept into the car, Fedotoff-White, somewhat
to his surprise, struck the intruder in the face and
sent him flying.

Luckily for all concerned the

crowd of troops on hand.

31

This first taste of revo-

lutionary Russia was soon followed by another.
Within several miles of Sebastopol the

A~cricans

heard rumors of a revolt in the Black Sea Fleet.
Unlike their Baltic counterparts, the southern fleet
had been stable since the beginning of the rcvolution.

Fedotoff-White was obviously shocked and

saddened to find that "the last citadel of order and
discipline in the Russian
the Bolsheviks ...

~:avy

was in the hands of

32

When they arrived in Sebastopol, the Haval party
found that the fleet's com."':lilnder. Admiral Kolchak,
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later to become a leader of the White Russian forces,
had been deposed but was free and unharmed.

The

fleet seems to have been under the loose control of
various Soviets and other ad hoc groups, some undoubtedly Bolshevik in sentiment and heavily inf luenced by "outside agitators" from the Baltic Fleet.
In an atmosphere of "profound distruct" the local
Executive of Soldiers, Sailors and Working Meen had
voted not to support the Provisional Government.

33

Incredibly, Admiral Glennon was able to restore
order in the Fleet.

Glennon first met with the

executive of the Soviet and was so well received that
he was invited to address the entire soviet of 1,200
members later in the day.

Like General Scott, Glennon

seems to have known what to say and when.

His speech

began with praise for Admiral Kolchak and emphasized
the discipline, self-restraint, and military record
of the American Navy.

When he had finished the Soviet

was persuaded to restore the arms and authority of
the officers and arrest some of the worst agitators.
The Soviet's executive committee reversed their
earlier vote and backed the Provisional Government
. t y to three. 34
by a vote o f six

Although he was

unable to prevent Kolchak's recall to Petrograd, the
American Admiral's performance was not only heroic
and inspiring: it was incredible.

It is surprising
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that he undertook to reverse the positicins of the
Soviet and even more so that he met with such suecess.
The incident demonstrated how truly malleable
many Russians were at this time.

There was on one

hand strong and genuine fear of the officer class.
This had certainly been agitated by the prevalent
view that Russia's defeats were the result of a
pro-German conspiracy within the Tsar's government.
On the other hand while there were undoubtedly quite
a few incidents of officers mistreating their men,
there were also unquestionably many well-intentioned
officers who posed no threat to the soldiers and
sailors.

35

It was in any event an atmosphere of

great distrust.

Certainly Glennon must have come

away from the incident feeling that Russian extremists could be persuaded to moderate their views if
they could be exposed to viewpoints similar to his
own.

After their successes with the Black Sea

Fleet, Glennon and his party travelled to the northern ports of Archangel, Roggekuel, Reval, and Helsingfors.

They were accompained part of the way by

Admiral Kolchak with whom Glennon discussed the
Russian Naval situation.

The Baltic Fleet had

already established its reputation for radicalism
and violence in March when it revolted and attempted
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to set up government by soviets.

Dmitri Fedotoff-

White's former commander, Admiral Nepenin, had been
murdered in the process.

There had been several

other major incidents since then, and it is safe to
say that the Baltic Fleet as well as various local
workers

soviets were constantly on the verge of

going over to the Bolshevik cause and declaring
themselves independent of the Provisional Government.
After their experiences with the Black Sea Fleet
the Glennon party must have entered the Baltic area
wi·th some t repi·a a t·ion. 36
Glennon's party first visited the port of
Archangel where they were able to view the long
lines of ammunition trains that were waiting to
move southward.

They also learned that conditions

in the fleet were bad, but there was no immediate
danger of revolt.

Moving on to Roggekuel on the

Gulf of Riga the Americans were able to sail on a
small destroyer whose crew proved to be both welltrained and enthusiastic.
Glennon party got

Returning to shore the

its first taste of the war when

they were interrupted by a German air raid.

Glennon

"enjoyed himself hugely" giving various orders and
leading his little band to cover.

37

At Zerel the

party got another positive view of the Baltic situation as enthusiastic sailors tossed Glennon in the
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air as per the local custom.

The Admiral apparently

enjoyed this event after a few nervous moments. 38
After an exciting thirty knot sail on the modern
destroyer Samson Glennon arrived in Helsingfors in
time to witness a revolt by several battleships.

As

Admiral Derderevskii's yacht attempted to set sail
for Reva! the battleships, under radical command,
attempted to block the yacht.

Luckily for Verder-

evskii several submarines that remained loyal to
the Admiral interposed themselves and the ships
withdrew.

39

After this incident Admiral Glennon and Fedotof fWhite became involved in another incident which
demonstrates

some. of the problems that the Provi-

sional Government faced.

After hearing of the brutal

slaying of Admiral Nepenin, Glennon thoughtlessly
remarked that it
Admiral

11

11

had served him

righ~'

as the Russian

had no business to give up without a fight.

11

Dmitri Fedotoff-White left the ·American Admiral's
presence in a rage and only Commander Crosley's
intervention persuaded him to return.

After Glennon

had made an apology Fedotoff-White explained that
the officers were virtually powerless as the government "didn't dare investigate or punish the murderers"
and had little real power to back them up because of
the strength of the Soviet.

Whether Glennon accepted
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this view is unknown but at least he was exposed to
i

' t • 40

Thus both General Scott and Admiral Glennon had
relatively broad overall views of the Russian military situation.

Although Scott could perhaps have

seen more of the Russian army, it is doubtful that
the Provisional Government would have wished to show
him their worst divisions.

Scott was well apprised

of the military situation in general and Glennon•s
experiences were exceptional.

Both men's conclu-

sions seem realistic under the circumstances.
Although General Scott seems to have evidenced
greater doubt that Russia could launch a strong
war effort, his advocacy of aid to Russian transportation seems to have been the most realistic
American policy available.

Both men seem to have

come off somewhat gruff but had profound, if ternporary, positive effects -- Scott in Roumania and
Glennon at Sebastopol.
to have been similar.

Dr. Mott's effect appears
The efforts of these three

men should not be discounted due to the limitations
placed upon them particularly by time and their
areas of expertise.

It is highly questionable

whether these men could have had.any strong influence
on the Soviet had they been given the opportunity,
although they might have had more insight into the
\
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situation facing the Russian people and their allies
had they been able to visit that body.

CHAPTER SIX
THE NEW LIGHT
OF THE WORLD

-113-

In retrospect the most important subsection of
the Root Mission was that of James Duncan and Charles
Edward Russell.

Given the political situation, the

discrediting of Root, and political and diplomatic
realities which precluded the special Ambassador
from making an appearance before the Soviet, America's
best chances to reach that body now rested on Duncan
and Russell.

Only they among Root Mission personnel

had the potential to establish a working relationship with the Soviet and adequately present the
American viewpoint.
James Duncan's style and socio-political background may have excluded him from the start.
received mixed reviews from those present.

He
Dmitri

Fedotoff-White's characterization was caustic in the
extreme.

White described Duncan as "stupid,"

"vulgar," and "practically devoid of manners.

11

Further, White reports that some members of the
American Commission "openly" ignored him. 1

In con-

trast, T. Bentley Mott described James Duncan as "an
absolute joy" who was both very amusing and at age
seventy-two still full of energy.

2

Duncan's manners

were not of crucial importance to the success of his
mission, and may in fact have been an asset in some
circles.

However, the union leader's naive approach

to the Russian situation was unlikely to influence
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the intellectual and idealistic theoreticians who
led the all-Russian and Petrograd Soviets -- whether
Marxist or not.

Duncan's emphasis was primarily

pragmatic and too closely tied to the American
experience to move or inspire the members of those
bodies.

It is possible that Duncan could have suc-

ceeded had he used a more inspiring approach.
Duncan apparently enjoyed his train ride from
Vladivostok to Petrograd where he was able to make
several speeches and numerous observations.

In-

cluded among the letters was one in which he described
the Manchurians as "more indolent than the Mongolians," which he may have attributed to his basic
premise that "where·returns or wages for labor performed are meagre, ambition to earn is not keenly
in evidence."

Perhaps the high point of the overland

ride for Duncan was his cribbage victory over Judson.
Duncan revealed his attitude on this occasion when
he described his success as a victory of the "industrialists over the military. 113
Duncan spent most of his time in Petrograd meeting with the Minister of Labor, Matthew I, Skobelev
and touring the factory districts in the Petrograd
area.

He quickly realized the danger that the atti-

tude of the workers posed to the war effort.

Duncan's

clasic example of this problem was the actions of
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the munitions workers who charged their employers
for two hour discussions of politics. 5

He hoped

to improve Russian business-labor relations by
introducing the Russian workers to the collective
bargaining approach of the American Federation of
Labor.

He conveyed this idea principally through

his talks with Skobelev and his speech to the
All-Russian Soviet.

He also advocated a shift

system that would increase Russian labor's output
and a quick settlement to labor problems in mining
and munitions.

In addition to these efforts Duncan

met on several occasions with British Labor Party
member, Arthur Henderson.

During these meetings

the two labor leaders discussed the war effort, the
Stockholm Conference, and labor problems in general.

6

Duncan's visit to the All- Russian Soviet in late
June influenced his whole perception of the Russian
situation.

While he watched, the Soviet voted on

a motion to deport a certain Robert Grirrm who was
allegedly a German spy.

The Provisional Government

had already decided to deport Grimm, and the Soviet's
vote thus constituted a vote of confidence.

This

vote was overwhelmingly in support of the government,
640 to 148.

Duncam concluded that the Provisional

Government enjoyed substantial support within the
Soviet.

The comfortable margin that the government
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received "practically governed the session thereafter
when important divisions affecting the status of the
Government were taken up. 117

Duncan was undoubtedly

naive in assuming that a single vote adequately
demonstrated the Soviet's support of the Provisional
Government.

He does not appear to have suspected that

the Soviet had become the real power center in Russia.
On June 29, 1917 the leader of the Granite
cutter's Association was given an opportunity to reach
the heart of revolutionary Russia.

He did not.

In his

usual mundane fashion he described American labor
practices, encouraged support for the "war to end all
wars", and advocated a law prohibiting child labor.
At one point Duncan·argued that although soldiers
couldn't fight in shifts, the workers could work in
shifts to support their comrades.

This approach was

a good one and quite naturally brought applause from
the soldiers' delegates who saw "the pith of the
argument."

The American labor leader did not elaborate

on how the workers' delegates received the idea.

In

any event Duncan concluded that his address had been
"well received" and that Soviet Chairman Tscheidze
had made an "able reply."

8

on July 27 Duncan attended the All-Russian Congress of Cossacks with Dr. Mott.

The Cossacks

constituted a relatively conservative force in Russian
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politics.

Nevertheless they had generally supported

the March Revolution.

By early July they were grow-

ing increasingly hostile to Bolshevik propaganda and
had become a major bulwark for the Provisional Government.

The Congress offered Duncan a more receptive

audience than the Soviet had been, but he apparently
failed to influence them in a major way and instead
concentrated on his major theme of increasing work in
the factories.

The Cossacks were, of course, largely

nomadic and had little interest in factory work. 9
During late June and early July Duncan visited
various other organizations, particularly the Petrograd Soviet, and made further visits to the workers
who were responsible for the output of war material.
From his report it appears that the American labor
leader spent most of his time passing out American
propaganda and giving speeches in which he advocated
increased work in the factories, support for the war,
adoption of the practices of American labor unions,
and adoption of union labels.

10

In his last major

address, to the All-Russian Trade Union in Petrograd
on July 5, Duncan once again struck these same tired
notes, expousing American methods of union organization and settling "trade contentions.

1111

There is no

record of how Duncan was received but this may well
have been the proper audience for his ideas.

In
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general, however, his pragmatic approach to the
advancement of "working men", which could have been
highly useful in other times, was not well suited to
a revolutionary era.

Perhaps typical of the situa-

tion was the attitude of R. J. Ischudetzki; a labor
leader who had arranged for Duncan's visits to the
various war-related industries in and around Petrograd.

Ischudetzki's position on the war was that he

wished to end it "promptly and successfully so that
there might be opportunity to depose and dethrone
capitalism. 1112
It is doubtful that James Duncan made any lasting impression on either the Russian workers or their
representatives.

He seems to have been satisfied

that one of his principle goals of increasing the
output of Russian workers through an adoption of the
shift system eventually gained Labor Minister
Skobelev's support.

Duncan reports that he was later

informed that "the agitation along this line was
satisfactory to the workers, providing suitable
compensation was assured them."

Duncan concluded

that the Mission's visit had been a timely one; the
Russian situation had on the whole been greatly
improved and "excellent general results" were in
ev1.d ence. 13
It is easy to view Duncan as having been blind
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to the meaning of the events that passed before his·
eyes.

Obviously his advocacy

6~

the adoption of

child labor laws and the use of union lables seems
preposterous in light of the questions of life and
death that were facing his audience.

The

disturb~ng

fact is that there must have been some reason for
Duncan to take such an optimistic view of the situation in his official report.

Certainly the vote in

the All-Russian Soviet that sustained the Provisional
Government was important, as were perhaps the others
to which Duncan alludes.
It is unlikely th.at his positive conclusions
were based upon some unrevealed facts.

He may simply

have suppressed his real fears both in the official
reports and his public statements.

Most likely, he

failed entirely to understand what he was observing.
There can, however, be little doubt that Duncan did
not have the personality, prestige, or perspective to
significantly influence those Russians with whom he
. con t ac t • 14
came in

Charles Edward Russell was potentially the most
important member of the Root Mission.

As an avowed

socialist, rather than a trade unionist, Russell had
a more concrete philosophical link with the Soviet's
leaders.

Although it is claimed that he had not read

all of Karl Marx's Das Kapital he had at least read
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some o f

1"t •

15

More important perhaps were his intel-

lectual facilities, which undoubtedly outshown Duncan's
and his reputation as a "muckraker" and socialist
candidate for Governor of New York.

Counter-balancing

these aspects of his background was his expulsion from
the pro-German Socialist Party of America, the
negative comments of Maxim Gorky's The New Life, and
an article published in Prahvda by Trorsky which contended that Russell was a "secret member" of J. P.
Morgan and Company.

16

Most probably realizing that

Russell did indeed have a chance of communicating
successfully with both the Russian Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats, anti-war forces concentrated their efforts in discrediting him.

That they

and some genuinely unconvinced Russians were successful in casting Russell in a bad light is highly probable,

Whether Russell could or should have been able

to overcome this sabotage is worthy of examination.
In making this examination it is perhaps crucial to
recognize that few Russians had knowledge of Russell
personally.

Reports of his expulsion from the Ameri-

can socialist Party, recounted in Gorky's paper and
perhaps others, must have some him significant, perhaps irrepairable, damage in the absence of common
knowledge of his genuine humanitarianism.

This is

another example of the harmful effects of both
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general Russian ignorance and the

ab~ence

of an

effective outlet for the American viewpoint.
Dmitri Fedotoff-White's impression of Charles
Edward Russell was somewhat critical.

He found

Russell a man of set and "rather moderate views" who
considered himself a socialist theoretician.

Further,

Russell kept the company of "several long-haired
individuals" who "led him by the nose" and "filled
his head with all kinds of nonsense.

1117

one is left

with the impression of a somewhat superficial socialist
who was easily swayed.

The identity of the "long18
haired individuals" is unknown.
Unlike most of his compatriots Charles Russell
seems to have avoided many of the early ceremonies and

to have begun
campaign.

the work of organizing the publicity

He worked on this with the aid of Stanley

Washburn from June 13 until June 18.

On the latter

date Russell and Duncan again appealed to the other
members of the Mission to begin a propaganda campaign
of massive proportions.

Russell

characterize~

the

feeling of the Root party as one of "great depression"
on this day.

At this point he asked to be relieved

of his publicity work; apparently feeling that it was
too insignificant under the circumstances.

19

During the remainder of his stay in Russia,
Russell spent the majority of his time meeting with
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the leaders of the Soviet and the
radical newspapers.

editor~

of various

On June 19 he met with the three

most influential non-Bolshevik

socialists~

Labor

Minister Skoboleff, the President of the Soviet,
Irakly G. Tseretelli and Social Revolutionary leader,
Victor Chernov.

Although Russell made no specific

report of this meeting it seems likely that he was
able to get a reasonably good view of the majority
socialist viewpoints.

When the main body of the Root

Mission went to Moscow, Russell remained in Petrograd to talk with Soviet leaders.

By June 22 he cabled

the State Department saying that his work could
not be completed in the time alloted and asked
for permission to extend his stay.

20

While he was awaiting a reply from the State
Department. Charles Russell was given an opportunity
to address the All-Russian Soviet.

21

Clearly aware

of the criticism that had been leveled at him, he
began his speech y demonstrating his socialist
credentials:
"I hold in one hand the red card of the
Socialist Party of the United States and
in the other the card of the printers'
trade union, ... of which I am a member.
I came therefore from the plain people
of America, from the workers, the radicals, the American revolution, the champions of democracy."
After praising the Russian revolution, the effects of
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which he described as "if in the darkest night a new
planet had suddenly arisen greater than the sun.",
the American socialist went on to describe America's
peaceloving nature.

Like most other speeches delivered

by members of the Root Mission, Russell's soon turned
to his main issue:

"Today the American radicals,

workers, and democrats have united ferevently to support and uphold this dreadful thing they had always
abhorred."

The war was one to save democracy, with-

out which "there can never come socialism, never come
peace, never come the emancipation of man."
II

Further

• we can never right the ancient wrongs of labor,

never gain for the producer the just fruits of his
toil, never free meri's hearts and lives from the
frightful blight and cold horrors of the competitive
system" without democracy.

22

This was perhaps the

best speech made by any member of the Root Mission.
Russell clearly understood his audience as well as
any American can have been expected to.

He picked

the best and only angle that he could have wisely used
to bring the members of the Soviet to the American
viewpoint.
It is clear that Charles Edward Russell understood the intricacies of the Russian situation in much
greater depth than the other members of the Root
Mission.

In a series of articles published in various
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popula American magazines soon after his return to
the United States, and eventually summarized in his
book, Unchained Russia, Russell concluded that the
decision of whether to continue the war lay with "the
toilers."

It was the Soviet, not the Provisional

Government, that controlled Russia's fate.

23

Further

a whole new attitude now prevailed in the land.

24

Russell criticized the "general failure of the Western
mind to grasp the sacredness of the Revolution. 1125
The "Allies never grasped the primary fact of the
situation • • • ,"that it was the voice of the
proletariat and the proletariat alone that was
heeded."

26

"Bµt so strong are the fixed habits of

men's minds that Russia must be like the government of
other countries.

1127

It was clear to Russell that the

Allies had th:Jught that the Russian Revolution aimed
only for political democracy,

"But the Russian

Revolutionists had shot far beyond political democracy;
they aimed at industrial democracy no less. 1128
What Russell feared was that the Russian worker
would never realize Germany's antipathy to democracy
. 1 sense. 29
. .
1 or in
. d us t ria
in either t h e po 1 1t1ca

This

fear was based on both the Allies' general misunderstanding of the nature of the revolution and the
presence of numerous "German" agents who "swarmed"
around the All-Russian Soviet, encouraging its leaders
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to thlnk that that body was the "r:cw 119ht o! tho
world" while tryinQ. w1th
the Russians

s~c

succc:rn. to conv1nco

that the United States wos tho enemy o!

the Revolution.

30

Ruoocll was oallcd by the !act that

the Gerr:1ans hod "overwhelmed the 1,111ea on a f 1old
never wisely nor cf!1c1cntly contcoted. 031

Further,

the American press was havinQ the c!!cct of a1d1nQ
the Germans 1n their qoals by 1to oarcost1c ort1clcn
about the Bolshev1ks or.d other "1gnorant" Runs1ans.
even if these stor1eo were
audiences.

o~unlnQ

lo ,\r.;cr1can

For Charles Rusocll "there won vary little

fun in stanchn9 on t.hc r 1cld o! H.:Jrn or.d hc:ir 1no
read to a cro~d o!
• " thoze ort.lclc:i ··
id1gnant Russ1ans.R 32 Chorlco Ruaucll'u v1cw o! thla
unfortunate s1tunt1on v<in shared by

So~ucl

tt.'irpcr.

1\s early as late April o! 1917: Pro!cnnor ll:sq:<tr had

began a

ca~pa19n

to have -oll rc!crcnccs to Runnion

wcaknes5 and 1nc!fcct1\. cr.crrn
0

Dcsp1 te

so~e

'~xchal•·d

!r~

the proan."

nuccc:w. hovcvcr. the nhort-:Uqhtcd

A.~erican attac~s

were

the Soviet 1n July.

ap~arcntly

nt1ll bo1r.Q road at

ll

V1trually alone ar.d probably larqcly d1ncrcd1tcd.
chaclcs Russell

~ust

h3~c

on June 30. Lans1r.g v1rcd
hl~

that

;"'~crican

~usscll

!clt

1~cr.r.c

;~bassndor

!runtrat1on.

franc15 to notify

could cxtcr.d his ntoy 1n Runnla.

soc1al1st nc•:cr received thus

tcl~ra::l.

The
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Ambassador Francis, perhaps unaware of Russell's
request, wired the Secretary of State at once asking
34
f or c 1 ari. f.ica t.ion.

. t h e say Francis
.
Later in
sent

another cable noting that Russell was "in through
touch with" the Soviet and was "maintaining that they
have the power."

Francis reported that this belief

had led Russell to talk about the Provisional Government "disrespectfully and openly, consequently, if
he remains in any capacity he might make trouble."
Francis concluded that Russell had decided that his
request was not to be answered and had therefore
35
decided to return with Root.
Thus the matter ended
with Francis withholding the cable, although Polk
wired Francis on July 7, ordering Russell's return.

36

After failing in his attempt to remain in Russia,
Charles Russell joined his fellow ambassadors on the
return trip.

It was clear in his mind that two

things must be done in order to save the Russian
situation for the Allies.

One was that a massive

propaganda campaign must be launched by the United
States and the other was that it must be impressed
on American newspaper editors that articles critical
of the Soviet and the Russians in general were having
a disasterous impact on the Russian view of America.
Russell would take up this two-fold mission upon his
return.

37

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CAREFUL ATTENTION
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
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While Dr. Mott, Scott, and Glennon were traveling and Russell and Duncan weie trying to gain
influence with the Soviet, Ambassador Root and the
other members of the Mission were attending conferences,
dinners, and entertaining or being entertained by
various Russians and Allies and Americans in Petgrograd.
f\mbassador Root remained in Petrograd throughout except
for a short trip to Moscow which, while it may or may
not have enlightened the mission members, does provide
some interesting insights into the Russian mind of 1917.
On June 21, Ambassador Root and the main body of
the mission, including Bertron, McCormick, Duncan,
3eneral Scott, T. Bentley Mott, Colonel Judson, and
various aids left Petrograd for Moscow by train.

Prior

to their departure Basil Miles had wired American
:ounsel Madden Summers that the mission, while in
~oscow,

wanted no banquets or entertainment that would

be "inconsistent with the present condition of short
food supply."

Miles requested that Sununers find

opportunities for "arousing some enthusiasm. 111

On

June 22 the American were officially welcomed by the
Moscow Duma.

After speeches by Mayor Astrov and several

leaders of Russian and American commercial organizations,
Root spoke.

Again he emphasized that the Americans

had come to aid Russia and that Germany was their
corrunon foe.

2
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Although Root is reported to have received loud
applause the response of several Moscovites who were
present is significant.

Were the Americans really

going to aid Russia in her time of need?

N. M. Kishkin,

Commissare of Moscow, voiced this question when he
stated that he had "always considered that the Americans • • were realists • • • we are sure that at the
present time the Mission has come with a real offer
for which we are deeply thankful. 113

The leader of the

Moscow Soviet, Tretiakov, pointed out that many Russian
"classes had not expected help from America in the war"
and emphasized that because of this it was imperative
that Russia derive a real benefit from the arrival of
.
4
th e Americans.
After the meeting Root spoke with reporters.

Con-

trary to his actual beliefs he emphasized that he was
not in the least bit alarmed by the Russian situation
and that he expected the war to end by 1918.

The

reporter seemed more interested that the American
soldiers followed orders out of a sense of duty in
absence of an "elective principle. 115
That night the Root party slept on their train
which was withdrawn from Moscow to Chimky, several
miles away, undoubtedly for safety reasons.

Throughout

the rest of their stay in Moscow the Root party attended
meetings and Root spoke to numerous groups.

Most of
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these events were of minor significance except for
Root's meeting with the High Procurator of the Holy
Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vladimir Lvov.
This meeting is of great significance not only because
it is one of the few that was well reported, but because Ambassador Root appears to have given substantial
weight to Lvov's observations on the Russian political
situation.

Further, Lvov's views were probably similar

to those held by leading members of the government and
many moderate socialists.

They are also important

because they are the only views of a Russian high official that can be documented in an American source. 6
The meeting was held at the National Hotel.
Ambassador Root began the coversation by inquiring as
to what Lvov thought of the proposed Constituent Assembly.

Lvov replied that he disagreed with the govern-

ment's timing; for he felt that the Assembly should not
be elected prior to the end of the war.

Lvov believed

that a constituent assembly could be safely convened
only after peace was achieved and Russia's "vital forces,"
i.e., the pro-law and order moderate majority of the
socialist parties, had time to come into play.

Further,

Lvov feared that if an assembly was elected prior to an
end of the fighting it would exhibit ... dangerously maximalistic tendencies."

Lvov went on to appraise the
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current situation.

He said an evergrowing gap between

the Maximalists (Bolsheviks) and the moderate majority
of socialists (the Social Revolutionaires and most
Mensheviks) existed and that if a "clear break" occurred
between the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government
he felt that the moderate Socialists would support the
government.
At this point in the conversation Root expressed
his fear that the Bolsheviks, waving the "black flag"
of a separate peace would revolt and gain control of
the country.

Lvov cited the large pro-government vote

in the Petrograd Soviet of March 14 (on a radical motion to arrest the Provisional Government) and contended
that the new coalition cabinet had the situation in
hand.

Nevertheless, Lvov stated that he expected that

the Bolsheviks could revolt at any time and probably
in the very near future.

Lvov felt that the moderates

would win out, although much bloodshed was likely.

The

moderate socialists understood that now was not the
time for many of the major socialistic innovations or
an abandonment of the private property system.

Root

voiced the primary American concern of whether the army
would be able to advance in the near future.

Lvov

replied that this was impossible until the Bolsheviks
were defeated and their propaganda silenced.

7
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Much of Lvov's analysis seems correct.

Although

the March 14 vote was somewhat.outdated it is clear
that the majority of Russian socialists were not
prepared to go forward with Bolshevik proposals.

8

That Lvov knew or believed that the Bolsheviks would
revolt in the near future is significant.

Root

accepted this view and it appears that the Provisional
Government expected it.

9

The political situation in

Russia had in fact changed radically since the Root
Mission had arrived.

The majority of the Murshevik

and Social Revolutionary parties were, by late May
or early June, committed to the Provisional Government.

In mid-June the Bolsheviks had won a decisive

moral victory in a contest of banners among the
workers of Petrograd.

This had caused much concern

in moderate and conservative circles and the Root
Mission must have been aware of it to some degree.

10

Judging from several of Ambassador Root's subsequent
observations, he appears to have accepted Lvov's
viewpoint that the Bolsheviks would be unable to gain
control of the country at that time.
on June 24 the Root Part, now including Crane
and Dr. Mott, returned to Petrograd, arriving the
next day.

From here Root and General Scott went to

Russian general staff headquarters (Stafka) at Mogilev
to meet with General Brusiloff.

After Brusilou
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apprised them of the military situation, Scott
left for the front and Roumania while Root returned
to Petrograd. 11

After their visits to Moscow and

Stafka the main body of the Root Mission resumed
schedules similar to those they had had prior to their
departure.

On June 28 the Mission held a general con-

f erence to discuss what was learned at Stafka.

On

Sunday, July 1, Root joined Tereschenko at his dacha in
Finland.

The majority of the Mission's members attended

special services at the Kazan Cathedral held in memory
1
.
of those who had died in the March Revolution. 2
Ambassador Root returned on Monday and again
took up the propaganda campaign.
cable of June 17,

Since his original

(see supra, p. 82-3.), the Mission had

received only a brief cable from Washington stating
that the proposal and short-term funding were being
given "careful consideration. 1113

Obviously con-

cerned, Root, with the aid of Mccormick and Bertron
had put up $30,000 of their own money to begin the
campaign.

This initial expense included the publish-

ing and mass distribution of two of President Wilson's
speeches and one of Ambassador Root's and was carried
out through the British and French.

14

Now, two weeks

after his original cable on the issue, Root again
cabled Lansing:

"I beg you to realize that Germany

is now attacking Russia by propaganda and is spending
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millions, at least a million dollars monthly, to
capture the minds of the Russian people."

He

stressed the urgent need for "active and immediate
counter-attacks by the same weapons" and noted the
Mission's $30,000 expenditure.

15

Charles Russell

reported that Root himself had often been the victim
of such propaganda, not necessarily German, and was
"violently" attacked at the Field of Mars where the
All-Russian Soviet met.

Russell stated that he
16
feared for the Ambassador's life.
Later in the day news of the successful advance

of General Brusilov was received from the front.
It inspired several popular demonstrations and the
Soviet passed a strong "pro-war, civic duty" resolution supported by all but a "very few Maximalists and
.
.
.
1 is
. t s. 111 7 . Th is
internationa
was, h owever, a 1 so th e

day when the All-Russian Soviet sponsored massive
demonstrations in Petrograd.

Confident of a victory

the moderate majority of the Soviet had supported the
idea which was originally a Bolshevik plan.

In what

turned out to be a contest of banners, the Bolsheviks
won an astounding moral victory.

There is no clear-

cut evidence that the Root Mission was aware of
this occurence or its implications on July 1.

It

may, however, serve to explain the urgency of Ambassador

~cot's

18
. t
cab 1 e to Was h ing on.
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From July 5 through the seventh Root was
occupied with the Conference of Allied Ambassadors
thenk taking place in Petrograd.

This Conference met

at the British Embassy and was chaired by Arthur
Henderson.

Its purpose was to determine how best to

aid Russia.

The conference report, adopted July 7,

suggested that Russia needed 2,000 locomotives and
40,000 railway cars, of which the United States could
send about half.

The report also advised adoption of

the shift system, expansion of repair shops, and
creation of price commissions and arbitration boards.
It offered American skilled labor, and instructed the
Russians to "avoid reckless driving."

In addition a

Joint Allied Committee would be set up on a semipermenant basis in Petrograd for the purpose of aid.
. 19
ing Russia.

After the Allied Ambassador's Conference Root
addressed a group of wounded soldiers on July 8 and
learned from Tereschenko that the Provisional Government would be unable to meet the military payrolls
due on July 15.

20

This impending crisis could have

had disasterous consequences, fanning the dissention
of the Army and Navy into armed opposition to the
Government.

Root immediately telegraphed Lansing to

request $75,000,000 in credits.

This request was

granted without delay, but no mention was made of the
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$100,000 grant for propaganda.

21

By this time the Mission was ready to implement
its propaganda plans.

Charles Smith of the Associated

Press had arrived from Peking to conduct the campaign.

22

Although the plan was under consideration in Washington,
approval was not forthcoming.

23

On July 7 Root had

received Washington's reply to his second request for
money to begin a publicity campaign.

The Mission was

informed that the President approved of the campaign
"in principle" and would authorize the $30,000
expense already incurred.

The question of further

outlay was "receiving the careful attention of the
Department."

24

The American envoys became discouraged.

T. Bentley Mott later stated that the "request for an
allotment with which to begin operations was so
modest" that the envoys had no idea "that it would be
refused."

Actually, as Colonel Mott pointed out, the

.
1 y ignore
.
d • 25
request was no t re f use d , i' t was simp

A

disgusted Root ordered Mott to make arrangements for
the Mission's return.

He told Mott:

"I want you to

get this expedition started back as quickly as possible.

We receive no replies to our telegrams and

our staying here under such conditions is useless.
Perhaps by going to Washington in person we can get
.
..26
some action.

A$ the Root Mission prepared to depart, the
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persistent rumors of a major Bolshevik uprising
continuea.

27

Charles Russell reported that at one

point it was suggested that the Root Mission withdraw to Helsingfors, as it was rumored that the
Bolsheviks planned to attack the Winter Palace and
"wipe out" the Americans.

28

Nevertheless the

American ambassadors seem to have accepted the
assurances of Procurator Lvov, Kerensky, and others,
that the revolt would be successfully suppressed
and the leaders of the Bolsheviks imprisoned.

29

Root cabled his appraisal of the situation to Lansing
on July 10:
We feel that we have contributed materially
to strengtheni~g the Provisional Government
and improving morale of people and army.
The situation is certainly much more hope30
ful and stable than it was when we arrived.
Root's analysis of the work of the Mission was
not only wishful but largely inaccurate.

There can

be little doubt that the speeches of several members
of the Root Mission had been temporarily useful to
the Provisional Government.

It is improbable that

any of these speeches had a lasting impact.

The

Mission had clearly, but understandably, failed to
influence the great mass of the Russian people.

This

could only have been done through a large scale
publicity apparatus.
That the Russian situation was "much more hope-
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ful and stable" was clearly open to question.

in

fact the Provisional Government and their tenuous
allies, the moderate majority faction of the Soviet,
had recently suffered a def eat by the Bolsheviks in
a contest for popular support in Petrograd.

The

Galicia offensive did appear successful on July 10
but the internal situation must be seen to have
worsened since mid-June.

In any realistic analysis

the outcome of the expected Bolshevik uprising would
be the determining factor.

Since this had yet to

occur Root's analysis must be considered as premature. 31
The Root Mission decided not to await the predieted uprising and boarded their train for
Vladivostok later on the tenth.

The return trip

across Siberia was made by all the major original
members of the Mission except Crane and Judson.
Colonel Judson was appointed Military Attache in
Petrograd where he remained until his recall in
December, 1917.

32

Charles Crain remained in Russia

until September.
The only major incident of the return trip
occured on July 11 when the American stopped at
Viatka where they learned that a wooden bridge over
which they must cross had been burned.

The following

day, while the Mission waited for the tracks to be
switch~d

to a new stone and steel bridge nearby, an
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icehouse near their train was set on fire and flames
spread to several frei9ht cars.

Both inc1dcnts wore
presumed to have been the work of the Dolnhcv1ka. 33
The train finally pulled out of V1atka on July 12
after a delay of thrity hours.

Tho rcma1ndcr of the

journey to Vladivostok was peaceful.

The train stopped

on two occasions for tho members to 90 awir:-r.itno and
Root made two speeches both of wh1ch were reportedly
well received.

On July 21 the Root Miosion arrived in

Vladivostok and Cr:lbarkcd for 1\rncr1ca that afternoon
at 2:41 p.m.

Prior to his departure.

A.~bassador

Root

left the l\lncrican Connul at Vlad1vo5tok. John K.
Caldwell. a letter for Frank
Red Cross Co::-.:nission.

B1ll1n~a

of the arr1vino

Thls letter providen and

excellent and more realistic
conclusions about Rusnla.

stat~cnt

of Root's

After polnt1no out that tho

of aid was predicated on whether Rusn1a would be able
to continue the war. Root added that:
We arc sat1sf 1cd that practically no one
really connected v1th the qovcrr..~ent.
either directly in the departr.:cnts or
1r.d1rcctly ln tho r.~jor1ty of the council
of te Wor;:.en's and Soldier's Deputies.
has any intention of r...aY.1n9 a separate
peace.
Root bcl1cvcd the cruc1al qucst1or: was whether the
Provisional
the war.
the w1ntcr

Govern~cnt

had the povcr to contlno

The f trnt "serious tent .. would
wh~n

co~c

dur.i.nQ

tho probl<?:':l of hav1n9 onou9h food.
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both at the front and in the cities, would come to
the fore.

If this problem could not be met effectively,

Root predicted "mob violence" and the overthrow of
the Provisional Government.

Root concluded that

general problems with transportation and labor,
especially the "great lack of discipline among the
railroad employees", made improvement "very difficult".
He advised Billings to take over the care of the
refugees from occupied Russia and Poland so that
the Provisional Government could concentrate on
supplying the army. 34

This letter to Billings

demonstrates that Root had a reasonable understanding of the Russian situation and that behind his
public optimism lay serious doubts about the
Provisional Government's ability to survive.
As the Root Mission left Russia in late July
the predicted "Bolshevik" revolt took place.

Like

many of the events of the Russian revolutions of
1917, it was largely spontaneous and leaderless.
The uprising was eventually turned into a victory
for the moderates and conservatives.
would dominate until mid-September.

35

These forces
It is not

know exactly when the Root Mission's members
learned of the outcome which appeared to corresponc
to Procurator Lvov's predictions.
the

"vi~tory"

in actual fact

of the non-Bolshevik elements was
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turbulent and short-lived because the basic
problems of land distribution and war aims remained
unresolved.

The Root Mission in all probability

arrived in Washington believing that Lvov and those
.
.
. t were correc t • 36
wh o supper t e d h is
viewpoin

The return voyage was made in fourteen days.

On

July 26 the Buffalo ran into a "brisk nor 1 wester 11
which caused the vessel to go through "certain
complicated gyrations, which proved to be incompatible
with the gastric safety of a number of the passengers."
Dr. Holten Curl lectured oti his expetience on the
Russian front and Stanely Washburn spoke on "Russia's
contribution to the cause of the Allies."
docked at Seattle on August 3.

37

The Buffalo

CHAPTER EIGHT
INDECISION AT THE WHITE HOUSE
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The Root Mission disembarked at Seattle on
~ugust

4 and, after a brief reception, Root, Russell,

Duncan and General Scott spoke, generally emphasizing that democracy and the Provisional Government
.
.
. 1
wou ld survive
in Russia.

After a short stop in

Chicago the envoys arrived in Washington on August 8
where they were met by State Department counselor
~rank

Polk and Samuel Gompers.

At a Washington press

conference Ambassador Root again emphasized Russia's
strengths and the democratic traditions of many of
the cities, towns and Zemstvo unions.

Major Washburn

1dmitted that the military situation was discouraging; the Russians having begun to fall back from
:;eneral Brusilov' s J·uly offensive, but contended
that the Russians would get stronger and the Germans
weaker if the battle lines approached Petrograd and
~oscow.

General Scott was optimistic, noting that

1fter an "orgy of liberty" the Russians were settling
jown.

The Mission's members presented a united front

of praise of Russia, optimism, and assurance that no
separate peace could be made while the Provisional
Government remained in power.

Only Charles Edward

Russell openly disagreed with his colleagues on any
issues.

Russell, while basically supporting the

general outlook of the other members, contended that
America should send troops to the Russian front and
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continued to assert that the

11

the real government of Russia.

workman 1 s council" was
2

The other members of

the American Mission remained silent on the latter
question but issued a general statement disagreeing
with sending troops.

The majority contended that

transporting a small number of troops there would be
of no moral or military account and when the Russians
saw

~hat

American troops received higher pay and

better rations the reverse might occur.

3

The question of whether or not to undertake a
full scale propaganda campaign in Russia continued
to be a source of conflict.

Naturally the subject

did not become a public issue but it was the major
thrust of the Root Mission's suggested Russian
strategy.

Ambassador Root was, as demonstrated above,

undoubtedly concerned.

His sense of urgency is

revealed by the fact that he cabled Lansing from
Chicago on August 6 requesting an immediate meeting
with the President which was granted.
Bentley Mott described the meeting:

Colonel T.
"everybody was

struck by the questions the President asked.
very well informed • • • 11
11

He seemed

on the Russian situation,

intelligent and charming.

11

But he said not a word

as to the Corrunission•s plan or why he had never
answered those telegrams.

11

Mott does not record

whether\anyone asked the President about either topic,
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but if his account is correct it seems unlikely that
anyone did.

4

That the Root Mission's foremost pro-

ject was not even discussed seems incredible.
Unfortunately there are no other in-depth reports of
this meeting.

It is possible that the members of the

American Commission believed that they would soon
have another opportunity to discuss the matter with
the President at length.

This was not to be the case.

After their meeting with the President the Root
Mission had a "long conference" with Lansing followed
by a more lengthly discussion between Root and the
Secretary of State.
in memo.

Lansing recorded these meetings

The Secretary of State noted that he was

"astounded at their optimism" and stated that he felt
that the Russian Revolution would follow the basic
path of the French Revolution, i.e. moderation followed
by terror culminating in a revolt against the terror
and some type of military despotism.

Lansing con-

cluded that while there was still a chance that the
Provisional Government and its allies would survive,
the United Stated should "strengthen" Russia "morally
and materially" but be prepared for her ultimate withdrawal from the war.

5

During their meeting of August 8, the President
requested a full report be sent to him when ready.
On

Augu~t

21, Dr. Mott forwarded the report of the Root
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Mission, a supplemental report including the proposed propaganda campaign, his own ideas on the
uses of Y.M.C.A. stations in Russia, and several
individual reports by members of the Commission. 6
The main report covered various topics and
provides a general summary of the conclusions of
the Root Mission.

The Report's chief contentions

were that Russia's greatest problem was one of
transportation; merchant ships were scarce and land
transportation was "defective."

The railroads in

particular, were crippled by "defective organization"
and by obsolete and worn-out rolling stock.

The

Report reiterated Root's note to Billings; the
Provisional Government would not make a separate
peace if it had "the power to continue the war."
This power was predicated on popular support and
the functioning of the "industrial system."

The

Government must also solve the problems of war
weariness, increasing industrial inefficiency (which
the Mission rated at one half of normal output),
increased production costs, and the fact that many
peasants were holding back their crops due to the
decrease in the value of the ruble.
The Root Mission's report was very clear in
noting that the Petrograd Soviet had originally
held "a greater power to exercise force" during the
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first months after the March Revolution than did the
Provisional Government.
All-Russian Soviet the

Upon the election of the
r~lationship

between the

Soviet and the Government was more cooperative because
the former was more conservative and responsible than
its predecessor.

The Report pointed out that the

Provisional Government's policy of separating the
"Maximalists" or "Bolsheviks" from the moderate
majority was working and that the Provisional Government now had the power to enforce its decrees.
The Report concluded that substantial economic
aid from the Allies would create "a strong probability
of keeping Russia in the war."

Without such aid

there was "little prospect" of so doing.

The benefits

of such aid would be "enormous" even if they allowed
Russia only to "maintain its defensive" and thereby
force the Central powers "to maintain continuously a
large force upon their eastern front."

The report

was signed by all but Charles R. Crane, who was still
in Russia. 8
In its supplemental report the Root Mission's
propaganda plan estimated that the Germans were
spending three million dollars a month.

The Mission

suggested countering this with a total outlay of five
and one half million dollars to establish a modern
news service in Petrograd to provide information for
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newspapers and periodicals, the publishing of pamphlets,
a film service, special advertising through posters and
the like, and to employ "hundreds" of speakers to tour
the army and the country.

The Y.M.C.A., through Dr.

Mott, offered to establish camps and stations throughout Russia to provide recreation, reading rooms, lectures,
movies, various courses, and "highgrade theatrical plays"
to help improve the morale of the Russian Army.

The

individual reports were basically elaborations of the material covered in the main and supplemental reports.

Root

discussed the propaganda campaign, recommended journalist
John F. Bass to head publicity in Russia, and described
the Russians as "completely bewildered. 119
The reports, al·ong with a memo from Dr. Mott
about publicity were given to Lansing on August 21,
but the President seems to have had them in his hands
by the following day when he wrote Mott to thank him.
Wilson's only comment on his intentions was a simple,
unspecific, "I want and intend to help.

1110

It was now ever two and half months since the
idea of a publicity campaign had first been conceived;
yet very little action had been taken.

Outside of the

publications of th speeches by Wilson and Root,
paid for by the members of the Root Mission, only a
promise to send one and a half million postcards,
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had been elicited from the Administration.

11

What occured during the following period is
unclear and difficult to document.

On August 24

Colonel Mott called on the President immediately
prior ro the cabinet meeting of that day.

Neither

Mott nor Ray Stannard Baker's Woodrow Wilson:

Life

and Letters give an account of what was said at this
12
.
mee t 1ng.

Later in the day, presumably after the

cabinet meeting, the President sent a telegram to
The Russian National Council Assembly, also known
as the Moscow State Conference, which was to begin
meeting on August 25 in Moscow.

13

The message was

typically ambiguous, expressing hope for "the
triumph of ideals of democracry for self-government
against all enemies within and without" and hoped the
Assembly would give "material and moral assistance
.

. • to the Government of Russia in the promotion

of the Common cause in which the' two nations are
unselfishly united.

14

On August 30, Root, accompained by Dr. Mott and
Cyrus McCormick, called on the President again to
discuss their propaganda plans.
was characteristic.

Wilson's response

He would give the plan

"sympathetic consideration 15
11
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Whether or not a major propaganda campaign of the
type suggested by the Root Mission would have kept Russia
in the war and the Bolsheviks out of power can never be
known.

If such a campaign had been started when it was

first conceived in June the results might well have
been satisfactory.

There is little doubt that the plan

could have been started in late June or early July.

The

necessary personnel were available, including Russell,
Washburn, Harper, and by July, Arthur Bullard in Moscow
and Charles Smith in Petrograa. 16

Russell, Washburn,

and Bullard were already working on publicity.
they needed was money and effective outlets.

What
Obviously,

the plans for motion pictures and touring speakers required more time to prepare and the organizational
abilities of an agency like Creel's Committee on Public
Information.

Nevertheless newspaper outlets existed and

the Provisional Government must have had influence with
many of them.

Further, with the majorities of the Social

Revolutionary and Menshevik parties now committed to the
war, numerous possibilities must be seen to have existed.
By late August, it was probably entirely too late to
change Russian public opinion about the war and the
Provisional Government, or to clarify America's position
on war aims.

Wilson apparently was temporizing, for

he remained uncommitted to the Root Mission recommendations on November 10, 1917, three days after the
Bolshevik revolution.

Responding on that date
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to a letter from Russell, again urging a full-scale
propaganda effort, the President said that Russell's ideas
ran "along the lines of my own thought," and that he would
do his best; but "all sorts of work in Russia now is
rendered extremely difficult because no one channel
connects with any other, apparently."

Wilson for-

warded Russell's letter to Creel saying it was "a
very important letter .

very near the heart of

the subject it is concerned with. 1117
The Mission recommendations had, in the interim,
been sent to Creel who, according to his memoirs, supported plans by the Railroad Commission and the Red
Cross but intially opposed the publicity idea as too
expensive.

Creel ultimately suggested that someone

be sent to pursue the propaganda campaign "after study."
On October 27, Edgar Sisson, Editor of Comopolitan
and nor employed by the Committee on Public Information,
sailed for Russia.

He arrived on November 25, several

weeks after the October Revolution.

For a time

he, assisted by Bullard, attempted to put forward
the American viewpoint, but by then their efforts were
of little value.

18

During the remainder of August and throughout
September, Root, Russell, and Duncan spoke of their
experiences on numerous occasions.

On August 16,
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they spoke at the Union League Club in New York.
Root continued to emphasize the strengths of
Russia, citing "self-control equaled in few countries of the world" and an "extraordinary capacity
for concerted action. 1119

On September 6 Root spoke

at the convention of the American Bar Association
at Saratoga, New York.

He contended that while

the Provisional Government had initially lacked
control over the population and army it had eventually won over the "reasonable socialists" in the
soviet and with them the Petrograd garrison.

In

response to the public concern with the July uprising,

and the march on Petrograd by General Kornilov

Root noted that these events had been explained to
him prior to his departure.

They were part of a

plan to make Kerensky dictator of Russia.

One can

only-imagine the effect in the Russian press of
this surprising, even incredible, contention.
There is certainly a possibility that it was
true and could have been conveyed to Root by any
number of people he had met with in Russia.

The

lack of political wisdom evidenced by its public
mention is truly surprising, especially on the part of
a man of Root's experience and general good judgement. 20
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The major theme of Charles Edward Russell's
post-mission speeches and some of Ambassador Root's
was that of counter-attacking those prominent
Americans who were still advocating peace.

Principle

among these was Senator LaFollette who had demanded
that the Allies state their terms and introduced a
resolution in the senate asking for a peace conference.
Russell began the counter-attack at the Union League
Club reception of August 15, when he called LaFollette
a:

"disloyal American that disgraces the Congress of

the United States", and a "trator in disguise that has
taken the oath of allengiance and goes to the Senate of the
United States to do the dirty work of the Kaiser."
Russell went on to note that LaFbllette's words would
be repeated on the Field of Mars and cause further
weakening of Russian resolve.

Senator Root joined in

the attack, calling those who still backed peace
after the decision for war had been made, "pro-German
traitors" who "ought to be shot."
Roosevelt supported this view.

Former President

21

In early September Riga began to fall to a
German offensive.

Russell spoke again in the sixth

at the Convention of the American Alliance for Labor
and Democrary in Minneapolis attacking LaFollette and
his allies, particularly Senators Gronna and Stone,
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and citing them as the real captors of Riga.

22

Root

continued the attacks on September 13 in Chicago
mention no names but calling all arguments against
the war, "enemy arguments.

23

On September 15 Russell

again attacked LaFollette, Gronna and Stone and
demanded charges against them for "plain murder. 1124
It is clear from his book, Russia Unchained, that
Russell truly believed that anti-war and pacifistic
statements by prominent Americans would have a serious
effect on Soviet opinion.

It is not within the scope

of this paper to calculate the effect of the words
and actions of LaFollette, Gronna, Stone and others.
nevertheless Charles Russell was one of a very few
Americans who had been to the Soviet and seen the
effect of similar statements and actions in the
.
25
American press.
Internally, the Root Mission had been a model of
unity~

With some relatively minor exceptions the

menbers worked together with "terrific spirit" and
without quarre1.

26

This internal harmony must be

attributed to the influence of Elihu Root.

From all

accounts the members of the Root Mission thought
highly of the performance of the former Secretary of
state.

27

Charles Russell believed that Root was in

danger for his life during much of the trip; yet "he

r-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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bore himself throughout with a dignified and tranquil
composure that moved us all to admiration."

Further,

"his personal kindness, unfailing wit, and genial
acquiesence in whatsoever hardship or difficulty won
all our hearts, however, we might differ from his
views. 1128

Admiral Glennon is said to have told

Josephus Daniels that he had "never heard more patriotic Or wiser utterances in support of the true democratic spirit" than those of Root.
praised the Mission's leader.

29

James Duncan also

30

Despite this general harmony within the Root Mission, Root, and his friends, questioned the President's
motives throughout the episode.
grapher, Phillip

c.

According to his bio-

Jessup, Root felt that

"Wilson didn't want to accomplish anything.
It was a grand-stand play. He wanted to
show his sympathy for the Russian Revolution.
When we delivered his message and made our
speeches, he was satisfied; that's all he wanted." 31
Further Root suspected that Wilson hadn't even read
the Ambassadors' dispatches regarding the publicity
campaign.

32

Nevertheless, Colonel Mott contended that

he had never heard Root speak of Wilson in anything
except "a spirit of entire objectivity."33

Given the

President's unsupportive behavior and the absence of
a documentable explanation for it, it is understandable
that Root and his compatriots would think that their
work had been futile and that the President had used them.
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thus decided to await the return of the Root Mission.
This would not, of course,

ans~er

the question of the

half-hearted effort that was made but would explain
its delay.

CONCLUSION

-15&-

Whether the Root Mission can be expected to
have had a significant impact on the Russia of 1917
is of course open to question.

The fundamental

problems which lay behind its inability to win over
the Russian populace to a continuation of the war
were massive.

They included the basic ignorance of

President Wilson and his closest advisors as to the
power and influence of the Russian socialists; the
failure of the President to make a clear, concise
declaration of American war aims, which helped to
undermine the Mission and America's credibility; and
the practical inability of a small party of partially
discredited Americans, having only tenuous administrative support, to overcome an apparently massive
combination of German and Bolshevik propaganda.
President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing
had an extremely limited knowledge of Russia.

In

addition most, if not all, of their advisors failed
to realize the advances that had been made by the
various socialist groups in that country.

The blame

for this failure must be placed in part on the
inadequacy of the American intelligence gathering
system in Russia and the poor communications system.
It was clearly a mistake for the President
to have relied on the initial analysis of Charles
crane and Samuel Harper.

It is obvious that neither

I- ------------------------------
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had, during March, April, and May, and adequate understanding of the defacto:EX>wer enjoyed by the Petrograd
Soviet and the workers, soldiers, and sailors of
Russia.

In light of the conservative make-up of the

Provisional Government and the fact that neither man had
been able to see the situation first hand, their lack
of perception is understandable.

The plain fact of

the matter is that no one in the administration or
among the Western Allies knew what was happening and
mistakenly viewed the March Revolution as a triumph of
liberal-nationalism.
It was this failure to recognize the influence
of the socialists coupled with Lansing's basic
conservatism, and the domestic political considerations
of the administration that caused the selection of men,
who despite their general good intentions and sympathy
for Russia, were almost inevitably to be viewed with
at best a suspicious eye by the Russian socialists.
The choice of Root was clearly a mistake.

Although

the Bloshevik, German, and socialist attacks on his
character were clearly unfair, the former Senator was
obviously too closely tied to conservative Republican
and eastern corporate interests to have been given a
fair hearing in much of Russia.

Despite this fact he

demonstrated genuine sympathy for the country and
performed admirably as head of the Mission.

Unfortunately

,-

--------------------------------
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he was, in a purely political sense, the wrong man
for the job.

Either Roosevelt or Bryan would have

been superior and the failure of Wilson to choose
Bryan remains a mystery.

Many of the other members

of the Mission appear to have reflected the domestic
political concerns and to have been drawn from background that were too conservative to be influential
with the defacto powers in Russia.

It should,

however, be noted that they were selected prior to
the ouster of Milyukov and Guchkov and the resultant
bourgeoisie-socialist coaliation was established.
Even when the necessity of influencing the Russian
socialist groups began to be recognized, Wilson and
his advisors failed to come up with Americans who
could properly be expected to do so.

James Duncan

was clearly a domestic political choice whose membership in the American Federation of Labor automatically
alienated significant nmnbers of Russian socialists.
Charles Edward Russell might well have been an
excellent choice had it not been for the attacks made
upon him by the Socialist Party of America and certain
Russian refugee groups.

These groups and the Russian

far lest appear to have succeeded on largely discrediting Russell even before his arrival in Petrograd.
The result of this unfortunate occurance was that
the American Mission had no representative whose
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political image could be expected to significantly
influence the Soviet.

The Root Mission was thus

most probably politically unexceptable to the
Russian left from the outset.

Despite this fact it

was well received by the government and other more
conservative circles and might still have been able to
win over a majority of Russian popular opinion had it
been able to express concurrence with the socialist
viewpoint regarding war aims and eventual peace terms.
President Wilson had decided for political reasonss,
not to discuss these issues and, when he ordered the
Root Mission to refrain from speaking to them entirely,
the Americans' chances of winning over a majority of
Russians must be seen to have declined significantly.
That this policy continued despite the please of
Kerensky, Charles Crane, and Ambassador Francis,
which were delivered through Lincoln Steffens, is somewhat surprising.

This is particularly because of the

purported influence of Crane.

It cannot be demon-

strated that the British and French would not have
gone along with public concessions to the Russian left,
nor can it be demonstrated that a significant offensive
by Wilson, the Mission, or both, on these important
issues, would not have persuaded the Russian masses
to continue their efforts.

Once the decision not to

speak to war aims and peace terms had been made the

,-
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Root Mission was relegated to using the carrot of
massaive economic assistance and "war for democracy"
oratory to persuade the Russians to continue.
Unfortunately these policies and statements had
little tangible inunediate value for the Russian
people and the Mission and appear to have been ignored
by the Russian left.
In addition it is important to note that the
Root Mission was by itself too small and insignificant
to have been expected to have reached the great mass
of Russian people.

Despite the fact that several

members of the Mission, particularly Admiral Glennon
and Dr. Mott were given significant opportunities to
influence large numbers of Russians, these opportunities
must be considered insignificant when compared to the
opportunities open to the Bolsheviks, their allies, and
German agents then at work in Russia.

As Charles

Russell stated, the western powers had been defeated
on a field that was neither fully nor wisely contested.
The best and perhaps only way to have done this was
through a large scale educational campaign such as the
Root Mission proposed.

Had this been undertaken by

the allies in conjunction with the Provisional Government in early June the outcome of the Russian
Revolutions of 1917 might well have been different.
rt certainly cannot be said that the ultimate Bolshevik
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victory seemed improbable.

Nevertheless the threat

was there, and the Root Mission, though fully aware
of it, was obviously unable, on its own, to have
significantly opposed such a threat without a large
scale educational campaign and strong allied and
administration backing.

The plain fact of the matter

was that the Russian people were tired of war and
were understandably more interested in fundamental
internal reforms.
The most unfortunate aspect of the Root Mission
was that its members, particularly Root, Dr. Mott, and
Admiral Glennon, performed well, knew what was needed,
and yet were unable to do much about the problems that
they saw.

To the degree that America could have

influenced Russia, the Root Mission's failure to do so
must largely be seen as a lack of administration
support.

The Wilson Administration was clearly pre-

pared to dole out large sums of money and war material
to the Russians but was simply unworthy to commit
itself to a massive effort to win the hearts and
minds of the Russian people.

As for the performance of

the Mission as a whole it was cohesive.

-162-

FOOTNOTES
Chapter I
1.

William H. Chamberlain, The Russian Revolution,
1917-1921, 2 Vols.
(New York: The MacMillen
Company, 1960), 1:75. Statement of Duma Representative, Dr. Paul N. Milyukov, soon to be
Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government.
Secretary of State Lansing believed this to have
been the case for a fact.
Lansing to Wilson,
15 March 1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers (hereinafter
Wilson MSS) Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
Reel 383/5A412-414.

2.

Chamberlain, 1:73-98; Marcel Liebman, The Russian
Revolution, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970)
p.p. 100-108.

3.

Chamberlain, 1:78; Liebman, p.p. 102-04. Tsar
Nicholas was at Stafka (General Staff Headquarters
at Mogilev) during this period. Apparently feeling confident of his position after the comparatively sparse crowds of March 11 had been disbursed
with ease, Nicholas dismissed the Duma.

4.

V. V. Shulgin, "Days" in "Revolution and Civil War
in the Narratives of White Guards" p. 99, quoted
in Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian
Revolution.
(Durham, N. C.: Duke University
Press, 1954) p.25. Shulgin, a monarchist deputy,
stated that he feared that "others
. who have
already elected some scoundrels in the factories"
would take power.

5.

Chamberlain, 1:89.

6.

Ibid.

7.

Ibid.

8.

This was a decisive occurrence. The Soviet of 1905
had included only "workers" and their "representatives." Whether, in 1917, it was decided to include
the soldiers due to their presence in large numbers
at the Tauride Palace or the decision to include
them was made for obvious political reasons, their
inclusion in the Soviet was a tremendous boost to
the power of that body.
Ibid.

I

1 : 8 6.

-1639.

Chamberlain, 1:93.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Alexander Kerensky manager to persuade the Soviet
to allow him to join the government and retained
his membership in the Soviet until the Bolshevik
Revolution in November. N. S. Chkheidze was
offered the position as Minister of Labor in the
Provisional Government but decided not to
participate on the basis of that vote .. Chamberlain,
1:89.

12.

Ibid.

13.

Liebman, p.p. 121-6.

14.

Francis to Lansing, 14 March 1917. United States
Department of State: Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918,
Russia, (hereinafter U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia),
3 Volumns (Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1931), p.1~11.

15.

Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy
of Woodrow Wilson, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1937.), p. 203; Arthurs. Link, Wilson The
Diplomatist: A Look At His Major Foreign Policies,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957.), p.p.
3-29. Wilson's knowledge of. Russia was probably
confined to that of the State Department. This
information was summarized in an unsigned memorandum entitled "Russia." May 1917. State Department
Records, re "World Ware I and its Termination,
1914-29," (hereinafter State Department Records),
National Archives, Washington, D. C. Microfilm
series 367, Frames 763.72/4711~/0016-0029.

16.

Link, p. 24.

17 .

Ibid .

18.

Samual Flagg Bemis, The American Secretaries of
state and Their Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A.
Knoph, 1929). 14 vols.
"Robert Lansing" by Julius
w. Pratt, 10: 47-175.

19.

Lansing to Wilson, 20 March 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, p. 1-13.

I

I

1: 94.

p. 5 .

-164-

20.

Wilson, War Message to Congress, 2 April 1917,
The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Ray Stannerd
Baker and William E. Dodd, editors, 6 volumes,
{New York: Harper's Brothers, 1925-1927), 5:12-13,
cited in Lloyd C. Gardner, Wilson and Revolutions:
1913-1921, The America's Alternatives Series,
Edited by Harold M. Hyman (Philadelphia, New York,
San Jose, Toronto: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1976),
p. 74.

21.

William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947.
{New York: Octagon Books,
1952, 1971), p. 86, Note 146. Wilson was also
pressed with advice by Oscar Straus, former Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Henry Morgenthau,
former Ambassador to Turkey, Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, Eliot Wadsworth of the American Red Cross
and Charles R. Flint, a wealthy industrialist.
In addition, Cyrus R. McCormick, the son of tpe
inventor of the reaper and soon to be made a
member of the Root Mission, offered his opinions.
McCormick to Wilson, May 9, 1917, Wilson MSS,
Reel 195/64B/42338-9.

22.

Williams, p. 86, Note 146.

23.

Wilson adopted Crane's view of the revolution and
Russia's new leaders. Josephus Daniels, The
Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913=1921,
Edited by E. David Cronon {Lincoln, University of
Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 119.

24.

Samuel N. Harper, The Russia I Believe In: The
Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper, 1902-1941. Edited
by Paul v. Harper with the assistance of Ronald
Thompson {Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1945), p. 78.

25.

Ibid, p. 79.

26.

Lansing to Wilson, 15 March 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
158/86/91639.

27.

Samuel w. Harper to Richard T. Crane, 16 March
1917, Wilson MSS, Box 158/86/91640-91645.

28.

Daniels, The Wilson Era, 2:56-7.

,---------------------------------------

-165..:

29.

Charles R. Flint, Memories of an Active Life.
(New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1923), p. 232. The
speakers at some of these.tallies included such
prominent Americans as Charles Evans Hughes,
Joseph Choate, Judge Alton B. Parker, and
Mayor Mitchell.

30.

David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy,
April, 1916-November, 1918, (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1921), p.p. 1-12; George Kennan,
Russia Leaves the War, 2 vols.
(New York: The
Atheneum, 1967), 1:32-35.

31.

Harper, Memoirs, p. 93.

32.

Francis to Lansing, 18 March 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, p. 1..,..5.

33.

House to Wilson, 12 March 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
198/91662.

34.

Fancis to Lansing, 22 March 1917, State Department
Records, 861.00/294-296.

35.

R. H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent, (New York:
Graden City, 1933), p. 279f Warth, p. 31; Lincoln
Steffens, Autobiography, (New York: Harcourt Brace,
1931), p. 764. Steffens and William Sheppard, a
journalist who had accompanied him, told Francis
that the Soviet held the real power but Francis
said he couldn't observe it nor send someone to.
The Ambassador told the reporters that they could
cover it. He would be interested in what they
could tell him about it. Francis was perfectly
right in observing that he could not go. This
would have been an insult to the government.
Whether he should have sent someone is open to
question. Certainly someone should have been
there as an American observer, most probably a
journalist in whom the administration had confidence.

36.

U.S.F.R .. 1918~E_ussj,_a, passim. The unfortunate
communications system does, however, serve as a
possible explanation for the increasingly pessimistic view of Russian affairs that both Lansing
and Wilson appear to have taken over the course
of the summer of 1917.

I

-·----- ------------·-----··--------------·----

-166-

37.

Francis to Lansing, 18 March 1917, U.S.F.R.,
1918: Russia, 1:5. See also Charles Crane to
Richard Crane, 14 May 1917, Wilsom MSS, Reel
383/SA/544, confirming Francis' observations on
the tranquility of Petrograd. These reports
undoubtedly contributed to the false optimism
within the Wilson Administration.

38.

Francis to Lansing, 23 March 1917, U.S.F.R.,
1918: Russia, 1:15-16.

39.

Ibid.

40.

Lansing to Wilson, 11 April 1917, including a
copy of Francis to Lansing, 10 April 1917, United
States Department of State: Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States: The
Lansing Papers, 1914-1920.
(Hereinafter, The
Lansing Papers), 2 vols.
(Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1939-40.)
2:325-6.

I

--

---------- - - - - - - - - - - - -

-167-

Chapter II
1.

Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, Lansing Papers
2:326. Lansing was adamant in his view that the
Russian front should be kept open. In his cover
letter transmitting Francis' telegram, Lansing
stated that the socialist policy of no annexations or indemnities would, if adopted, "remove
the chief incentive" for a Russian offensive.
Further it "may cost this country millions of men
if this movement for a separate peace cannot be
checked."

2.

New York Times, 7 April 1917, p. 11:2.

3.

Kennan Diary, entry of April 9, 1917, George
Kennan Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, quoted in Christopher Lasch, American
Liberals and the Russian Revolution, (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 42, Note .50.

4.

House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92118.
It is probable that House had yet to
hear of Straus' suggestion.

5.

Flint, p. 233.
letter.

6.

Williams, passim and particularly page 86, Note 138.
House stated that he feared Russia would either
be "knocked or bargained" out of the war.

7.

House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92118-9.

8.

Lansing to Francis, 16 May 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, 1:109.

9.

Wilson to McCormick, 27 April 1917, Ray Stannard
Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 9 vols.
Cr~w York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.,)

Flint does riot give the date of

7:38
.
.. r
10.

Wilson to Mrs. Corine Chatman Catt, 9 May 1917,
WiI:son MSS, Reel 195/64B/6; Daniels, Wilson Era,
2:59; Baker 7:42.

11.

Miles to sununers, 18 June 1917, State Department
Records· 763.72/7487/0041-2.

I

-- ----------------------------------

-168-

12.

Elihu Root; America's Message to the Russian
People: Addresses by the Members of the Special
Mission of the United States to Russia in the
Year 1917, (Boston: Marshall Jones, 1918), p.p.
11-127.

13.

Lansing to Francis, 14 April 1917, U.S.F.R.,
1918: Russia, 1:107.

14.

Francis to Lansing, 19 April 1917, Ibid.

15.

Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/3800~; House to Wilson,
10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box, Box 87/92118-~.
Oscar Straus, a former Secretary of Commerce
and Labor, Edward N. Hurley, a former Chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, and Henry
Morgenthau, a former American Ambassador to
Turkey, were also mentioned as possible members
of the American Commission. The New York Times,
25 April 1917, 8:2. Straus and Morgenthau were
suggested by Colonel House,. House to Wilson,
undated, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92241.

16.

Lansing to Wilson, 12 April 1917, Lansing Papers,
p.p. 326-7.

17.

Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, Lansing Papers,
p. 326.

18.

Wilson to Lansing, 19 April 1917, Lansing Papers,
p. 327. Wilson's letter listed these four plus
Root, Eugene Meyer of New York, and John F.
Stevens of New York. Meyer was originally invited
to join the Mission but the invitation was later
withdrawn. See, infra, pages 24-26 and Stevens
was later named to head a separate Railroad
commission.

19.

Basil Mathews, John R. Mott: World Citizen (New
York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1934) is
tqe best source for information on the life of
John R. Mott.

20.

Suprisingly no further information on Samuel
Reading Bertron is available in any of my sources.

21.

Williams, p. 86.

-169-

22.

House to Wilson, undated, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92241. House's cable was probably sent
around April 11.
·

23.

The New York Times, 21 April 1917, 1:4.

24.

Daniels, Wilson Era, 2:57-8.

25.

Louis W. Koenig, Bryan: A Political Biographv
of Wilson Jennings Bryan.
(New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1971), p.p. 540-551.

26.

Ibid.

27.

Daniels, Wilson Era, 2:135.

28.

Koenig, p.p. 549-551.

29.

Henry B. Fine to Wilson, undated, Wilson MSS,
Box 87/93048-9. Fine's letter was probably sent
between May 10 and May 12.

30.

Philip c. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols., (New York:
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), 2:336-358. A
particularly amusing recorcunendation for Roosevelt
was that of Mr •. H. M. Robertson, President of the
Alabama Home Building and Loan Association, who
wrote the President that, "Next to the submarine
nothing troubles us here in Alabama as much as
the situation in Russia. And a thought comes to
me with such force that I wish to express it to
you. Who could deal with the multitude over there
like the Honorable Theodore Rossevelt'?" Further,
in Russia, Roosevelt would be of "a thousand times
more value to us than leading an Army in France.
H. M. Robertson to Wilson, 8 May 1917, Wilson MSS,
Reel 195/64B/42336.

31.

Wilson to Henry B. Fine, 14 May 1917, Wilson
MSS, Box 87/93050.

32.

House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Box 87/92118-9.

33.

Jessup, 1:

34.

Wilson to Mrs. Crawford H. Toy, 31 January 1915,
Baker, 5:126-7.

35.

The New York Times, 10 April 1917, 3:2.

I

p. 570.

-170-

36.

Daniels, Wilson Era, 2:57-8.

37.

Ibid., 2:47. Daniels reported that Wilson responded
with his theme that questions of party should not
enter into the question. This was, of course, not
what Daniels was concerned with .

.38.

Wilson to Lansing, 19 April 1917, Lansing Papers,
p. 327.

39.

The New York Times, 21 April 1917, 1:4.

40.

Lansing, Memoirs, p. 334.

41.

Baker, 7:37.

42.

The New York Times, 28 April 1917, 1:4.

43.

Daniels, Wilson Era, 1:437

44.

T. Bentley Mott, Twenty Years as Military Attache,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 205.

45.

House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92118-9.

46.

Flint, p. 234.

47.

Wilson to Mrs. Corrin Chapman Catt, 9 May 1917,
Wilson MSS, Reel 195/64 B/6: Baker 7:42: Wilson
to Rabbi Stephen s. Wise, 28 April 1917, Baker,
7:59: both in Daniels, Wilson Era, 2:59.

48.

Daniels, Wilson Era, 2:59.

49.

Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917 and 19 April 1917,
Lansing Papers, p.p. 326-7.

50.

Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, Lansing Papers,
p. 326.

51.

Ibid.

52.

House to Wilson, 20 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92466-7.

I

I

---------------------------- ----

-171-

53.

Wilson to Lansing, 19 April 1917, Lansing Papers,
p. 327. This was probably Frederick William
Lehman who would appear to.have been Gompers first
replacement. He had some political and financial
connections with the Wilson Administration, had
been born in Germany, and was very probably
Jewish. Due to this latter factor he was probably
"uninvited." Daniels mentions Lehman's inclusion
in Wilson Era, 2:58.

54.

The New York Times, 28 April 1917, 1:4.

55.

James Duncan to Wilson, 7 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4524~/0641.

56.

House to Wilson, 20 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92466-7.

57.

Lansing to Wilson, 19 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel
383/5A/476. Lansing claimed that he did not
understand what Choate•s friends meant by this.

58.

William Kent (U.S. Tariff Commissioner) to Wilson,
3 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92729; Senator
Paul O. Busting to Wilson, Wilson MSS, Box 87/
92920-22, 9 May .1917.

59.

Root to Lansing, 3 May 1917, State Department
Records 763.72/4524~.

60.

Lansing to Wilson, 7 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel
383/5A/534-6, including Polk's memo on 535-6;
Walling to Wilson, 10 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92954.

61.

A. M. Simons to Senator Husting, 3 May 1917, Wilson
MSS, Box 87/92923.

62.

Charles E. Russell et al, "The Socialists and the
War, 11 The New Republic, 10 (31 March 1917), p.p.
262-263 cited in Charles E. Russell, Bare Hands
and Stone Walls, (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1933.), p. 293. Other American socialists
signing this article included Walling, J. G.
Phelps Stokes, W. J. Ghent, Upton Sinclair, Mrs.
Jack London, and George Sterling. Charles Russell
had been very specific in his views here. He
believed that a German victory would establish
that treaties have no validity, small nations had

-172-

no rights that large ones were bound to respect,
and a nation could opt for.war instead of arbitration and "still suffer nothing in the estimation of rninkind."
63.

Russell, Bare Hands, p. 294.

64.

Lansing to Wilson, 3 May 1917, State Department
Records, 763.72/4525.

65.

A. M. Simons to Senator Busting, 4 May 1917, Wilson
MSS, Box 87/92923.

66.

Wilson to Creel, 14 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel
195/64B/42356; Creel to Wilson, 10 May 1917, Reel
195/64B/42399.

67.

Kennan, 1:48. Kennan points out that Bullard did
not care for the "limelight". It is thus open to
question whether he would have accepted a position
with the Root Mission. He did, however, accept
the position of propaganda director in Petrograd.
Washburn also appears to have been a good choice
but need not have preempted Bullard.

68.

Taylor Stults, "George Kennan: Russian Specialist
of the 1890s," The Russian Review 3(July, 1970):
275-285.

69.

Root to Lansing, 3 May 1917, State Department
Records, 763.72/4524~.

70.

Lansing to Wilson, 3 May 1917, State Department
Records, 763.72/4524~.

71.

House to Wilson, undated, Wilson MSS, Box 87/92241.
House suggested Henry Morganthau and Oscar Straus.

72.

Lansing to Wilson, 18 April 1917, Lansing Papers
2:237.

73.

Lansing to Wilson, 30 April 1917, Wilson MSS,
Box 87/92680-1.

74.

Francis to Lansing, 3
Records, 763.72/4525.
that the inclusion of
would be acceptable.
1917, U.S.F.R., 1917:

May 1917, State Department
Francis had earlier stated
a Jewish representative
Francis to Lansing, 19 April
Russia, 1:107.

r-- . ---·---------··- ·····-------173-

75.

House to Wison, 2 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box 87/
92728.

76.

Lansing to Wilson, 3 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92782.

77.

Ibid.

78.

Reuben Fink to Tumulty, 26 May 1917, Wilson MSS,
Reel 195/64B/42367.

79.

Tumulty to Wilson, 30 May 1917: Judge Aron Levy
to Tumulty, 29 May 1917, both Wilson MSS, Reel
195/64B/42367.

80.

The New York Times, 30 May 1917, 3:8.

81.

Eliot Wadsworth to Wilson, 7 May 1917, Wilson MSS,
Reel 195/64B/42331.

82.

Samuel R. Bertron to William Phillips (Third
Assistant Secretary of State), 8 May 1917, State
Department Records, 763.72/5143/0004-5.

83.

I have found nothing relating to the reason for
Root's objection and do not feel qualified to
speculate on it. Root had been a member of the
International Relief Board of the Red Cross,
Jessup, 2:314.

84.

State Department Records, 763.72, passim.

85.

McAdoo to Wilson, 17 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92368.

86.

Jessup,
2:38. General Scott did, however,
accompany the American Army to France after the
completion of the Root Mission.

87.

Daniels to Wilson, 10 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/92368.

88.

Ibid. Daniels told the President that Glennon
had been picked because a senior Admiral could
not be named "in view of the high rank of the
army conunissioner." This was not to demean
Glennon in any way. Daniels held him in the highest
admiration.

I

-------- - -------------------------------------------------------

-174-

89.

Kennan, 1:41.

90.

Burlison to Wilson, 2 May 1917, Wilson MSS, Reel
195/64B/42318-9.

91.

Mott, p. 191.

92.

Washburn had apparently been ill and for some
week Mr. Willoughby Smith, who had been
recommended by Ambassador Francis, appeared to
have the position. An unknown Mr. Burr was also
in contention for this position but he was charged
with pro-German sympathies by the Provisional_
Government and appears to have been forced to
leave Russia.
I can find no references to this
episode other than Lansing to Washburn, 12 May
1917 and 21 May 1917, State Department Records,
763.72/4617 and 4856h respectively and Francis to
Lansing, 20 June 1917, State Department Records,
763.72/5452.

93.

The best source of information on Basil Miles is
George Kennan's Russia Leaves the War.

94.

Lansing to Francis, 14 May 1917, 16 May 1917, and
22 May 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/4609,
4697, and 4792 respectively.

95.

Mott, p. 192.

96.

The log of the Root Mission Elihu Root Papers,
(Hereinafter, The Log, Root MSS), Library of
Congress, Washington, D. c. Container #28.

97.

See N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World
Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.),
Arthur s. Liuk, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look At
His Major Foreign Policies.
(Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1957.), and Charles Seymour,
American Diplomacy During the World War.
(Handen,
Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964.) Among others
give insights into the relationship between
President Wilson and Secretary Lansing. This
relationship was of course too complete to be
analyzed hereon.

-175-

Chapter III
1.

The New York Times, 28 April 1917, El2:1; Jessu2,
2:354.

2.

The New York Times, 2 May 1917, 1:4.

3.

Ibid.

4.

Ibid., 4 May 1917, C7:3,4; Warth, p. 99.

5.

Wise to Wilson, 24 April 1917, Wilson MSS, Box
87/192532-4.

6.

In fact, though unfortunately, this might well have
been an advantage if it was significant at all.

7.

The New York Times, 4 May 1917, 7:4.

8.

Lansing to Wilson, 28 April 1917, Wilson MSS,
Reel 195/64B/42307.

9.

The New York Times, 3 May 1917, 7:1-3.

I

3 May 1917, 7:1,2,3.

10.

Ibid., 2 May 1917, 9:4.

11.

Ibid., 3 May 1917, 7:2-3.

12.

State Department Records, 763.72/16649/9.

13.

See The New York Times, 3 May 1917, 14:1 for an
editorial attacking these papers and the threats
of the disloyal socialists.

14.

Ibid., 28 April 1917, 2:3.

15.

I have found no record of a direct counter-attack
by the Administration at this time.

16.

The New York Times, 18 May 1917, 6:5, quoting the

17.

Ibid., 19 May 1917, 3:4-6.

18.

Ibid., 16 May 1917, 2:8.

19.

Ibid., 4 May 1917, 7:3-4. Wallings charges, which
appear in full form in the Boston Globe of May 3,
were striking in nature. He noted that at one
point Hillquit and Berger had been suggested as

I

- - ------------------------- ---------- - -- - - - - - - - - - -

-176-

possible members of the Root Mission. Walling
responded to this idea by asking "Why not ask
Bernstorff (the German For~ign Minister} to
represent us?" A copy of this article can be
found in State Department Records, 763.72/4524~.
20.

The New York Times, 4 May 1917, 7:3-4.

21.

Ibid., 20 May 1917, II, 2:2.

22.

Ibid., 10 May 1917, 8:4.

23.

Ibid., 20 May 1917, II, 2:2

24.

Lansing, Memoirs, p. 334.

25.

The New York Times, 21 April 1917, 1:4.

26.

Root to Lansing, 6 May 1917, Lansing Papers,
2:329.

27.

Lansing to Wilson, 7 May 1917, Lansing Papers,
2:329.

28.

Wilson to Lansing, 7 May 1917, Lansing Papers,
2:331.

29.

Root's biographer, Philip C. Jessup, suggests
that Lansing's response regarding the Railroad
Commission caused Root to suspect that Wilson
didn't consider the Root Mission to be of much
importance. Jessup, 2:359.

30.

Flint, p. 234

31.

Ibid.

32.

Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, Lansing Papers,
2:326. See, supra, p. 23.

33.

The New York Times, April-May, 1917, passim.

34.

Stone to Root, 15 May 1917, State Department
Records, 763/72/4674~/0652. References to
Boynton's activities appear in The New York Times
on March 19, July 21 and August 8, 1917.

-177-

35.

Root to Lansing, 3 May 1917, State Department
Records, 763.72/4524~/0097-8. Further, someone,
probably Francis, cabled Washington to point
out that some of the Russian refugges returning
from America were planning to attack Root upon
his arrival in Vladivostok and use Pouren and
Rudewitz as their primary weapons. Root did
not see this cable which didn't reach Washington
until June 9. Unsigned cable to Lansing, Received
9 June 1917, State Department Records, 763.72/
5239/0343.

36.

Root to Mrs. Root, 19 May 1917, cited in Jessup>
2:360.

37.

Jessup, 2:360

38.

Ibid.

39.

The content of Harper's briefing is unknown.
It
probably consisted of his original interpretation
modified by Francis' cables and various newspaper
reports and was thus undoubtedly less optimistic
than his view of March, 1917.

40.

Root to Lansing, 18 May 1917; State Department
Records, 763.72/4749.

41.

The Long, Root MSS.

43.

Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia
to· the Secretary of State, (hereinafter, The Report),
Root MSS, The Library of Congress, Washington, D. c.,
Container #28; U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia, 1:131-146,
p. 131: Warth, p. 84.

44.

This phrase was that adopted by the Zimmerwald
Conference of 1915. Which was a conference for
European Internationalists opposed to the war.
Austin Van Der Slice.
International Labor,
Diplomacy and Peace: 1914-1919.
(Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941.).

45.

Liebman, p. 147.

46.

Ibid., p.p. 148-9.

-17847.

Ibid., p. 148.

48.

The Provisional Government,. despite its public
concessions to the socialist viewpoint, was
itself committed to an offensive, as was a
majority of the Soviet if only to gain a stronger
position with the allies after the war. Ibid.,
149-50.

49.

The "Executive Committee" appears, from Duncan's
account to have been a committee made up of
various groups, including, but not confined to,
the Vladivostok Soviet. James Duncan, "Labor
Features: Russian Revolution 1917." The Address
of Convention at Buffalo, New York.
(Publisher
unknown, 1 91 7) •

50.

The Log, Root MSS.

51.

Ibid.

52.

Russell, Bare Hands, p. 360.

I

------------- ------------ ---------------------

-179-

Chapter IV
1.

The Log, Root MSS.

2.

It is probable that there were some objections
to the fact that the American Mission was using
the Tsar's train, although I have found no
documentary evidence it. The Americans use of
the train was, however, most probably unwise from
a public relations standpoint.

3.

Root to Lansing, 5 June 1917, State Department
Records, 763.72/5234/0111.

4.

The Log,

5.

Ibid.

6.

Ibid.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Jessup, 2:361.

9.

The Log of the Mission dates the American arrival
as June 12: all other sources, including the
Report of the Root Mission, date their arrival as
June 13.

10.

"Root Appendix to The Report of the Root Mission,
Root MSS, Container #28.

11.

See particularly, Francis to Lansing, 18 March
1917, U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia., p. 5. The major
incidents of violence had been confined to the
March Revolution, the demonstrations against
Milyukov and Guchkov and the July revolt of the
Bolsheviks.

12.

Dmitri Fedotoff-White, Survival Through War and
Revolution in Russia, (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1939), p. 138. FedotoffWhite characterizes all references prior to page
141 as having been taken directly from his diary.
All material presented thereafter was written
after the fact. Many of Fedotoff-White's
characterizations of Root Mission members are
extremely critical because, according to their
author, he did not understand American behavior
at the time. Many of these descriptions are

Root MSS.

11

1 ··------------

-180-

presented here in order to give some type of
insight into people about whom little was
written. They represent only White's opinion
in 1917.
13.

The Log, Root MSS.

14.

Fedotoff-White, p. 143.

15.

Ibid.

16.

Root, America's Message.

17.

Fedotoff-White, p. 144.

18.

Ibid., p. 146.

19.

Ibid., p.p. 145-6.

20.

Again, this fact appears to have had a profound
and misleading impact on most American observers.

21.

The Log, Root MSS.

22.

Ibid. Ambassador Buchanan did not record this
meeting in his memoirs.

23.

Ibid.

24.

Root to Lansing, 18 June 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, 1:118. For full text see Root, America's
Message.

25.

Root to Lansing, 18 June 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, 1:118.

26.

Ibid.

27.

The New York Times, 19 June 1917, 2:4. The
reporter was not identified by the Times.
Herbert Bailey was mentioned as being in Petrograd
for the Times during this period. The President
received a copy of this article on May 21.
Tumulty to Wilson, 21 May 1917, Box 88/3/93271-9.

28.

Lansing to Francis, "For Root, 11 27 June 1917,
U.S.F.R., Russia: 1918, p. 127.

29.

See infra, p. 92.

-181-

30.

N. Gordon Levin's, Woodrow Wilson and World
Politics: American Responses to War and
Revolution provides an excellent analysis of the
almost blind optimism of President Wilson and
some members of his administration, particularly
Colonel House, in regards to Russia. Many months
after the November Revolution, House was still
convinced that the Bolsheviks were a temporary
phenomenon and that the "liberal-nationalist"
forces would regain power in Russia. Wilson
appears to have shared this view.

31.

The Log, Root MSS; Mott, p. 203.

32.

Root to Lansing, 17 June 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, 1:120-22.

33.

Fedotoff-White, p. 144. This appraisal appears
to have been exaggerated. Root, Dr. Mott, Russell,
Duncan, and Bertron seem to have been very concerned but still optimistic. General Scott was
pessimistic (see infra, p. 111). The
views of McCormick, Crane, and Admiral Glennon
are unknown at this point in time.

34.

Liebman, p. 149: Alexander Kerensky, The
Catastrophe, (New York and London: D. Appleton
and Company, 1927) is Kerensky's account of his
aims, efforts and appraisal of the situation.
See particularly pages 133-174.

35.

Root to Lansing, 17 June 1917, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, 1:120-22. The publicity campaign is
variously referred to as an educational, publicity
and propaganda campaign by various primary and
secondary sources. The Supplementary Report of
The Root Mission refers to the plan as an
"educational Campaign." Supplementary Report
of the Diplomatic Mission to Russia to the
Secretary of State, undated, U.S.F.R., 1918:
Russia, 1:147-150.

36.

Charles Edward Russell MSS, The Library of
Congress, Washington, D. c. (hereinafter Russell
MSS). Russell made several notebooks or "diaries"
of his activities while in Russia which may be
found in Container #B.
(Hereinafter, "Russian
notebooks, Russell MSS").

-182-

37.

The Log, Root MSS.

38.

Root, America's Message, passim.

39.

I have been unable to locate private papers of
either Mr. McCormick or Mr. Bertron .

.40.

McAdoo to Wilson, 16 May 1917, McAdoo to Francis,
17 May 1917, both Wilson MSS, Box 88/93130-3.

41.

The Report, Root MSS, Container #28. The
appended report on Russia's financial needs was
not reprinted in the U.S.F.R. series.

42.

Fedotoff-White, p.p. 139-40.

43.

The Report, Root MSS; U.S.F.R., 1918: Russia,
1:146. Bertron was one of the contributors
to the $30,000 which the Root Mission used to
begin their short-lived publicity campaign. The
Log, Root MSS.

44.

Fedotoff-White, p. 140.

45.

The Long, Root MSS. The Log makes little mention
of either Bertron or McCormick. It is nevertheless implied by ·this document that Bertron spent
much of his time assisting Root and working on
publicity matters.

46.

Albert Parry, "Charles R. Crane: Friend of Russia, 11
The Russian Review, 6 (Spring, 1947): 20-36, p. 20.

47.

Ibid.

48.

Ibid., p. 21

49.

Interview with Mr. Peter Martinj Director,
Institute of Current World Affairs, Hanover, New
Hampshire, November, 1979.

50.

Parry, p. 28.

51.

Senator LaFollette contended that he had sent
Steffens to expose the Root Mission.
Both Parry
and Steffens contend that it was Crane who asked
Steffens to go at a chance meeting shortly before
Crane's departure. Lafollette•s contention
appeared in The New York Times, 21 April 1917, 1:4.

-183-

Sec E.."u:l:.y. p. 28 and Lincoln Stc!fcna. Autobioor.:1phy.
Wcw York: Harcourt. Brace. 1931.).
p. 740 respectively for Crane and Stcffcn'o
explanations.
52.

Ste!fena.

53.

The Nev York Ttrnc~. 21 Apr1l 1917. 2:1: Daniels,
D1ar_y. p. 57. At a cabinet rncctinCJ aomcwhat prior
to the selection of A.~bassndor Root the Prooidont
told cabinet members that Crane "Knew well the
leadinQ sp1r1ts and said they were men of ability,
and had the conf1dencc of Run:tiil." T•tkcn 1n 1tn
context this statc:ncnl. implied that W1l!lon had
trcrncndoun conficcncc in Crane's knowlcdQC of
Russia and that he was one. 1f not the man upon
whom the President relied for an undcrntand1nQ of
that nat1on.

54.

The LOQ. Root MSS.

SS.

Charles R. Crane to Richard T. Crnnc. 14 Mny 191-.
Wilson MSS, Reel 383/5A/544.

56.

Fcdotof(-fthitc, p. 140.

57.

Steffens, out9b199r~phY, p. 764. I have found no
such cables fr~ Crane. rranc1a. or Kcrcnn~y
wh1ch ~~kc this ~pcc1fic point. There arc to =ay
knovlcdQc no cable fro~ Crane to W1lnon or Lana1nq
after May ar.d understandably no c::.blcn fro~ Kcrcnnky
at al 1.

SS.

Ib1d •• p. 765.

59.

J.£..\d •• p.p. 770-772. The letters !roo Crane and
Franc1s arc not 1r.cludcd 1n tho ftoodrow ftllson
HSS or to ~.ay kr.owlcc9c any other source.

60.

Dnn1cl5, D13rY. p. 57

61.

Ch.lrlcn
li4.

?-.:...r_r_r. p. 30, quot1no the
2~ ~cptc=.0.Cr

:.;_o_~:

p. 746.

Sc;~ur, b-~l>Y Putlna th2
~orld W~[.
(Ha7~cn. Conn.: Archon DO<JY.tl, 1964.),

p.
62.

outobiQ(]r~phY.

1917.

rus. ~u:o

.PiUl<,!i" !icv,a:

the !r.l~c nu:-:b~r 1n !ootr.otc- r.u:::ber 63 1n an
approx17.at1on. All other in!or~4t1on pcrta1n1nQ
to thin r.otc 1~ exact.

-184Chapter V
1.

"Mott Appendix" to The Report of The Root
Mission, Root MSS, Container #28, p. 1.

2.

Mathews, p. 247.

3.

Galen Fisher, John R. Mott. Architect of Cooperation and Unity.
(New York: Association
Press, 1952), p. 28.

4.

Mott Appendix, Root MSS, p. 2.

5.

Charles R. Crane to Richard T. Crane, 14 May
1917, Wilson MSS, Reel 383/SA/544.

6.

Mott Appendix, Root MSS, p. 3.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Ibid.

9.

Mathews, p.p. 249-51.

10.

Harper, Memoirs, p. 102.

11.

Mott Appendix, Root MSS, p. 4.

12.

Ibid. According to Mathews the Y.M.C.A. had
been highly successful in Britian and France
working with both the regular armies and in
prison camps. Mathews, p. 248.

13.

Fisher, p. 158. I do not have a copy of this letter,
nor know to whom it was sent. Fisher dates it
as June 27, 1917.

14.

It was very unfortunate that the Orthodox Church
had apparently been closely connected, through
his appointments of Bishops, with Rasputin. This
undoubtedly tainted the Church and in all
probability caused it to lose favor with the masses.
Charles Crane to Richard Crance, 14 May 1917,
Wilson MSS, Reel 383/SA/544.

15.

This is another example of the inability of most
members of the Root Mission to reach the masses,
usually because they were not given the opportunity.

16.

Fisher,

p. 30.

, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-185-

17.

Fedotoff-White, p. 139.

18.

"Conference of June 18, (with General Manikovsky)",
Scott Report, Russell MSS, Container #36, p. 31.

19.

Ibid.

20.

"Scott Appendix" to the Report of the Root Mission,
Root MSS, Containers #28, p. 1.

21.

Andrews to Lansing, 7 July 1917, State Department
Records, 763.72/6109. Andrews was not informed of
the impending arrival of the Scott party until
the evening before its arrival. He was obviously
taken by surprise by this visit and so noted in
his cable.

22.

Mott, p. 200.

23.

Andrews to Lansing, 7 July 1917, State Department
Records, 763.72/6109.

24.

Mott, p. 200.

25.

"Russia", undated in the General Hugh L. Scott
MSS, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

26.

Scott Report, Russell MSS, Container #36, p. 1.

27.

Ibid.

28.

Ibid., p. 2.

29.

Ibid., p. 3.

30.

The Log, Root MSS.

31.

Fedotoff-White, p. 148.

32.

Ibid., p. 149.

33.

Glennon Report, Russell MSS, Container #36;
Fedotoff-White, p. 150.

34.

Fedotoff-White, p. 154.

36.

Glennon Report, Russell MSS: Fedotoff-White, p.
157.
\

-186-

37.

Fedotoff-White, p. 158.

38.

Ibid., p. 160.

39.

Ibid., p. 161.

40.

Ibid., p. 164.

-187-

C@pter VI
1.

Fedotoff-White. p. 139.

2.

Mott, p. 195, Note tH.

3.

Duncan. "Labor Features". p.p. 13-14.

4.

Ibid., p.p. 18-19.

S.

Ibid •• p. 31.

6.

The Stockhold Conference was an international
meeting of socialists, predominantly of the antiwar factions, and generally conotdcrcd a forum
for the ''internationalists". The majority of
Allied gover~~ents. including the United States,
opposed the Stockholm Conference fearing that
it would hinder efforts to insure the defeat of
Germany. Sec particularly V~n D.QX Sllc~, p.lssim.

7.

Duncan Report, Root HSS, p. 5.

8•

l.l:U.sl..

9.

Ibid.

11.

Dunc<in Report, Root HSS, p. S.

12.

Ib1d.

13.

Ibid.

14.

Ja::::es Duncan, a labor le<ider o! 110::-:c pro::tlnencc
appears to have been surpristnqly naive both from
the test of his message to the ;~cr1can Federation
of Labor Convcr.tton of 1917 ar.d form the texts of
las Russian sp-cechcs. Did he really understand
what he ~as obscrv1n9 or Y.now anything about
Harx1s::::7 Unfortunately. I h.lve found noth1n9
::-,ore on hl::i.

15.

fcdotoff-ft'M~

16.

Russell, 8ar£ tLar._qn. p. 351. Thin reference is
the only docu~cntary cvtdcncc of this 1nc1dcnt.
Intcrestir.Qly. Ru~scll thouQht Trots;.y was r.-.orc
lir.cablc than Lenin. The A.~crican socialist

p. 13?.

-188-
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